

# Part II

## Tackling Regeneration: The Key Issues

During the course of the evaluation of the Single Regeneration Budget the research team sought to:

- understand more about the nature of the problems in run-down and deprived areas and their causes.
- identify the factors that make for successful regeneration and the scope for policy intervention;
- identify the contribution of the Single Regeneration Budget.

Part One described the specific features of the SRB approach to local area regeneration. These were:

- **Partnership:** Very much the “engine-room” of the SRB approach to regeneration. The argument being that the nature of the regeneration problem often contains diverse and complex features embracing economic, social and physical factors that require all of the relevant partners at the table who have a stake in improving the general well-being of the area concerned. The involvement of other public delivery agents was designed to encourage more **Mainstream Bending** of resources into the deprived areas. Where possible the involvement of community representation was hoped to facilitate more bottom-up responses.
- **Competition:** The argument was that bidding for funding would encourage innovation in regeneration - in essence the players getting their act together. In the context of normal competitive processes this would mean delivering what the market wants. In relation to SRB it meant achieving a regeneration package and the associated outputs and capacity building that met the requirements of the Government Offices for the Regions as the main delivery agents for the Government of the system in the first four rounds. Inevitably a more overt competitive based approach to delivery begged questions as to whether innovation in the regeneration response compromised meeting need.
- **“Hands-Off” Management:** Local partnerships have been responsible for the management of their regeneration schemes on the basis of guidance provided by the Government Offices and periodic performance review in the early rounds, and the Regional Development Agencies in the last two rounds.
- **Flexibility:** The SRB programme enabled regeneration patterns to build regeneration schemes that could vary considerably according to their **size, geography (no formal boundaries and any area in England could apply), duration, theme and objective**. It was possible under SRB to secure funding for **Thematic bids** as well as more **Holistic bids**.

Part One also assessed whether the allocation of SRB funding had been in line with need as proxied by the Index of Local Deprivation. The Interim Evaluation of SRB produced by the SRB evaluation team commented extensively on issues relating to delivery and this will not be repeated in this Report. This part of the Report concentrates on presenting evaluation findings relating to:

- partnership working (chapter 4);
- the community and voluntary sector involvement in partnership working (chapter 5);
- the private sector in partnership working (chapter 6);
- thematic working (chapter 7);
- mainstream bending and the role of area based initiatives (chapter 8);
- scheme outputs, additionality and value for money (chapter 9)
- joined-up regeneration (chapter 10).

## 4. Features associated with attainment of good partnership working: further case study evidence

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Partnership working has been central to the SRB approach to achieving local area-based regeneration. Throughout the evaluation it has been important to quantify more precisely how a partnership-based approach has been able to improve regeneration outcomes relative to other delivery mechanisms. The evidence points to significant benefits from partnership-based delivery and, moreover, the benefits have been increasing through time as regeneration partnerships have become better established.

Benefits in relation to specialization, avoidance of duplication and the adoption of common objectives have been particularly noticeable. Further case study evidence is discussed that reinforces the view that relative success in partnership working is not associated systematically with size, duration or theme. Rather, it is more to do with how the partnership actually functions, its structure, systems and the trust, confidence and goodwill that exists between its members. The extent to which the case study partnerships formed the basis for new regeneration initiatives post SRB is examined.

### 4.1 The importance of partnership working

- 4.1.1 A central feature of the SRB approach to regeneration has been the emphasis on partnership working whereby interested parties come together at the local level to produce a regeneration scheme. The objective has been to tackle multiple deprivation in targeted areas of need and thus to work across traditional mainstream delivery programmes. The establishment of Government Offices for the Regions in 1994 helped to facilitate this and locally-based SRB partnerships have been able to operate with the delivery organisations of mainstream departments, principally local authorities and for much of the period Training and Enterprise Councils, as well as other agencies such as the police and health authorities. It has been a feature from the outset that the number and the range of partners represented in the partnership could vary considerably and that the lead partner could be from the public, private or voluntary sector.
- 4.1.2 The partnership model was clearly not unique to SRB. It was a strong feature of City Challenge and had been an embodied feature of EU Structural Fund delivery for many years, although the precise format of partnership working had varied considerably. However, at the time of the introduction of SRB evaluation, evidence as to the benefits arising from partnership-based delivery was largely qualitative. This evidence was consistent with the view that partnership effects were generally positive, but little else was known. The belief in the value of the partnership approach arose largely from the view that partnership working was a 'good thing' on conceptual grounds rather than from any robust empirical analysis. At the beginning of the National Evaluation of SRB a study was made of the main aspects of partnership working that had been identified in the literature as offering potential benefits to regeneration. The following stood-out as being the principal mechanisms by which benefits might arise:

- The ability of the partnership approach to enhance the overall resources available for regeneration by drawing in a proportion of funding from some or all of the partners, including the private sector;
- The opportunity to achieve economies of scale in clustering regeneration projects/ programmes within a local area and thereby securing economies in project management, financial planning and control, recruitment, purchasing etc;
- Synergy effects whereby partners modify their own activities to bring them more into line with objectives of the partnership as a whole and provide supporting activities to enhance partnership achievements;
- Co-ordination effects that may enable the avoidance of duplication of activity, permit large scale indivisible projects to go ahead and allow partners to specialise in areas of expertise/projects in which they have comparative advantage;
- Externality effects whereby the integrated partnership approach leads to a clustering of regeneration activities that achieve a critical mass, improve the image of the area and attract new activity both to itself and surrounding areas.

4.1.3 A central component of the National Evaluation of SRB has been to try and quantify more precisely how a partnership-based approach has been able to improve regeneration outcomes in terms of the size, quality and duration of impacts and the cost effectiveness with which such outcomes have been achieved. It has thus been an objective of the evaluation to identify the key features of partnership working that are associated with relative success. During the evaluation partnership-based issues were assessed by examining 20 case study partnerships over an eight year period to establish the views of partners as to how partnership working may have enhanced local area-based regeneration benefits.

4.1.4 The benefits from partnership working have been examined in the case study partnerships at different points in time to help to understand not only the type of benefits that might arise but also how partners perceive them to have changed over the lifetime of the partnership and thus the general life-cycle of partnership evolution. At the time of the interim evaluation, broadly two to three years into the lifetime of the regeneration schemes, partners were asked to identify whether they believed regeneration benefits were higher than if regeneration had been delivered through a non-partnership-based approach. The partnership members were asked for their view as to whether the effect of each partnership mechanism was 'zero or negative'. The objective was to establish a 'baseline' perception from amongst the partners indicating the strength of partnership working and what key mechanisms were believed to be capable of adding to the regeneration product. To see how these partnership working effects have changed from this 'baseline' point the position at the final evaluation stage was also examined.

4.1.5 The evidence indicated that at the baseline position, depending on the key mechanism considered, somewhere between a third and a half of the 20 case study partnership respondents believed there was 'zero or negative' benefits from the SRB partnership-based model of delivery relative to the non-partnership approach. (See Table 4.1 below).

4.1.6 However, by the time of the final evaluation the position had changed quite considerably. With perhaps the exception of the generation of interest in neighbouring areas virtually all partnership mechanisms were felt to be contributing something to the regeneration product relative to the alternative position. It was of particular interest to note relative improvement in the avoidance of duplication,

indivisibility, scale and critical mass elements. By the time of the final position virtually all case study partnerships had recorded something more than negligible benefits associated with a better division of labour in regeneration delivery (partnership mechanism 3 in Table 4.1).

<b>Table 4.1: Impact of partnership approach on programme benefit: Baseline and Final positions</b>		
<b>Partnership mechanism</b>	<b>Qualitative assessment of impact number of case studies answering: zero or negligible</b>	
	<b>1997</b>	<b>Final</b>
<b>Co-ordination – closer working together of partners</b>		
1. Avoidance of duplication (central point for enquiries, reduced admin costs)	6	0
2. Larger scale activities possible (indivisibility)	7	5
3. Partners specialising in areas of expertise in which they have comparative advantage	4	1
<b>Clustering – geographical clustering of regeneration activities</b>		
4. Scale economies (ability to negotiate lower costs)	12	3
5. Critical mass	10	2
6. Generate interest in neighbouring areas	11	9
<b>Synergy – adoption of common objectives by partners</b>		
7. Adopt common objectives within the partnership	7	5
8. Carrying out other initiatives to support partnership objectives or “bending” main programmes in favour of partnership objectives	7	6

Source: Department of Land Economy Survey of Case Studies

- 4.1.7 Two potential mechanisms by which partnerships might encourage synergy involved partners adopting common objectives and carrying out other initiatives to support partnership objectives, including the bending of main programmes. In one third of case studies any such benefits were seen as negligible at the baseline - reflecting other evidence of tensions at the time between partners and between lead partners and partners. However, the position had improved somewhat by the time of the final evaluation.
- 4.1.8 Table 4.2 describes the view of partnership members regarding the impact of partnership working on the generation of regeneration benefits at the time of the final evaluation using a 1-5 scoring system, where **1=weak, 5=significant**.
- 4.1.9 It is encouraging to note that the evidence points to considerable co-ordination benefits between the partners by the time of the final evaluations. More specifically, all case studies recorded a positive impact on avoidance of duplication, with the most dramatic improvements occurring in Northumbria, Sunderland and Wolverhampton moving from a negligible position at the interim to a strong effect by the final position. Larger scale activities and the pooling of partner expertise also shifted towards larger impacts than previously experienced. Clustering effects, which had the lowest scores at the interim stage, also improved for most partnerships by the end of their schemes. Originally, around half of the partnerships recorded zero or negligible impacts for scale economies and reaching a critical mass. However, both these mechanisms saw shifts towards stronger impacts during the lifetime of the schemes. This was particularly true in terms of achieving a critical mass where seven case studies recorded a strong effect by the final evaluation stage.

<b>Table 4.2: Impact of partnership approach on programme benefit: Final position</b>						
<b>Partnership mechanism</b>	<b>Assessment of Impact Number of case studies scoring:-</b>					
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Co-ordination – closer working together of partners</b>						
1. Avoidance of duplication (central point for enquiries, reduced admin costs)	0	2	8	8	2	20
2. Larger scale activities possible (indivisibility)	5	2	4	6	3	20
3. Partners specialising in areas of expertise in which they have comparative advantage	1	2	5	4	8	20
<b>Clustering – geographical clustering of regeneration activities</b>						
4. Scale economies (ability to negotiate lower costs)	3	4	8	4	1	20
5. Critical mass	2	5	6	6	1	20
6. Generate interest in neighbouring areas	9	1	3	5	2	20
<b>Synergy – adoption of common objectives by partners</b>						
7. Adopt common objectives within the partnership	5	1	5	4	5	20
8. Carrying out other initiatives to support partnership objectives or “bending” main programmes in favour of partnership objectives	6	2	5	5	2	20

Source: Department of Land Economy Survey of Case Studies

## 4.2 Features associated with the attainment of good partnership working; evidence from the evaluation of recent case studies

4.2.1 The evaluation of the SRB case studies at the final evaluation stage has enabled a more extensive analysis of the benefits of the partnership approach than was possible at the interim stage because initial teething difficulties and a range of project related problems had settled down. In the Mid Term Evaluation Report the researchers presented evidence from ten of the case study partnerships that had reached the final evaluation stage. Results from the remaining ten case study areas can now be considered.

### *Bristol 2020*

4.2.2 The Bristol Regeneration Partnership (BRP) was established initially as an informal association in 1995, with accountable body functions provided by Bristol City Council. In 1998/99, the partnership moved to a more formal structure - an Industrial and Provident Society, set up under the IPS Societies Act of 1965 and influenced by Bristol City Council. Bristol City Council has continued to play the role of accountable body. Membership in 2002 comprised Avon Health Authority, Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Community At Heart (Barton Hills NDC programme), Department of Work & Pensions (formerly Employment Service), Black Development Agency, Hartcliffe & Withywood Ventures (SRB5 programme), Bristol Chamber of Commerce & Initiative, Learning & Skills Council (formerly WESTEC), Bristol City Council (including specific Education role), South West TUC, Bristol Housing Partnership, University of the West of England, Business Link West/Small Business Service, VOSCUR, City of Bristol College, West of England Coalition for Disabled People.

4.2.3 The IPS structure is most unusual, and possibly unique, in comparison with regeneration partnerships elsewhere in the UK. Our consultations were not able to

reveal why the IPS structure was chosen in preference to the unincorporated association or company limited by guarantee options which are the predominant forms of regeneration partnership elsewhere in the UK. It is thought that the City Council had some direct experience of this model from other activities and had found the IPS model to be beneficial. In their review of the partnership in 2001, Colin Buchanan and Partners and Entente commented on the structure in some detail, noting its peculiarity but observing that, compared with alternative structures, it offered no particular advantages or disadvantages for the SRB management and delivery role which BRP was playing.

- 4.2.4 BRP has bid for and co-ordinated the delivery of over £50 million from successive rounds of SRB funding. From round five onwards, with an increasing focus on community-led approaches to regeneration, it has broadened its membership to include representation from the Hartcliffe & Withywood Community Partnership (the round five scheme) and from the Barton Hills NDC programme. While there is no broader community representation other than this, the area-based SRB schemes have their own local advisory groups. These were established in response to criticism of the remoteness of the BRP from programme activity on the ground.
- 4.2.5 The Hartcliffe & Withywood SRB5 scheme is community-led and managed locally at arms length from BRP. The other SRB schemes have been managed from BRP by a team of five Scheme Co-ordinators, under the direction of an Executive Officer and with support from a Scheme Administrator and administrative support. Funding for this core team has come from a management fee equivalent to 5% of the value of the SRB funding.
- 4.2.6 In terms of the round one Bristol 2020 Scheme, there was some co-ordination of activity from the partners, but this was limited to the childcare and housing activities. Bristol 2020 presented only limited opportunities to cluster projects or to achieve scale economies because of the dispersed and fragmented nature of the programme. The degree of synergy arising from the scheme, or even subsequent rounds of SRB, is very limited. This potential benefit from partnership working has not emerged to the extent that we would have expected for an organisation with such a wide-ranging vision and mission.
- 4.2.7 The BRP is considered to have executed its SRB responsibilities in an effective manner, with great commitment and with all of the benefits that might be expected from a single organisation managing a series of regeneration funding programmes, namely operational efficiency, co-ordination, dissemination of lessons between projects and programmes, targeting, and developing expertise in key processes (notably bid writing, appraisal, monitoring). Moreover, BRP staff, notably the Executive Officer, have played important roles in the development of other regeneration initiatives in the city, including NDC (where they facilitated a conference to allow communities to decide which area should be selected) and the Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy.
- 4.2.8 Following the foundation of the partnership, we found in our interim evaluation that there remained tensions reflecting “prior ownership” of the funding, major differences in how the purpose and benefits of regeneration were perceived by different groups, frustration concerning the ways issues and decisions were tackled, and different perceptions of the roles and commitment of different partners. As time has progressed, and Management Committee processes and relationships have evolved, some of these issues have been resolved, and others (such as the prior ownership of funding) have inevitably diminished with the passage of time. However, the issue of

strategic direction and clarity of purpose have continued to dog the BRP. The BRP has discharged its SRB responsibilities effectively and efficiently against the backdrop of a very broad remit, but without clear strategic direction, and with some continuing confusion over its wider regeneration roles and responsibilities. There have been tensions over whether BRP should be concerned with social and community-oriented regeneration, or economic regeneration or both. While SRB bids have become increasingly well targeted on particular areas or themes, they are in effect mini regeneration strategies developed to attract funding for projects. The lack of an overarching regeneration strategy that would present a definitive statement of the city's regeneration needs and opportunities has perpetuated the emphasis on project delivery rather than strategic planning of services. Moreover, the lack of clarity about purpose, method, roles and responsibilities has allowed tensions to continue.

- 4.2.9 A reasonable question, given the BRP's vision and mission, was why it has not assumed this strategic role. There appear to be two key factors. First, the 5% management fee which has core-funded BRP was insufficient to support these activities. Although the matter has been discussed at a number of management committee meetings, there has been a lack of interest by the partners in funding a more strategic role. Second, strategic planning and real partnership could be argued to require power and existing funding to be shared further, and this may also have limited interest by some partner organisations. Third, the emphasis of SRB, which had been at the heart of BRP's activities, only from round five onwards explicitly focused on mainstream bending and strategic planning issues rather than projects. There was no external impetus until recently to take a more strategic city-wide approach to regeneration.
- 4.2.10 Some additional core funding was provided in cash and kind by the City Council and TEC, and this was used to prepare a "Community Regeneration Framework". This document was launched in September 2001 – six years after the launch of Bristol 2020. It is a scene-setting document that maps the issues and needs across the city, theme by theme, and identifies principles, general aims, and potential actions. While this will undoubtedly be a valuable resource for those developing their own strategies, it is not, itself, a strategic plan with clear resources, targets, and roles and responsibilities.
- 4.2.11 The levels of BRP's fee income for management of the SRB programmes have been diminishing, to the point where they will soon no longer cover staff and other costs. Inevitably, therefore, the last two years has seen BRP trying to review its performance and position itself for the future. The Colin Buchanan and Partners/Entente report referred to above recommended that the BRP should broaden its membership and position itself to take on the responsibilities of the Local Strategic Partnership. This option did not attract the support of the City Council, and it would also seem that the other partner organisations were either unprepared to champion the proposal or unsuccessful in opening the subject up for real debate. Although BRP can point to its success as a delivery agent, some members we spoke to who had played a central role in the partnership expressed reservations about the depth of genuine partnership working and, given BRP's limited strategic role to date, of its ability to assume the role of local strategic partnership. As a result, from April 2003, BRP's remaining SRB responsibilities were taken over by the City Council's regeneration department and BRP ceased to exist.

### *Hull CityVision - Gipsyville*

- 4.2.12 The Hull CityVision Partnership (HCV) was formed in 1995. It emerged from an informal association of public, private and voluntary sector local agencies led by Hull City Council that had met during the previous two years to discuss the changes in UK and European policy on urban regeneration and how they impacted on the future regeneration of Hull. HCV was charged with preparing the first City Regeneration Strategy (CRS) for Hull to act as a strategic framework to bid for additional funding and it provided the context for the first round SRB bid which successfully secured £25 million for a seven year programme. The CRS was linked to seven Geographical Priority Areas of which the Gipsyville was one, and it was on this basis that the following year HCV secured a further £12 million of SRB for improvements to this estate.
- 4.2.13 Originally, HCV consisted of a Steering Group of thirty-five members drawn from public sector, private sector, mainstream players and voluntary sector with an Executive Board of seven drawn from the City Council, University of Hull, private and voluntary sector which met bi monthly. Delivery of the CRS was the responsibility of the Management Team with a staff of thirteen, who managed the SRB programmes and co-ordinated other partnership bids for additional funds. In 1997 the HCV structure changed to incorporate a Stakeholders Group to which fourteen community representatives were appointed and from which two were also elected to the HCV Board. The Board expanded to twelve directors with equal representation from the public, private, voluntary and community sectors. Four Sub-Boards were also created (European, Company Operational Matters, Technical Advisory Group and SRB Steering Groups/Focus Groups). This fourth sub-group had two distinct strands: the SRB Steering Groups dedicated to the strategic management of the SRB schemes, and the Focus Groups, responsible for the socio-economic projects within the SRB schemes.
- 4.2.14 The SRB2 Steering Group had responsibility for the delivery of the physical regeneration, housing renovation and new build projects in Gipsyville. It met on a bi-monthly basis being led by the City Council. It had a membership of twelve drawn from the Joint Venture Company (formed by the City Council and private sector), Housing Associations, Hull City Council and the Focus Groups. The Group continued to oversee the new-build for ownership project as part of the original SRB two scheme which was delayed owing to the depressed housing market in Hull. The Group presided over, what was at that time, an innovative approach to the development of mixed tenure housing within a depressed area and enjoyed a positive working relationship with the HCV Board and Technical Advisory Sub-Board.
- 4.2.15 The Focus Groups were the primary mechanism for the involvement of local community in the management, future development and implementation of the scheme. Originally there were four Focus Groups which met monthly and comprised residents and other community representation, each having a place on the SRB2 Steering Group. However, eventually they were combined into one Focus Group as residents decided to take a more integrated approach, with some fifteen members drawn from residents (majority) community groups, a Community Development Worker and invited project managers. While the Focus Groups provided an opportunity for wide-ranging community discussion, they were restricted to the socio economic SRB projects and some members did comment that they felt unable to influence the larger housing/environmental element of the programme which they believed was dominated by the local authority and private sector. The Groups also had direct links with the Technical Advisory Sub-Board that offered support in the



development of projects and thus enabled the community to participate directly in the SRB scheme.

- 4.2.16 By 1998, the Technical Advisory Sub-Board was given new powers to function as the key committee for the purpose of the SRB programme and had responsibility for all project approval. In the following year the Technical Advisory Board was delegated to deal with the SRB programme on behalf of the Board.
- 4.2.17 While the HCV planning and delivery structures (the Board, Sub-Boards & Management Team) exhibited clear partnership working practices, there was less evidence of this process within the Gipsyville Steering Group and the Focus Group despite being one of the HCV Issue Groups. Those interviewed from the HCV Board and Management Team suggested that the successive rounds of SRB contributed to the overall strategic objectives of the city-wide regeneration strategy in which partners and stakeholders were signed up to clearly defined aims and objectives linked to a common agenda.
- 4.2.18 However, at the level of the SRB two scheme, the Gipsyville Steering Group was mainly geared to meeting the targets of physical regeneration as defined by the City Council and the joint venture company, despite having representations from ward councillors, the SRB Management Team and residents from the Focus Group. According to some residents, the overall objectives of this major element of the scheme had not always coincided with identified community needs and, in any event, had overshadowed the socio-economic activity within SRB2.
- 4.2.19 While residents on the Focus Group (50% membership) presided over the development of socio-economic projects, they felt this was only a small element of the overall SRB scheme that offered limited opportunities for partnership working with key service providers, the private sector and Hull City Council staff in terms of building sustainable development.
- 4.2.20 HCV was successful in securing five rounds of SRB. In addition to the first two rounds it received funding from rounds three, four and six accounting for a total of some £78 million SRB. Delivery of all SRB programmes was carried out by the Management Team which was led by a Regeneration Manager, with each SRB programme having a dedicated programme manager. Partners commented that the overall management of the SRB programmes had worked smoothly and efficiently dealing with any problems as they arose. However, this level of partnership working has not been sustained within the Gipsyville scheme as residents found it difficult to fully represent residents' interests within the Gipsyville Steering Group, though the Focus Group offered greater opportunities for community input and has subsequently evolved into the Gipsyville Forward Residents Group.
- 4.2.21 From its inception the Partnership adopted a strategic approach to fostering partnership working and delivering joined-up regeneration. Its organisational structure has become broader over the past six years with the creation of a Stakeholder Group and Board that have drawn members from the public sector, voluntary organisations, private companies and local communities. Overall partners believe that decisions were made collectively and that this improved over time. There were some concerns, particularly early on, that the partnership was too local authority and private sector dominated, making the voluntary and community sectors sometimes feel excluded. When the Stakeholders Group was created it allowed a greater direct involvement by the community through the SRB Steering Group, Focus Groups and the Board itself. There were some difficulties with this, however, as the Stakeholders Group increased

to around fifty members, which made discussion of issues quite difficult and any consensus elusive. Overall, however, community partners commented that they had noticed an improvement over the lifetime of the scheme and were more included to the Partnership than had been the case in the early days.

- 4.2.22 As the SRB two team was part of the broader HCV operations, linked to developing the City Regeneration Strategy (CRS), it was possible to develop the Gipsyville initiative as part of a programme in which Geographical Priority Areas (GPAs) have been the focus of regeneration activity. SRB two lessons and pilot projects have subsequently been integrated into the CRS with funding from SRB four, SRB six and bids for European Objective three funding, Hull Community Investment Fund, Lottery Fund, New Opportunities funding, Hull Leisure Services and Hull Employment Consortium/DfEE finance. The manager of the Gipsyville Multi-Purpose Centre (GMPC) was commissioned to write the framework for the West Hull PACT for community development and the GMPC is also involved in the West Hull Employment PACT.
- 4.2.23 While the HCV City-wide regeneration strategy (CRS) developed over successive rounds of SRB and proved to be successful for GPAs such as Gipsyville, there has been a continuing need to strengthen partnership working with a range of key initiatives and organisations across Hull. Some initiatives developed under SRB two were transferred to SRB three, SRB four and SRB six.
- 4.2.24 From June 2002 Hull CityVision developed three separate strands that could have consequences for Gipsyville. Hull CityVenture and will develop/monitor socio-economic programmes including the remaining SRB schemes, NDC and European programmes. CityBuild is the Urban Regeneration Company (URC) focusing on urban renaissance linked to the Rogers Report, while HCC, in partnership with other key players, will develop the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) that will work closely with CityVision. However, the degree to which Gipsyville will be able to participate in further regeneration activity will be governed by the ability of community organisations and the community to develop a forward strategy to encourage partnership working with other programmes and mainstream players in meeting locally defined needs.

#### *Regenerating Central Brighton*

- 4.2.25 There was an informal partnership network well before the SRB scheme in Central Brighton largely instigated by Brighton Borough Council (Later to become Brighton & Hove City Council). The Brighton Council's Economic Development Committee had been established as early as 1986 and included representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, the voluntary sector, the Trades Council and Social Services. Other partnerships included the Sussex Academic Corridor, the Brighton Training and Enterprise Network and the Town Centre Business Forum. In 1993 the Brighton and Hove Economic Development Company Ltd (BHEDCo) was formed including directors from all local business sectors with the prime objectives of building business confidence and encouraging new business investment in the local area.
- 4.2.26 By the time of the bid for this round two SRB scheme in 1995, the Brighton Regeneration Partnership (BRP) had successfully bid for two round one SRB schemes. In 1996, when Regenerating Central Brighton SRB2 got underway the partnership was more formally constituted. At this time the key partners comprised the Borough and County Councils, BHEDCo, East Sussex Brighton and Hove Health Authority, PACT Community Projects, Sussex Enterprise, Brighton Consortium of

Housing associations, the Brighton Festival Society and the Regency Area trader and community associations. In addition, around forty other partners were involved including Sussex Police, the Employment Service, the University of Sussex and the Brighton Housing Trust.

- 4.2.27 Throughout its lifetime the partnership has successfully bid for SRB funding from all six rounds of the scheme. It secured over £41 million from the fund, which has attracted further funding reaching to around £133 million in total. There were a total of eight schemes of which four were dedicated to regenerating central Brighton (from rounds one, three and four in addition to the round two scheme). Two other schemes were concentrated on Hove one concerned with promoting business and the other centred on the Hangleton and Knoll housing estates (which is also one of the 20 case studies in the national evaluation). Finally, two other schemes focused on promoting social inclusion. All schemes were eventually merged into a rollover delivery plan being the responsibility of the partnership as a whole.
- 4.2.28 In the early days of the partnership there was a perception that it was dominated by the local authority and did not allow some of the smaller organisations to have sufficient say within the partnership. Over the years the partnership has attempted to redress this balance by reducing local authority representation and increasing Board members from the voluntary and community sectors. Following the review in 2001 the partnership comprised four from the local authority, four from the Voluntary and Community Sector Forum (a body set up under SRB five), two representatives from local business organisations, and other representatives from the Police, Brighton & Hove Housing Trust, Business in the Community (Chair of the Partnership), Learning Partnership, Academic Corridor, South East Arts, the health authority and the Employment Service.
- 4.2.29 Initially, the day to day running of the scheme was carried out by the regeneration manager within the SRB two Regeneration Team. This Team was advised on a quarterly basis by the SRB2 Lead Officers Group from the Council. The Regeneration manager then had to report on a quarterly basis to the BRP Steering Group comprising of the key partners. As the scheme developed and the successful SRB schemes were merged the management arrangements changed. The funding for the Regeneration Team was passed to the new Programme Management Team, which was responsible for managing all SRB schemes. In 1998 the partnership underwent a review to reflect the wider strategic remit it had. The sub-group URBAN Partnership Group was set up at this time operating as the management committee for Brighton's URBAN programme (which ran alongside part of the SRB4 programme until 2001). Following the review four priorities for the partnership emerged for 1999:
- A continuous review of its structure and membership in the light of its strategic role for all regeneration activity across Brighton & Hove by strengthening its connections with other partnerships;
  - To continue developing a Regeneration Strategy;
  - To further develop its Communication Strategy through the formation of a Communications & Publicity Sub-group;
  - To develop its role in relation to regional initiatives through its relationship with the South East England Development Agency.
- 4.2.30 By 2000 BRP sought a greater focus to involve communities in its work, it also sought further funding to support its work and enable greater communication to publicise its work and role. This resulted in the Partnership Support Project, which funded a

dedicated Support Officer to the partnership with SRB five monies. At the same time restructuring within the Culture & Regeneration Directorate of the Council resulted in a newly formed Regeneration Team responsible for the day to day management of SRB.

- 4.2.31 Discussions with the partners about the day to day running of the partnership revealed a general satisfaction with the change of Chair and a feeling that partnership working had improved in recent years. Board meetings were judged to be well attended, focused and to work well, comprising a good cross section of members. There was an overall comment that the officers of the Regeneration Team were well organised providing good briefings for meetings with papers clearly set out and focused. Newer Board members also commented on the value of an induction course some had attended which gave them an opportunity to find out about the partnership.
- 4.2.32 Despite this general feeling of satisfaction with the partnership there were some tensions. Most notably time was a factor that many partners found a constraint (particularly the private sector). Other commitments often meant that it was not always possible to dedicate the necessary time needed and some were not always able to stay for the full duration of Board meetings. There was a general feeling that this had improved with the new Chair, meetings had become more focused and briefer. The introduction of breakfast meetings made it easier to fit in around other commitments. Not all partners welcomed this change, however, and some felt that there was a danger that issues were being overlooked in an attempt to get through a large agenda.
- 4.2.33 Some of the partners who had been in the partnership from the beginning felt that initially there was very little collective decision making. There was another concern that the partnership had not been truly strategic and that projects were largely worked up without proper consultation with partners. The change in emphasis of the partnership to include a greater representation of community and voluntary organisations partly alleviated these fears, although some partners still felt consultation and strategic thinking could be improved.
- 4.2.34 Partners were also keen to see greater resources for the officers running the scheme as the 5% allowance was insufficient and resulted in a bid for further support in round five. There was also the feeling that the threshold needed before SEEDA approval should have been raised to £1 million as this would have improved the effectiveness of the regeneration process.
- 4.2.35 BRP was set up primarily as a delivery vehicle for SRB and other regeneration initiatives such as the URBAN programme. As a consequence of its role BRP gained an expertise in regeneration issues and has responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the Brighton and Hove Regeneration Strategy as set out in April 2002. With SRB funding secured up to 2006 BRP is set to continue as a delivery vehicle. BRP also has strong links with both the Brighton and Hove Economic Partnership (BHEP) and the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). There is some cross over between partners from BRP, BHEP and the LSP. The Chair of BRP is also on the LSP and is closely involved in East Brighton NDC. Some of the lessons derived from the BRP experience could be of value to both BHEP and the LSP. For example, the need for a clearer engagement framework for the private sector, voluntary sector and mainstream players.

- 4.2.36 The Brighton and Hove Economic Partnership is focused on improving the image of the City of Brighton and will work closely with Brighton & Hove City Council. This partnership is very much private sector motivated and has sixteen members of which there are six private, four local authority and others including the voluntary sector. This Partnership feeds into the Local Strategic Partnership lessons that have been learned from BRP.
- 4.2.37 The Local Strategic Partnership is tasked to develop an overarching framework within which all other partnerships are able to operate and to also play a leading role in the preparation of a Community Strategy to provide a context for all local, community focused work. However, in the longer term the future of BRP is less certain as it may eventually be subsumed into the LSP once the remaining SRB programmes have finished.

#### *Swadlincote Woodlands*

- 4.2.38 The Made in Swadlincote Partnership grew out of “Action for Swadlincote”, which was an audit of businesses and training activities in Swadlincote carried out in 1993 by South Derbyshire District Council (SDDC) and the Southern Derbyshire Training and Enterprise Council. Its initial mission was to create 1,000 new sustainable jobs by 1998 within Swadlincote. The Partnership was originally brought together by three main players, namely, SDDC, Chamber of Commerce and the Training and Enterprise Council. It was initially a discussion group but the Made in Swadlincote Partnership eventually emerged. While the Partnership was unsuccessful in securing SRB in round one they modified the bid and eventually succeeded in winning funds for the Swadlincote Woodlands scheme in round two.
- 4.2.39 The Made in Swadlincote Partnership managed by the Swadlincote Woodlands Regeneration Board, did not change much during the lifetime of the SRB scheme. Although the Partnership was originally instigated by the SDDC the Board achieved a good balance between public and private partners from the outset and, as a result complaints of local authority dominance did not arise. It originally had fourteen Board members (six public, seven private and one voluntary sector). By the close of the scheme there was an eighth private sector partner giving a Board of fifteen partners. The public sector partners were four from SDDC, one from Derbyshire County Council and one from the National Forest Company. The private sector included the Chair, Southern Derbyshire Chamber, Southern Derbyshire Business Link, Swadlincote and South Derbyshire Chamber of Trade, Commerce and Industry, Derby and Derbyshire Business Venture, Gresley Investments Ltd and two representatives from the local business community. The Council for Voluntary Services was the voluntary sector partner. While the Partnership was somewhat light on community and voluntary direct representation, it should be noted that at the time the Partnership was originally formed Swadlincote did not have a local CVS. The Chairman of the partnership has remained the same throughout the lifetime of the SRB scheme.
- 4.2.40 General comments from the partners were that the partnership has been well run and effective with collective decision making. Indeed some partners commented that it worked better than other partnerships in which they were involved. The Board met between four and six times a year and in addition had a Technical Appraisal Group which met when it was deemed necessary. There was also a Marketing Group (although this did not become operational until the end of the scheme). Finally, a Contingency Group was also set up to look at the forward strategy of the scheme. The main delivery of the scheme was carried out by officers at SDDC, although some

projects within the scheme also had direct input by partners such as the housing private and social housing projects lead by Gresley Investments Ltd, the Community Safety Project lead by the Derbyshire Constabulary and the Small Business Support Scheme which was run by Derby and Derbyshire Business Venture.

- 4.2.41 The Made in Swadlincote Partnership pre-dated the SRB scheme and was originally set up with the objective of securing new investment and creating employment opportunities for the Swadlincote area. Once the SRB programme got underway the partnership became more absorbed by SRB activities and eventually SRB matters dominated all partnership meetings. As a result some partners have commented that SRB had to an extent 'taken over' from the original Partnership intentions that were based more on economic objectives. This effect was somewhat accentuated by the financial difficulties suffered by SDDC at the time, which resulted in other economic activity in Swadlincote being curtailed.
- 4.2.42 Tensions emerged between some of the partners, particularly those working on the more complex projects such as the Forest Park enhancements and housing projects. Any difficulties that did arise, however, were dealt with effectively by the strong Chairmanship of the Partnership. This strong 'hands-on' approach helped to keep the programme on track throughout its six years.
- 4.2.43 While most partners felt they were in an equal partnership, there was some feeling, particularly early on, that the CVS partner was not involved to the same extent as the other partners. During the lifetime of the scheme changes did occur, although it was felt there was still room for further improvement. Another factor to emerge from one of the partners was that working within a partnership did bring with it some disadvantages in terms of the individual profile of a partner. Where a partner was heavily involved in a particular project the overall achievement of that project would tend to be attributed to the partnership as a whole rather than the individual players. Where individual partners needed to maintain a certain profile within an area this could present difficulties.
- 4.2.44 In terms of things that worked well overall, a very important element of the Partnership was the Chair who remained throughout the lifetime of the scheme. Without exception all partners felt he was the key to the success of the programme and had been on hand to sort out any problems that arose. The introduction of breakfast meetings was viewed positively by most partners as it meant the partnership work did not encroach on other work commitments. The day to day running of the scheme was undertaken by SDDC officers and partners recognised that they did this very effectively. During the lifetime of the scheme SDDC experienced a serious financial crisis, but was able to keep up the delivery of the programme even though lack of other money at the time meant that there was not much other activity in Swadlincote. SDDC were also pragmatic and the flexibility of SRB allowed for changes to some of the original projects. The intended Heritage Centre was not considered feasible but the Sharpe's Resource Centre replaced the project and has provided an important local amenity and improved an old building central to the town.
- 4.2.45 In terms of SRB funding the Partnership secured further SRB monies for an Access Centre in Newhall from the 2001/2 Capital Fund which amounted to some £269,000, they did not bid for any other rounds of SRB and the partnership has now discontinued. Some of the partners, including the Chair, are involved in the South Derbyshire Local Strategic Partnership, which it is intended will include some new members such as education and health partners and to engage other private sector

partners from the local business community, particularly the bigger players. The Board consists of 24 partners with equal representation between local authorities/parishes, other public agencies, the private sector and the voluntary and community sector. Other partners are pursuing a new Economic Partnership and to this end there is a move to re-form the local Chamber of Trade.

#### *Royds Bradford*

- 4.2.46 The Bradford Congress nominated the Royds Community Association (RCA) as the accountable body for this seven year SRB scheme, with its Board drawn from residents through the RCA, key partners from Bradford Metropolitan Borough Council (BMBC), Keepmoat PLC and Brunel Housing Association, with other members from the public, community and private sectors. From its inception the RCA has sought to work in partnership with a range of associate partners that could effectively deliver local regeneration as defined by residents. During the life of this SRB not only has the RCA been the accountable body, but residents have been the largest single group on the Board which has enabled the community to maintain its influence on the direction and scope of this initiative.
- 4.2.47 The RCA has demonstrated the value of working in partnership with the local authority, private sector and housing associations in the physical regeneration of the area. It has also worked effectively with the police in reducing property crime and the PCT in developing health care initiatives. English Partnerships, the Church Urban Fund and the Countryside Agency have worked closely with the RCA in developing local amenities in the creation/improvement of 'village centres' across the three estates. In encouraging partnership working residents have had an opportunity to be involved with various private sector and mainstream players in regenerating their estates.
- 4.2.48 The project was originally developed as part of BMBC's Community Regeneration Strategy (1991) linked to the physical, economic and social regeneration of a number of disadvantaged areas such as Royds. A subsequent report (Areas of Stress 1993) provided further evidence of the need to address the problem of deprivation in the identified areas including Royds. The original bid was developed by BMDC Housing Department in conjunction with residents from the three housing estates, Bradford TEC, Keepmoat Construction, Haslam Homes, Brunel Housing Association, Bradford College and the Council of Churches.
- 4.2.49 Although the major element of the SRB scheme was the renovation of social housing with some new build for rent and sale, the RCA was committed to socio-economic initiatives linked to education/training, health care, employment, crime and the environment in addressing a number of local community needs.
- 4.2.50 The RCA has gained national recognition as an example of a community led programme with real partnership working. Residents were involved at all levels of the regeneration process in planning, developing and delivering the various physical, economic and social projects across the three estates. Residents are not only in the majority on the Royds Board, but are active in the various working parties and committees that provide channels of communication for the Board and the wider community.
- 4.2.51 In reaching the wider community the marketing of the Royds initiative has focused locally on the production of regular newsletters, an annual report and numerous articles in both local and national newspapers/journals. The Royds Consultation Bus

has enabled road shows to be mounted across the estates involving some five thousand local residents with such success that a second bus came into operation in the summer of 2002.

4.2.52 From its experience of SRB and other local regeneration, the RCA is now developing a number of activities as part of its forward/sustainability strategy. While the SRB scheme finished in March 2002, the RCA remains committed to:

- Building on the SRB estate-based regeneration activities;
- Building the RCA asset base through its research/consultancy activities, ILM initiatives and rental income from existing properties;
- Working with the Local Strategic Partnership over the next three years in Neighbourhood Action Planning in local communities and developing a range of pilots for Neighbourhood Management within South Bradford;
- Developing the Enterprise Park (and SRB six programme) as an income generator and local source of economic activity. This will be in conjunction with the Regional Development Agency;
- Producing a successful bid to the New Opportunities Fund aimed at reducing social exclusion.

#### *Woolwich Revival*

4.2.53 The Woolwich Partnership was led firmly by Greenwich Council. They were the accountable body and heavily involved throughout. The Woolwich Development Agency (WDA) was set up as an arms length organisation to manage the programme. The clear view at the time was that with a local authority covering such a broad swathe of London's South Thames waterfront, and with the intensity of physical regeneration required in and around Woolwich, a dedicated delivery agency was needed that would not be distracted by other Council business. There was also the feeling that the local agency would be more accessible to local people and businesses than a Greenwich-wide delivery structure.

4.2.54 The Board of the WDA had three key partners, namely, Greenwich Council, the Greenwich Waterfront Community Forum and the Greenwich Waterfront Business Forum, as well as other partners acting in more of an advisory capacity, namely SOLOTEC (now replaced by the East London Learning and Skills Council), the University of Greenwich, the Greenwich Council for Race Equality and the Bexley & Greenwich Health Authority. The structure of the WDA includes the Chief Executive, programme managers and monitoring managers. At Board level, decisions were recommendations that needed to be approved by Greenwich Council. The Chief Executive of WDA is accountable to the Director of Strategic Planning in Greenwich Council. It is understood that all employees of WDA are Council employees.

4.2.55 The method of representation of the community was criticised by the final evaluation of the Woolwich Revival scheme (UK Research Partnership, 2002) for being insufficiently representative and lacking in the necessary underpinning (e.g. below Board level, through topic or implementation groups) whereby more wide-ranging community participation in directing the programme could be secured.

4.2.56 Consultees we have spoken to suggested that the lack of sub-Board groups was reflective of the Council's desire to keep a tight grip on proceedings. However, the argument also ran that the task was sufficiently manageable not to need sub-groups or task groups.



- 4.2.57 If representation at Board level was insufficient, what efforts did the scheme make to consult more widely about needs and priorities? A local skills survey and community audit conducted at the outset of Woolwich Revival provided valuable evidence on local needs, especially concerning skills development and employment. The evaluation report on Woolwich Revival notes that at a relatively early stage, follow-up work with residents through a household survey was undertaken (and as a result further emphasis was placed on developments in the Town Centre). From the perspective of guiding the development of the programme it could be argued that, to a degree, the community's voice was actively sought out and listened to. Compared with some other schemes, more effort appears to have gone into survey-based needs assessment.
- 4.2.58 Over time (after four years of the seven year programme) they had a "sector chairs group" – a group of three (public, private, voluntary/community) which became the executive group of the main Board. The chairmanship of this group rotated across the three sectors.
- 4.2.59 It has been argued by some respondents that the partnership was not one of equals and while able to contribute to discussion, the business of delivering the SRB programme, certainly in the early days, was effectively run by the London Borough of Greenwich much on its terms. This attitude was argued to exist in its strongest form at the bidding stage, but over time the Council has "opened up", and in latter days some consultees felt that there was a much better feeling of equality in terms of decision-making about project selection, although ultimately quite a lot had to be filtered through the Council to be implemented. Those spoken to were in no doubt that Greenwich Council has shifted its attitude to partnership working, and that SRB had been instrumental in that.
- 4.2.60 Woolwich Revival was an SRB round one programme so the implementation process was inevitably a steep learning curve. A number of consultees noted that the SRB programme helped to embed a partnership ethos within Greenwich Council in particular, which up to that point some believe had adopted a paternalistic attitude to regeneration and partnership working. The partnership working begun through SRB has carried through, and WDA still manages two other SRB programmes and some EU Objective 2 funding. It also has a potential role in implementing the London Development Agency's Zones of Change and seems likely to have some kind of role in the Government's plans for a new form of Urban Development Corporation in the Thames Gateway.
- 4.2.61 The Local Strategic Partnership is functioning and produced a high level community strategy early on. Greenwich is one of the 88 most deprived local authority districts in England, and qualifies for Neighbourhood Renewal Funding. It is understood that the Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy has been prepared and is being implemented. The work of the SRB programmes, and that which is likely to be the focus of the London Development Agency's support, has strong physical regeneration and economic development foci. Neighbourhood Renewal is seen as being more concerned with service improvements and improving access to services and the economic opportunities coming on stream through other initiatives. One might argue that the design of these initiatives and the routes that funding streams take has encouraged the physical and economic to operate separately from the social, but mechanisms have been put in place to encourage local partnership working through a range of different networks including:

- “Champions meetings” across Greenwich Council service areas and also involving the police and health professionals;
- Council Corporate Funding Officers Group – Neighbourhood Renewal, Children’s Fund, Sure Start, plus individual directorates.
- SRB co-ordination groups, which involved Neighbourhood Renewal staff from the Council;
- Corporate Group for Strategic Development involving representatives from all directorates, including NR, as well as Woolwich Development Agency, the Education Action Zone and transport.

4.2.62 Overall, partnership working through SRB has stimulated new networking activity and consolidated pre-existing links between organisations, providing a firmer foundation to move forward. This applies particularly to the voluntary/community sector, which is gradually consolidating, a process supported by SRB. Experience gained through working on Woolwich Revival has also benefited organisations across all sectors, strengthening their capacity to submit and win bids for funds from subsequent regeneration programmes.

#### *Sunderland City Partnership*

4.2.63 Initially, the City of Sunderland Partnership (CSP) comprised the City Council, Sunderland City TEC, Tyne and Wear Development Corporation, the University of Sunderland, Tyne and Wear Chamber of Commerce and the City of Sunderland Forum. The voluntary and community sectors gradually came on board as well as other key players in local regeneration across the city.

4.2.64 With regard to the internal structure of the CSP, in its early days the partnership operated on two levels, the Strategic Board and the Officer Working Group, with a Programme Management Subgroup being set up in 2001 as part of the restructuring for the LSP. The Strategic Board was responsible for policy/decision making and the monitoring of programme performance. The Officer Group acts as the working group for the partnership, although its role was reviewed as the partnership evolved in order to ensure that the partnership itself was able to concentrate on more strategic issues. As a result, the Officer Group has played a greater role in the day to day programme management issues. It considers issues relating to performance and forward strategy and is supported in this role by the partnership Secretariat (provided by Sunderland City Council). Sunderland City Council is the Accountable Body, with full programme, financial and output accountability. The ability to approve project appraisals of over £1.5 million resides with the Board, whereas the Officer Group has been given delegated authority to approve project appraisals with a contribution of £1.5 million or below on behalf of the partnership. Some of these responsibilities have been further delegated to a Programme Management Subgroup.

4.2.65 As part of the restructuring for the LSP there were other thematic subgroups, one for each of the main policy areas of health, crime and education. They have a working relationship with the Board and feed into the structure. This is seen as a positive strategic development within the Partnership in that there are occasions when propositions put forward to the Board from the subgroups helps the board to make important changes in those policy areas. There is a general consensus that the reshaping of the partnership to take account of these policy areas will help with strategic direction.

- 4.2.66 The Partnership Board met on a monthly basis as did the Officer and Programme Management Groups. The Programme Management Subgroup met the first week of each month. The resulting documents were reported to the Officer Group the week after to update the groups on any projects that had been approved, recommended etc. This subsequently fed into the Partnership Board. No local working groups were set up as part of the SRB one programme. However, focus groups as sub groups of the Partnership and its Officer Working Group met to develop ideas for the bid and the implementation of the programme. Regular meetings of representatives of organisations leading on projects are held and at these meetings a range of issues relating to project/programme management were discussed.
- 4.2.67 With regard to monitoring, there was a general consensus that there was a good SRB support team in place in the Council. Independent project evaluations were not introduced until SRB round three (1998) when a Finance and Monitoring Unit was set up. This was further strengthened and renamed the Regeneration Support Unit in 2001. The Unit's general remit was to carry out the day to day monitoring of expenditure and outputs, a role that was further strengthened to include project development and appraisal support in order to ease the burden, workload and bureaucracy of the monitoring functions which were carried out by the local authority. The enhancement of the programme management function led to improved overall programme co-ordination. It also forged productive links between individual projects as well as integrating the programme with other initiatives. Delivery plans were merged into two with rounds one, two and four on the one hand, and rounds three, five and six on the other, as the areas targeted and the objectives to be achieved by these programmes were very similar. However, although the programmes were merged for administrative purposes they retained their operational identity and have different local partnership structures.
- 4.2.68 Discussions with the partners revealed an overall satisfaction with the decision making process, it being described as a very inclusive process where all the partners are involved in discussions and decide the way forward through consensus. Despite this general feeling of satisfaction, however, there is the perception that in the early days the partnership was too much focused around the local authority and other key players such as the University and the TEC, with the local authority having more of a predominant role in designing the programme and then putting proposals through to the Partnership Board for their approval. There is agreement, however, that this changed over the years and the role played by the local authority has eased to benefit the other partners, with all the partners having a more equal say and equal power in decision making.
- 4.2.69 The partnership model adopted to deliver the scheme had four key elements: the partnership itself, Lead Agents responsible for implementing individual projects, SRB co-ordinators for the East End and Hendon and the Coalfield, and the aforementioned central programme management and accountability function provided by the City Council's Regeneration and Housing Service.
- 4.2.70 While decisions were generally made by consensus some tensions arose regarding the voting rights of partners. Negotiations that the voluntary sector's two seats on the Board might increase to three caused some debate among partners as it would give the voluntary/community sector three votes compared with only one vote for other partners with single representation.
- 4.2.71 There was general agreement that SRB brought together contact organisations that would not normally have come together. It was a step change to see all the key

players invited to the table and for each of them to present their case. As a consequence the individual partners began to understand more about the role of other organisations.

- 4.2.72 There were also benefits in avoiding duplication – the various partners did not compete against themselves. They worked jointly to bring funding into Sunderland. A uniform front from the City of Sunderland was thus presented to the outside world which had not happened in quite this way before. The diversity, creativity and innovation that emerged from the process of working in partnership has been commented on by some of the partners, although not all.
- 4.2.73 The City of Sunderland Partnership took some time to develop, however, it became a very solid and broad ranging partnership bringing together all the major players from the public, private and voluntary sectors. It has been successful in securing all rounds of SRB and following the completion of the first round programme CSP was accredited to become the Local Strategic Partnership. The City Council appointed an LSP Co-ordinator in late 2001 with the remit to work with all partners in developing the partnership to its LSP status. There was an agreement amongst all the partners that the CSP was well ahead of its time when it became the LSP both structurally and functionally.

#### *South Leytonstone Community Partnership*

- 4.2.74 The initial bid for the SRB programme “A Contract for Change” was submitted in 1995 by the newly formed South Leytonstone Partnership, with the London Borough of Waltham Forest as the lead partner and Accountable Body. The partnership brought together representatives from the public, private and community/voluntary sectors with the common vision of “transforming South Leytonstone from an area with high unemployment, crime and appalling housing conditions into one where people are proud to live and work”. At the bid stage the Council was very much at the helm with limited consultation with the other partners.
- 4.2.75 The partnership at this time had a membership of twelve, with four partners each from the public, private and community/voluntary sectors. The four community/voluntary representatives were from each of the key residential locations in the bid area, namely; Cathall Estate, Cann Hall, Avenue Road Estate and the local Church which is central to the SRB target area. The partners were drawn mainly from local residents’ or tenants’ associations. The four public sector partners were from the London Borough of Waltham Forest. Private sector members included the Waltham Forest Chamber of Commerce and three local businessmen. In addition five co-optees were appointed from organisations with a particular interest in the specific projects within the programme. These were the Waltham Forest Housing Action Team, the Metropolitan Police, London East Training and Enterprise Council, Redbridge and Waltham Forest Health Authority and Forest Healthcare NHS Trust.
- 4.2.76 Initially the partnership was chaired by the Chief Executive of the Council, however, there was the feeling at this time that the Partnership was becoming dominated by the local authority. This resulted in the Chairmanship being passed on to a community representative by the second year of the programme, thus sending out the message that the community was at the heart of the programme. By the final year of the programme community representation on the Board had increased to five these being CREST (Avenue Kids Club), Cann Hall Residents Association, Avenue Steering Group, the Holy Trinity Church and the Nexus Centre.

- 4.2.77 There remained four members from the private sector throughout the lifetime of the programme. One of the features of the partnership was felt to be a lack of commitment from the business community at board level. This was probably due to the nature of the businesses in the Leytonstone area which are mainly small and subject to change contributing to some discontinuity in communications. In addition, it was felt that the contribution of the Chamber of Commerce was very limited rarely attending Board meetings. There was a desire to include one or two of the larger employers such as Tesco or Woolworths but this was not successful.
- 4.2.78 The SRB programme was managed on a day-to-day basis by Stratford Development Partnership Ltd (SDP). Discussions with partners revealed that in the initial stages of the programme there was some concern that SDP were not acquainted well enough with the needs and issues of the local community and it was felt there was a danger that the programme would lose touch with local people. In effect, by the close of the scheme partners felt generally that these problems had been overcome and that SDP had successfully completed their task. One problem mentioned in discussions with partners had been the turnover of key staff at SDP, that some felt had affected the day to day management and caused communication problems in tracking the implementation of the scheme.
- 4.2.79 All partnership meetings were open to the public and, as such local people could attend as observers. All partners were involved in project appraisals which were day long sessions held about four times a year. A project appraisal committee comprised typically one representative each from the community, local authority, the agency acting for the project, Stratford Development Partnership, a financial representative from the council and a chairman. All decisions were fed back to the Board for approval.
- 4.2.80 One of the criticisms of some partners was that it was not strategic enough and not very proactive. Continual changes of the Chair and other personnel also led to a lack of continuity which did not get better as time went on. The Partnership did not gel as a unit and by the completion of the SRB programme no other funding had been sought and consequently the Partnership dissolved in March 2003.

#### *Nottingham Capturing the Dynamics*

- 4.2.81 This second round SRB scheme was initially run by the Nottingham Partnership Forum, which included key players from the public, private and voluntary sectors. Nottingham City Council acted as the accountable body, taking responsibility for the receipt and use of the SRB Challenge Fund and for the realisation of the delivery plan. The Forum selected a small Board to be responsible for the SRB Challenge Fund regeneration programme in the City.
- 4.2.82 The Board comprised representatives from Nottingham City Council, Nottinghamshire County Council, Greater Nottingham TEC, Nottingham Development Enterprise and the Voluntary Sector Urban Regeneration Forum (one representative from each organisation). It met on a quarterly basis chaired by each partner on a rotating basis. Based within the City Council, a small executive staff handled day-to-day implementation.
- 4.2.83 At the launch of the initiative local area partnerships already existed on the Broxtowe Estate and in the Urban Initiative Area. On the Bestwood estate an inter-agency group formed the basis for a local area partnership, which was developed during the early stages of the SRB2 implementation. These local area partnerships were made

up of businesses, local authority ward members, the voluntary sector, service providers operating in the areas and the local community. Their role in the SRB2 was to appraise and approve individual initiatives, to scrutinise the local implementation of the strategic programme and report on the progress and effects to the Regeneration Forum Board.

- 4.2.84 In 1999/2000 the governance structure for the SRB2 initiative changed slightly. The Greater Nottingham Partnership (GNP) Executive expanded to include sixteen members: from the City Council, two from the County Council, one from each District Council (Ashfield, Broxtowe, Gedling and Rushcliffe), one from Greater Nottingham Training and Enterprise Council, one from Nottingham Development Enterprise, one from Nottingham Council for Voluntary Service, two from Nottingham Health Authority, one from the Further Education Sector and 1 from each Sectoral Alliance (maximum of six).
- 4.2.85 A year later the 2000/2001 Delivery Plan proposed a change to the decision making structure. This allowed all the SRB initiatives which had been won for Nottingham (SRB2 to SRB7) to be organised under one overall management system. The Technical Advisory Group became the 'Implementation Group' for SRB2.
- 4.2.86 The GNP had overall responsibility for SRB programmes/effective delivery and to develop the strategic overview for City regeneration. The SRB Programmes Policy Group existed to ensure the effective management and delivery of SRB programmes through the SRB management team and to advise the GNP Executive on progress and opportunities for change. The SRB Implementation Groups existed to advise the Policy Group of funding approvals/refusals, monitor individual programmes against delivery plans and report all performance issues to the Policy Group. It also considered new project proposals in the light of local support, needs and availability of funding.
- 4.2.87 Whilst the SRB2 initiative was originally due to finish at the end of 2000-2001, a further year's extension was granted although the 2001-2 Delivery Plan merged all the SRB funded schemes into a single scheme, from April 2001. Effectively, the management structure did not change, but many inputs and outputs were merged and some projects were transferred to later SRB bids.
- 4.2.88 Throughout the initiative, it was noted, by a number of respondents, that local area partnerships (LAPs) become more involved in the local development/implementation of SRB2. It was also argued that the use of these LAPs from the outset, by the City Council, caused some tensions – partly because the GNP, organised on an informal basis, was not always able to maximise strategic planning through the Executive and Forum which made the work of the SRB Policy Group more complex in dealing with the various Strategy Groups. It was also argued that the City Council had tended to dominate the SRB2 initiative at the early stages, although this had become less of an issue as it had progressed.

### *Merseyside Learning Partnership*

- 4.2.89 In comparison with many SRB partnerships, the Merseyside Learning Partnership (MLP) had the opportunity to build on the experience of earlier partnership working. On Merseyside this had largely been due to the requirement of national and European funding bodies for local agencies to promote and coordinate public/ private partnerships in order to bid for (primarily) regeneration monies. It was expected that the SRB agenda could be developed and taken forward at a considerable pace, faster and in a more sustainable way than in areas where the main players had less experience of working in partnership.
- 4.2.90 The idea of a Liverpool City of Learning emerged in 1992. It was formally launched in 1993 with members from key local education and training organisations, including the City Council, universities, further education colleges, schools and the voluntary sector and became incorporated in 1996. One of its main objectives was to develop a coordinating body for large scale Objective one projects following the designation of Merseyside as an EU Objective One area.
- 4.2.91 At the time, there was no single multi-agency, cross-authority partnership with a remit to draw together the range of elements relating to education, the skills of young people, and support for disaffected pupils. MLP was formed to bring cohesion and economies of scale to these activities across three metropolitan boroughs on Merseyside, to address gaps in terms both of geography and of provision, reduce the chance of duplication of effort and to stimulate innovation. Following the inclusion of the MEON project, it became a sub-group of the City of Learning Partnership.
- 4.2.92 There were eleven partner agencies at the outset. Most had previously worked together on Objective One schemes and Merseyside City of Learning SRB One. Merseyside TEC was the lead partner and the accountable body. The three other core partners were Knowsley Local Education Authority (LEA), Liverpool LEA and Sefton LEA who had all previously worked together and with the TEC on education/ business links, including Compacts. Further expertise and wider representation was brought by the other partners who were Cities in Schools (UK), The Prince's Trust, Liverpool City Challenge, Bootle Maritime City Challenge, Liverpool – City of Learning, Healthy Cities, and Merseyside Council for Voluntary Service (MCVS). The MLP Chairman was the TEC Chief Executive. At different times in the life of scheme there were two Vice Chairmen: a representative from MCVS and a secondary school head teacher.
- 4.2.93 During the process of forming the partnership clear tensions arose around the inclusion of MEON which had originally been conceived as a Liverpool-only scheme, and was very popular with schools, but not with all three LEAs. In addition, Liverpool LEA was not keen to share the idea with the other authorities. However, most partners thought that the overall benefits of MLP would outweigh any difficulties surrounding the addition of MEON to the original scheme.
- 4.2.94 Initially there was a management board of eight people: the Chief Executive and Secretary from Merseyside TEC, three LEA Officers and three headteachers. It met frequently, but did not act strategically. Tensions between the three LEAs over their shares of the funding (exacerbated at one stage when a Board member moved from one LEA to one of the other LEAs in the Partnership), between the headteachers and their LEAs over priority of spend, and a lack of TEC understanding of and familiarity with mainstream education meant that the management board had great difficulties coming to agreement. Partner representatives were of different levels of seniority and

thus decision-taking was usually referred back to more senior staff within partner organisations.

- 4.2.95 From the start of Year three, membership of the Management Board expanded with the addition of Careerdecisions Ltd (now Connexions), Liverpool One Partnership, Scottish Power and Liverpool – City of Learning, and now had the right to co-opt additional members to enable more effective delivery. Partner representatives all held senior positions of responsibility within their own organisations. Membership of the Management Board was unchanged for the remainder of the scheme, although promotion and retirement meant six changes in personnel during Year four. Community involvement and interest in the scheme remained low both in terms of strategy and of management, and there is no evidence that other means of consultation with community groups, e.g., parent groups, were carried out or considered by the Management Board.
- 4.2.96 Operational activity (implementation, monitoring and reporting) was identified as the responsibility of the Learning Partnership Coordinator, managed by Merseyside TEC's Education Manager and supported by its Education team. However, towards the end of year one the Education Manager resigned from the TEC. Half way through MLP year two, responsibility for Education was passed to the TEC Education Business Link Manager (who was responsible for the TEC's SRB1 Enhancing Job Prospects Partnership), along with the MLP remit. The only synergy between the two SRB schemes was through Compact operations. Different individuals from the three LEAs were on each Board: the SRB1 Board and its sub-groups were seen to operate well as partnerships, in contrast to MLP, whose LEA board members were perceived to champion the needs of their own organisation, rather than the needs of their sector or of the Partnership itself.
- 4.2.97 With the exception of the MEON project which was run by ICL at a distance from the rest of MLP, delivery within each of the three Local Authorities was centrally coordinated through Merseyside TEC, and managed on an operational basis by individual coordinators for the identified programme strands. Although all four core partners agreed on MLP's priorities, they were less in agreement on components of the programme, having different views about the division of funding between projects and about delivery mechanisms.
- 4.2.98 The four pilot projects run in year one, raised a number of concerns about the design and delivery of the scheme which had an adverse effect on the developing partnership. These concerns included:
- uncertainty and confusion over the rationale and origin of the IADP Project Steering Group which seemed to provide a duplication of effort, both of the strategic focus of the MLP Board and of the TEC's operational management of the scheme;
  - accusations of an unfair "preferred supplier" status levelled against the TEC in its relationship with one provider;
  - a need to renegotiate the deliverables for one project with GOM, and a change in the delivery mechanism from delivery by one contractor across all LEAs to each LEA managing the strand its own area.
- 4.2.99 The year one Evaluation by GHK Economics & Management (GHK) recommended that MLP consider bringing probation and health services "into the fold" of the interagency programme, given the relationship between exclusion and crime and mental health. This strand was extended to youth and community workers and health professionals for the first time in year three, and multi-agency conferences were



arranged in the two final years across all three boroughs. Other than these activities, there were no new links, e.g., joint learning, networking activities or sharing of good practice, developed across Merseyside which could be attributed to MLP.

- 4.2.100 The fragmented way in which the various project strands were brought together at the outset and the appointment of a new co-ordinator at a crucial stage of the scheme's development following the year one pilot projects meant that ownership of the scheme was a real issue for individual agencies and for individuals. There was little in the assemblage of the projects that facilitated joined-up working and which might have led to a feeling of joint ownership. In practice, the structure of the scheme served to highlight the conflicting and competing objectives of partner agencies (especially the LEAs), members of the Management Team (notably headteachers and representatives from the LEAs) and of the individual project strands, which remained fragmented throughout the life of the scheme.
- 4.2.101 From year four, it would seem that the partner agencies and individuals connected with the scheme were diverted by external events. The well-publicised and highly critical 1999 Ofsted review of Liverpool LEA led to a complete overhaul of that organisation, with staff in all senior posts replaced. Responsibility for SRB was transferred from GOM to the North West Development Agency, where staff did not have the necessary experience to support the scheme's co-ordinator in renegotiating the necessary changes to the MLP Action Plan. Lastly, the planned demise of the TEC (in the final year of MLP) meant that TEC staff involved in the scheme were preoccupied with concerns about their joint and individual responsibilities when the larger Merseyside-wide LSC was formed.
- 4.2.102 After the slow start, MLP managed to commit and spend its funding allocation, and implement a number of unrelated projects including a number of small innovative projects, and the larger, stand-alone, MEON strand. It provided valuable resources in terms of individual capacity and ICT capital, much of it to schools who were self-selected on grounds their willingness and ability to contribute funding, staff resources, etc, rather than on criteria of relative need. MLP was fragmented in structure, demonstrating little synergy either between its own strands or with other schemes. It did little to add to partnership working on Merseyside, either from an operational or a strategic point of view, suffering as it did from the competing interests of its core partners and the top-down direction of spend.

### **4.3 General conclusions on the factors that make for good partnership working**

- 4.3.1 The evidence from the review of partnership working indicates that there has been good and weaker attainment across the case studies. What has stood out from the research has been that performance *per se* has not been systematically correlated with size, duration or theme. In other words, the evidence did not suggest that there was a 'one-size fits all' format to partnership working in regeneration schemes. Rather, relative success has been associated with how the partnership actually worked and its structure, i.e. what it did in its day to day operations and how it was set up. The evidence suggests that there is no perfect formula for partnership working to ensure that optimal benefits emerge for the regeneration product achieved in the local area concerned and in relation to the strategic theme being pursued. However, some of the key findings are:

- Avoid missing-out partners if it is possible, or ensure that the partnership scheme has access to the missing partners through a link to a wider more strategic local partnership on which they are represented;
- Seek to avoid dominant partner(s) who often take control of key decisions since not only does this mitigate against good partnerships, by reducing possible synergies, but it usually means that there is little likelihood that the partnership will continue when specific regeneration funding comes to an end;
- Avoid marriages of convenience no matter how expedient they appear to the funding agency in appeasing bidders for scarce regeneration funding. They rarely work and mean little likelihood of continuity;
- Ensure the partnerships management and administration frameworks build on existing structures if they have a proven track record. Avoid re-inventing the wheel – avoid partnership proliferation for its own sake;
- It is not clear that the private sector is best placed to be the lead partner in a regeneration scheme. The private sector has a critical role to play but often provides effective outcomes when playing to its key strengths. The private sector often prefers not to be the lead partner;
- The community can be effective lead partners but this usually requires considerable capacity building, often over many years. Need access to officer support heavily in early years – often from local authority;
- Partnership should identify its key objectives and how they may ‘fit’ with wider goals of the mainstream providers/emerging policy items at an early stage. It is essential to have a vision in place from the outset and to have a clear strategic approach that builds from a careful analysis of the problems of the area and its residents, including real and perceived weaknesses and threats as well as strengths and opportunities. Successful partnerships identify emerging policy agendas at an early stage and seek to work in tandem with them, and this is particularly true for thematic partnerships;
- Partnerships involving extensive geographical coverage have to ensure representation across areas and it is essential to have a strong secretariat. It is necessary to recognise that policies drafted at one spatial level (national) need to be customised in their delivery to reflect deliver on the ground. It is also important to recognise that the incidence of problems like crime can easily be displaced between areas (zero sum game);
- Ensure that the partnership has effective monitoring and reviews procedures that inform the partners on a regular basis as to progress against scheme targets. Too many partnerships have monitoring systems that are relatively good at housekeeping matters but weak at providing the information to make strategic decisions;
- Ensure that monitoring information encompasses relevant themes (i.e. drugs, enterprise, employability) and relevant geographical areas such as new neighbourhoods, district, region;
- Good partnership working requires officers experienced in regeneration priorities, objectives and ‘speak’. There is a shortage of suitable qualified staff virtually across the board.

#### **4.4 Implications for successor bodies**

- 4.4.1 A finding from the research is that if there are strong and well founded partnerships in place in an area, then it is desirable to assess whether this could be used to continue regeneration in the area concerned when the original source of funding finishes and if new sources of regeneration funding will allow it. In other words, if core regeneration objectives still remain to be secured, then within reason the broad format of existing delivery vehicles may well be such that they can continue to be used. This may seem common sense but unfortunately it has become rather too common in recent years to establish new partnership structures whenever a new initiative (and usually an associated funding stream) has emerged from Central Government, the European Commission or elsewhere. The term 'death through partnership' has considerable meaning in many parts of the United Kingdom at the present time!
- 4.4.2 It is worth emphasising this point for two main reasons that have stood-out from the research. The first is that the evidence presented throughout this Report and elsewhere indicates quite clearly that in the majority of cases partnership-based delivery vehicles carry with them substantial advantages over single agency-based approaches in delivering regeneration. However, the research evidence is also fairly unambiguous that successful regeneration requires the presence of an effective partnership that recognises the factors that conform to Best Practice described above. This includes the ability to produce a strategy that enhances the core competences of the area and its residents.
- 4.4.3 The second is that it takes considerable time to establish and build partnerships. There are the nuts and bolts issues of obtaining a physical base, recruiting staff and establishing governance structures, as well as monitoring and financial systems - all in themselves sources of significant problems for new and developing partnerships. However, there are also matters relating to trust, confidence and the establishment of goodwill that are also not easy to establish and take considerable time. These 'set-up' costs may be very significant indeed.
- 4.4.4 In the light of these findings it was therefore with some interest that the research team examined the extent to which the partnerships established for the purposes of delivering the SRB case studies proved to be sustainable and went on to deliver regeneration on the basis of further rounds of SRB or new policy imperatives like Local Strategic Partnerships and Urban Regeneration Companies.
- 4.4.5 Tables 4.3 and 4.4 at the end of the chapter describe what happened in each case to each of the 20 case study partnerships when their original SRB funding came to an end. In six cases the partnership ceased its operations. In the remainder a number of models emerged.
- 4.4.6 Of those partnerships that did not continue the main reasons were:
- The partnership was formed for a specific regeneration initiative for a small area and once this had been completed there was no need for it to continue (Limes Farm Partnership, Chalkhill);
  - The partnership had not worked in a cohesive way during the scheme, thus there was insufficient momentum to keep the partnership going once the scheme had come to an end (Merseyside Learning Partnership, South Leytonstone Community Partnership);

- Closures of lead agencies (such as the Training and Enterprise Councils) led to a break in continuity of the Partnership (Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership, Brent and Harrow).

4.4.7 In some of the case studies although the partnership did not continue post-SRB, other partnership working took place:

- Bristol Regeneration Partnership, which was successful in bidding for all rounds of SRB, ceased to operate in 2001 as a decision was made by the City Council, in consultation with other partners, that it was not a suitable vehicle to provide the basis for the Local Strategic Partnership. Subsequently, the Council brought the management of the outstanding SRB programmes into its own regeneration department and is to pursue a strategic approach to regeneration and neighbourhood renewal through the Bristol Partnership, the LSP;
- The Made in Swadlincote Partnership (MISP) did not continue once its SRB programme finished, however, a number of the partners are involved in the South Derbyshire Local Strategic Partnership which has been developed through the Business Planning Group. It is hoped that some of the lessons from SRB can be brought to the LSP. Some of the remaining MISP partners are pursuing more economically grounded objectives through a new Economic Partnership which will concentrate on future light industrial and retail projects being carried in the town.
- In some cases a lead partner, usually the Council, realised that it needed to reduce its dominance and one way of doing this was to move the partnership to another host body. This usually meant that a new format of partnership working was established after the finish of the round one or two SRB scheme as was the case in Wolverhampton.

4.4.8 Some partnerships sought further funding from SRB after their round one/two funding. They used this funding to run subsequent programmes. Thus:

- Northumbria Community Safety Partnership went on to secure two further rounds of SRB enabling the Partnership Strategy Board to develop a sustainable programme against crime, emphasising the strength of the original thematic SRB scheme;
- The West Midlands Industrial Club were successful in securing SRB funds for round six allowing them to further explore the needs of the engineering sector in the region. Again, emphasising the strength of the original thematic SRB scheme;
- The West Cornwall Initiative Partnership successfully bid for three other rounds of SRB funding (one in association with the East Cornwall Initiative Partnership);
- The Rochdale Challenge Partnership was successful in gaining two further rounds of SRB funding in rounds two and five. One of the strengths of the SRB1 programme had been the forward strategy which had been designed from an early stage. A Working Group was set up to ensure all agencies had an input into the Forward Strategy which was then fed back to all Action Teams. The Canalside Action Team met beyond the end of the scheme to ensure partnership working on the physical regeneration programme continued;
- The Brighton & Hove Regeneration Partnership (BHRP) was successful in attracting successive rounds of SRB and will act as a delivery vehicle up to the completion of the round six scheme due to finish in 2006. The partnership is also seen as the main vehicle for delivering the South East England Development Agency's (SEEDA) Single Programme as part of the Area Investment Framework for Brighton and Hove and Adur. BHRP does also have strong links with both the Brighton & Hove Economic Partnership and the Local Strategic Partnership;

- The Woolwich Development Agency still manages two other SRB programmes and some EU Objective Two funding. It also has a potential role in implementing the London Development Agency's Zones of Change and seems likely to have some kind of role in the Government's plans for a new form of Urban Development Corporation in the Thames Gateway. Although Greenwich Partnership, the Local Strategic Partnership, is still very much at an early stage, it is functioning and has already produced a high level community strategy. Woolwich Development Agency is accountable to Greenwich Council, and not the Greenwich Partnership;
- The Royds Community Association (RCA) plans beyond SRB1 include the development of a strategy to fundamentally review the approach to managing the capital and social assets of the Royds area. From its SRB/local regeneration experience, the RCA is developing a number of activities as part of its forward/sustainability strategy. RCA has secured SRB round six funds and has sought further funding through a number of routes, including its consultancy and research activities, mainstream players, working with the LSP, bidding to the New Opportunities Fund and developing proposals for Neighbourhood Management.

4.4.9 Other partnerships have evolved during the life of the SRB programme and have developed into other bodies and structures. These include:

- Hull CityVision Ltd (HCV), for which the SRB2 programme was part of the broader HCV operations, linked to developing the City Regeneration Strategy (CRS) and as such the Gipsyville initiative has been developed as part of a coherent programme in which Geographical Priority Areas (GPAs) have been the focus of regeneration activity. SRB2 lessons and pilot projects have been integrated into the CRS along with other funding from rounds four and six of SRB and bids for further funding have included European funding, Hull Community Investment Fund, Lottery Fund and the New Opportunities Fund. After June 2002 HCV's forward strategy was set out into three distinct operations:
  - Hull CityVenture, that will develop/monitor socio-economic programmes, including the remaining SRB schemes, NDC and European programmes;
  - CityBuild, as an Urban Regeneration Company focusing on urban renaissance in line with current thinking, including the Rogers Report;
  - CityVision, that will work in partnership with the Local Strategic Partnership being developed by the City Council and other key partners.
- In Nottingham the Greater Nottingham Partnership successfully secured funding for four further rounds of SRB. From October 2002 an agreement was formalised between the GNP, which now manage all SRB funding for the East Midlands Development Agency as a Strategic Sub-regional Partnership, One City Partnership Nottingham (OCPN - who were the deliverers of the SRB as a Local Strategic Partnership) and the City Council (as the accountable body for SRB). This focused decision making within OCPN in implementing a unified SRB programme within the City;
- The City of Sunderland Partnership successfully bid for every round of SRB securing over £69 million of funds with forecast leverage of around £165 million. In 2001 the partnership restructured into a Local Strategic Partnership for the City which is made up of fourteen partners who include representatives from the council, Science Park, University, voluntary service and Small Business Service.
- For the Hangleton Knoll Project (HKP) the problem of attracting funding streams continued to dominate the operation of this community-based organisation. It is hoped that the track record of HKP will attract further financial support, though this reputation must be linked to a continuing strategic approach to locally focused

regeneration and community led activity. Building better links with mainstream providers and obtaining a greater involvement of the private sector remain priorities;

- 4.4.10 Overall, the evidence suggests that even those partnership structures that were regarded as effective delivery agents of regeneration by the end of their original round one or two SRB funding underwent significant change as they responded to new needs. As would be expected, those partnerships identified as being effective took a considerable period of time to evolve their working practices, membership and structures. Where effective partnership structures emerged these bodies then went on to attract further rounds of SRB funding. In the best cases they were successful in all further SRB rounds – in itself a measure of the confidence they inspired in the relevant supporting agents. There are thus examples from the SRB case studies of where the core competences of the regeneration partnership have evolved sufficiently to meet the needs, at least in part, of new initiatives like Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs).
- 4.4.11 Whilst the SRB research demonstrates the merits of building on existing partnership structures that have built a holistic approach to regeneration, perhaps over many years, we should end with a note of caution. Partnerships work largely as a result of having people who are committed to the task in hand and are senior enough to commit the resources of their respective institutions. If the seniority of the people is reduced this will change the whole cutting edge of the partnership and its ability to achieve real change.

**Table 4.3 Evolution of the 20 partnerships – Partnerships that did not continue**

Name of scheme	Partnership	Evolution
Limes Farm Partnership	The Limes farm Partnership	The Partnership did not continue beyond the SRB 1 scheme which finished in 1999. No further SRB funding was sought. This scheme was focused on the renovation of the Limes Farm housing estate in Epping with some training, health and social associated projects. Arrangement were in place to continue some of these projects
Brent and Harrow Business Support Scheme	Brent and Harrow Partnership	The Partnership did not continue beyond the life of the SRB 1 scheme and did not secure any subsequent funding. It was led by the North West London TEC which ceased in 2001. Of the 3 strands that comprised the scheme the business support element was to continue through the local Enterprise Agencies. The school links were destined to be mainstreamed but the Community Works element had no clear successor arrangements
Chalkhill Estate	Chalkhill Estate	The Partnership did not continue beyond the life of the SRB scheme and while some of the good practice training projects did continue their focus was on other deprived areas within Brent.
Merseyside Learning Partnership	Merseyside Learning Partnership	Partner commitment to the Merseyside Learning Partnership was not sufficient for it to survive beyond the term of its funding. This was due to a number of reasons: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ MLP's area of remit did not fit the emerging national "partnership map": it did not cover all of Merseyside (Halton, St Helens and the Wirral were excluded),</li> <li>▪ it was too closely associated with the TEC to be politically acceptable to many local players.</li> <li>▪ The development of national policies addressing disaffection and attainment encouraged the formation of new (and different) delivery partnerships within LEAs.</li> <li>▪ As a <i>partnership</i>, MLP had not delivered value to its stakeholders by way of joined-up activity or added value in terms either of strategy or delivery.</li> <li>▪ There is no evidence available that the MLP Board at any time took steps to attempt to fit the partnership into any overarching sub-regional or regional strategy.</li> </ul>
Lancashire Manufacturing Support Scheme	Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership	This was a Partnership between two TECs and a private company. The Partnership was established specifically to accommodate the joint SRB bid. Once the programme had completed the Partnership did not remain. No other SRB funding was secured.
South Leytonstone – Contract for Change	South Leytonstone Community Partnership	This Partnership did not continue beyond SRB. Relations between the partners did not develop in a cohesive way during the lifetime of the programme and it last met in March 2003 just before the SRB programme was due for completion.

Source: Department of Land Economy

**Table 4.4 Evolution of the 20 partnerships – Partnerships that have developed further**

Name of scheme	Partnership	Evolution
Northumbria Community Safety	Northumbria Community Safety Partnership	The Partnership went on to secure two further rounds of SRB funding which enabled the Partnership Strategy Board to develop a sustainable programme against crime, securing over £12 million SRB and leveraging a further £15 million.
Engineering in Education	The West Midlands Club 'Engineering in Education Scheme' Partnership	The Partnership put together a bid for round 5 SRB funding to ensure that the programme started in round 2 was able to continue, however, this was unsuccessful, although a related bid by one of the original partners was successful. They were subsequently successful in round 6 securing just over £4 million to further address the skill needs of the engineering sector in the region. [
Hangleton and Knoll	Hangleton Knoll Project	<p>While HKP had operated in the area for many years SRB funding enabled it to develop a more strategic approach to local area regeneration. Working in partnership with established organisations has enhanced capacity building and has left in place a firm foundation from which further community based activity can be developed and co-ordinated. While downsizing is a key focus of the future activities of HKP, the problem of funding streams continues to dominate the operation of this community-based organisation. It is hoped that the track record of HKP will attract further financial support, though this reputation must be linked to a continuing strategic approach to locally focused regeneration and community led activity. Building better links with mainstream providers and obtaining a greater involvement of the private sector remain priorities.</p> <p>In developing a forward strategy, HKP is aware of the need to attract an increased number of proactive residents who will be able to carry forward a range of existing and new initiatives that will contribute to local regeneration. In building successor arrangements it is recognised that the nucleus of existing residents must be strengthened through further direct community participation in the operation of projects and organisations. HKP viewed its involvement with SRB as an opportunity to develop new approaches to local regeneration in which the community play an active role in developing the scope and range of initiatives and in this respect SRB has left in place improved community facilities and has helped strengthen the community organisations that benefited.</p>
Swadlincote Woodlands	Made in Swadlincote Partnership	<p>The Partnership was not set to continue post-SRB. Some of the partners including the Chair are involved in the Local Strategic Partnership which has been developed through the Business Planning Group. It is hoped that some of the lessons from SRB can be brought to the LSP. The LSP has around 24 partners with equal representation between local authorities/ parishes, other public agencies, the private sector and the voluntary and community sector. South Derbyshire District Council and the South Derbyshire Chamber are both in the LSP along with the existing Chair at MISP who also sits on the Sub-regional Strategic Partnership.</p> <p>Some of the remaining MISP partners are pursuing more economically grounded objectives through a new Economic Partnership which is related to ongoing and future light industrial and retail projects being carried out in the town.</p>
Bristol 2020	Bristol Regeneration Partnership	The Bristol Regeneration Partnership has been successful in bidding for all rounds of SRB securing a total of around £50 million and leveraging a further £116 million. In 2001 the BRP ceased to operate as a decision was made by the City Council, in consultation with other partners, that it was not a suitable vehicle to provide the basis for the Local Strategic Partnership. In March 2002, Bristol City Council took the decision to bring the management of the outstanding SRB programmes into its own regeneration department, and to pursue a strategic approach to regeneration and neighbourhood renewal through the Bristol Partnership, the LSP.
Regenerating Wolverhampton	Wolverhampton Regeneration Partnership	The original Wolverhampton Regeneration Partnership did not continue after the completion of the SRB scheme. The perception that the Partnership was too dominated by the local council led the Partnership to reform. The current Partnership Board has ten members from the key organisations including the Council, health authority, local college and university, voluntary sector and race equality representative.
West Cornwall Initiative	West Cornwall Initiative Partnership	The Partnership were successful three other rounds of SRB funding (one in association with the East Cornwall Initiative). Total secured funds amounted to some £13 million with levered funds expected to be around £79 million.
Canalside Rochdale	The Rochdale Challenge Partnership	One of the strengths of the Canalside programme was the forward strategy which was designed from an early stage in the programme. All project leaders were involved in the development of the strategy. A Working Group was set up to ensure all agencies had an input into the Forward Strategy and that this work was then fed back to all Action Teams to ensure the maximisation of knowledge and expertise and the strengthening of links between initiatives. The Canalside Action Team also met beyond the end of the scheme to ensure partnership working on the physical regeneration programme continued. The Partnership was also successful in gaining two further rounds of SRB funding giving an SRB funding total for the town of £46 million.



**Table 4.4 Evolution of the 20 partnerships – Partnerships that have developed further (Contd)**

Name of scheme	Partnership	Evolution
Regenerating Central Brighton	Brighton & Hove Regeneration Partnership (BHRP)	<p>As the Brighton &amp; Hove Regeneration Partnership (BHRP) was successful in attracting successive rounds of SRB it acted as a delivery vehicle up to the completion of the round six scheme due to finish in 2006. As a consequence BHRP gained an expertise in regeneration issues and has responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the Brighton &amp; Hove Regeneration Strategy set out in April 2002. The Partnership is also the main vehicle for delivering SEEDA's Single Programme as part of the Area Investment Framework for Brighton &amp; Hove and Adur. BHRP also has strong links with both the Brighton &amp; Hove Economic Partnership and the Local Strategic Partnership.</p> <p>The Brighton &amp; Hove Economic Partnership (EP) which was set up in 2001 is focused on improving the image of the City of Brighton and will work closely with Brighton &amp; Hove City Council. This Partnership is very much private sector motivated and has sixteen members six private, four local authority and others including voluntary etc. This Partnership feeds into the Local Strategic Partnership lessons that have been learned from BHRP. EP is working very well and is more private sector oriented concentrating more on economic projects e.g. sites and premises. Many of the partners from BHRP are also members of the Local Strategic Partnership which is called 2020 Community Partnership. The Partnership currently comprises some 32 partners from all sectors many of whom were involved with BHRP.</p>
Greenwich - Woolwich Revival	Woolwich Development Agency	<p>WDA still manages two other SRB programmes and some EU Objective Two funding. It also has a potential role in implementing the London Development Agency's Zones of Change and seems likely to have some kind of role in the Government's plans for a new form of Urban Development Corporation in the Thames Gateway.</p> <p>Greenwich Partnership, the Local Strategic Partnership, is functioning and produced a high level community strategy early on. Woolwich Development Agency is accountable to Greenwich Council, and not the Greenwich Partnership.</p> <p>Greenwich is one of the 88 most deprived local authority districts in England, and qualifies for Neighbourhood Renewal Funding. It is understood that the Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy has been prepared and is being implemented. While the work of the SRB programmes, and that which is likely to be the focus of LDA's support, has strong physical regeneration and economic development foci, Neighbourhood Renewal is seen as being more concerned with service improvements and improving access to services and the economic opportunities coming on stream through other initiatives.</p>
Royds Bradford	Royds Community Association	<p>The RCA plans for the future of the Partnership beyond SRB1 include the development of a strategy to fundamentally review the approach to managing the capital and social assets of the Royds area. Within this strategy the revenue streams for the provision of services such as housing, health service delivery and social services should be more closely related to the needs of local areas and, it is anticipated, would entail delegated authority to locally-based organizations such as the RCA. From its SRB/local regeneration experience, the RCA is developing a number of activities as part of its forward/sustainability strategy. RCA remains committed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Building on the estate-based regeneration activities developed under SRB1 and extending partnership working to adjacent areas</li> <li>▪ Continued support for Community Businesses as part of the socio-economic development of Royds.</li> <li>▪ Establishing sustainable social action, including other agencies using mainstream funding for projects and discussions with Bradford Council on the delivery of local services by residents/community based companies.</li> <li>▪ Looking at alternative housing management initiatives, particularly linked to community ownership/stock transfer as part of the continued involvement of residents in managing their estates.</li> <li>▪ Building the RCA asset base through its research/consultancy activities, ILM initiatives and rental income from existing properties (eg. Shops, Healthy Living Centre)</li> <li>▪ Working with LSPs over the next three years through Neighbourhood Action Planning in local communities, using money from the NRF as part of the Bradford Vision initiative.</li> <li>▪ Developing a range of proposals and pilots for Neighbourhood Management as part of the Government's proposals to modernise service provision in partnership with local residents. RCA has been given two years to develop part of the initiative.</li> <li>▪ Developing the Enterprise Park, which has SRB6 funding, as an income generator and local source of economic activity. This will be in conjunction with the RDA.</li> <li>▪ A successful bid to the New Opportunities Fund aimed at reducing social exclusion.</li> </ul>

Table 4.4 Evolution of the 20 partnerships – Partnerships that have developed further (Contd)		
Name of scheme	Partnership	Evolution
Hull CityVision – Gipsyville Estate	Hull CityVision	<p>The SRB2 programme was part of the broader HCV operations, linked to developing the City Regeneration Strategy (CRS) and as such it has been possible to develop the Gipsyville initiative as part of a coherent programme in which Geographical Priority Areas (GPAs) have been the focus of regeneration activity. SRB2 lessons and pilot projects have subsequently been integrated into the CRS with funding from SRB4, SRB6 and bids for European funding, Hull Community Investment Fund, Lottery Fund, New Opportunities funding, Hull Leisure Services and Hull Employment Consortium/DfEE finance.</p> <p>After June 2002 HCVs forward strategy was set out into three distinct operations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Hull CityVenture that will develop/monitor socio-economic programmes including the remaining SRB schemes, NDC and European programmes</li> <li>▪ CityBuild as an Urban Regeneration Company focusing on urban renaissance in line with current thinking including the Rogers Report.</li> <li>▪ CityVision that will work in partnership with the Local Strategic Partnership being developed by the City Council and other key partners.</li> </ul>
Nottingham Capturing the Dynamics	Greater Nottingham partnership	<p>The Partnership successfully secured funding for 4 further rounds of SRB in addition to this round two scheme. Total SRB funds secured amounted to over £43 million with projected leverage overall of almost £79 million. From October 2002 an agreement was formalised between the GNP which now managed all SRB funding for the RDA as a Strategic Sub-regional Partnership, One City Partnership Nottingham (OCPN - who were the deliverers of the SRB as a Local Strategic Partnership) and the City Council (as the accountable body for SRB). This focused decision making within OCPN in implementing a unified SRB programme within the City.</p>
City of Sunderland	City of Sunderland Partnership	<p>The City of Sunderland Partnership successfully bid for every round of SRB securing over £69 million of funds with forecast leverage of around £165 million. In 2001 the partnership restructured forming into the new Local Strategic Partnership for the City which is made up of around 20 partners who include representatives from the council, Science Park, University, voluntary service and Small Business Service.</p>

Source: Department of Land Economy

## 5. Partnership working and the involvement of the Community and Voluntary Sectors

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After a modest start in rounds one and two, SRB began to encourage and develop more effective community participation in local area regeneration.

The participation of communities has varied across SRB schemes. From the 20 round one and two schemes that have been the subject of our final evaluation, only Royds Bradford and Hangleton and Knoll were community led with the direct involvement of residents in the planning, development and delivery of the programmes. This was partly achieved through partnership working with community-based organisations that had built a strong reputation within the community over time.

The Royds Community Association, as the accountable body, has demonstrated the scope for community involvement at all levels and the value of real partnership working that has resulted in several regional and national awards. The Hangleton & Knoll experience provides lessons for the SRB programme in relation to inclusion, project targeting, partnership working, links with existing community activity and sustainability.

### 5.1 Lessons of community and voluntary sector involvement in SRB

5.1.1 Gabriel Chanan's article on '**Discovering Community Action**' (Community Development Forum, 1994) highlighted a continuing paradox in the role of the community in local regeneration. He drew attention to the importance of the voluntary sector and community groups in enhancing people's quality of life on the one hand, and, on the other, the weaknesses of the community sector which constrain its ability to effectively carry out economic and social regeneration. It is often "small and poorly resourced for the job it needs to do" and often "too fragmentary or lacking in the necessary powers". Community groups frequently splinter and are fiercely independent, while "leaders" of a group may not represent the community as a whole. Where groups come together into "umbrella" groupings these may not be sufficiently robust or independent to strengthen the community sector or give it "a co-ordinated voice". Whilst individual groups pride themselves on their independence, "dynamic umbrella activity is needed to create strength in the local groups as a whole", and hence, enable them to be effective partners in, for example, an SRB regeneration partnership, by compromising some independence in return for regeneration benefits. Chanan went on to say :

"No partnership can succeed if it treats the local community as a junior member. The community and its organisations is not just one amongst many agencies, as it is often treated. It has to be given **equal weight with all agencies** taken together: after all, it consists in itself of a wide range of agencies". (Chanan 1994: p15)

5.1.2 In Chanan's more recent research (**Searching for Solid Foundations- Community Involvement and Urban Policy**; ODPM 2003) he states:

"Community involvement has been a growing aspect of urban policy for at least ten years, and has become particularly prominent in the last five, being a fundamental aspect of regeneration, local government modernisation and local governance. However, it occupies an ambiguous position, mostly lacking

specific aims and targets. There is a tendency for community involvement objectives to get swallowed up into the objectives of other fields or to dissipate as programmes unfold.” (Chanan 2003: Executive Summary, p15)

- 5.1.3 For Chanan “Objectives and methods of improving community involvement at both national, regional and local level should include but clearly distinguish between:
- a) building up social capital and community cohesion in local communities;
  - b) maximising local residents’ engagement and involvement in public decision-making and monitoring of services;
  - c) facilitating different types of service provision by community and voluntary organisations;
  - d) facilitating the contribution of communities to building up local economic activity and social enterprise.” (Chanan 2003: p90, point 3)
- 5.1.4 From the outset SRB was designed to encourage the involvement of the community in local area regeneration, as the original guidance made clear. However, in round one, and to some extent round two, experience many community groups/voluntary organisations did not possess the knowledge, skills and administrative resources to be effective partners, let alone lead partners of regeneration schemes. During this early period, although the Government Offices for the Regions sought to give special help to community led bids, community groups found the competitive approach to the funding of regeneration difficult to get to grips with. In consequence some community groups made failed bids in rounds one and two and became dispirited.
- 5.1.5 However, even in this early stage of SRB there were mechanisms through which local partnerships could assist in capacity building amongst community groups. Firstly, local partnerships received about 5% of SRB spend (7% in schemes with high private sector participation) to cover management and administrative expenses. In some cases this was distributed amongst the active and involved partners but in other cases the lead partners/accountable bodies tended to retain most or all of this funding. This was often at the expense of partners who had management, monitoring and administrative tasks to do.
- 5.1.6 A second mechanism was through scheme projects run by community groups, the funding for which could include a component for managing and administering the project and, hence, building the capacity of community groups to undertake regeneration projects. Such a component was rarely built into project costs in round one schemes but was increasingly included in subsequent rounds.
- 5.1.7 The third mechanism was a project within the scheme, the objective of which was explicitly to build up the capacity of the community to take part in the regeneration process. Several case studies have deployed this mechanism, which can take one of several forms. At Limes Farm Estate, for example, one project funded a community development worker, whilst in Hangleton Knoll, Woolwich and Swadlincote a “community chest” project had been set up to award small sums (typically £200 to £2,000) to community groups to enhance their organisational skills and capacity. Royds-Bradford ran a social network aid programme, Canalside Rochdale a community planning and training weekend and Hull CityVision similar focus planning groups. Some of these are quite modest attempts at direct capacity building but they have the merit of recognising that very low levels of capacity have to be enhanced gradually - in some cases by helping to set up formal community groups where there were none before.

- 5.1.8 In rounds three and four the Government Offices for the Regions began to play a more proactive role in building successful schemes out of two or more community-based bids which individually would not have been approved. The introduction of the “outline bid stage” in the bidding process provided a means for the Government Office to improve and merge together partnerships and schemes, involving community groups into something more viable and coherent which would also serve to build the capacity of the community sector.
- 5.1.9 However, there was also an issue of tokenism in that having key individuals from the community sitting on SRB boards/committees, charged with strategic planning and development, did not necessarily lead to wider community involvement in the regeneration process. As Purdue *et al* 2000<sup>1</sup> are aware, there are tensions regarding accountability and community representation when they state:

“Community leaders bear heavy expectations to span the barriers between the structures and professions of government on the one hand and the socially excluded and often disgruntled local populations on the other.”

They go on to say:

“This creates the expectation that community leaders can represent all types of people in their area. However, all too often leaders have access only to fragmented communities of identity based on limited social networks against a background of apathy or even hostility.” (Purdue *et al* 2000, p2)

- 5.1.10 In the wake of the SRB experience, recent changes in the SRB programme and the advent of the New Deal for Communities and Pathfinder initiatives, it is surprising that the community engagement issues raised by Chanan and Purdue *et al* have not received more systematic attention. In setting this problem in context, Burton 2003<sup>2</sup> suggests:

“There are many descriptions of how community involvement strategies have been anything but strategic - how they have been poorly conceived, inadequately resourced and developed far too late in the cycle to be very effective..... But few are able to draw on empirical material of what has worked successfully in practice.” (Burton 2003, p 28)

## 5.2 The role of local communities in the SRB process

- 5.2.1 While the majority of SRB schemes have offered opportunities for community/voluntary sector participation, there has been considerable variation across schemes in the actual degree of participation. Of the case study final evaluations only two initiatives (Hangleton Knoll and Royds Bradford) were characterised by the local community actually taking the lead in planning and delivering projects. In other SRB schemes the community and voluntary organisations have not always been able to make a significant contribution and/or become involved in the early planning stages of the regeneration initiatives. In some cases capacity building within community groups has been a necessary prerequisite for their participation, though there has been no coherent strategy across schemes.

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<sup>1</sup> Purdue, Razzaque, Hambleton, Stewart, Huxham and Vangen. (2000) Community leadership in area regeneration; The Policy Press.

<sup>2</sup> Burton (2003). Community involvement in neighbourhood regeneration; stairway to heaven or road to nowhere?; CNR Paper 13, p28: July 2003

- 5.2.2 Where community involvement has been significant in SRB schemes there has often been a definable impact in terms of the effectiveness of the scheme in meeting its targets and developing a more robust forward strategy. A key factor in community capacity building is to ensure that individual projects have been designed to tie into existing structures and meet identified specific needs. Where this has occurred members of the local community have become more directly involved in issues that they have identified and perceived as requiring attention. For example, the operation of the Royds Community Association (RCA) with a majority of residents on the Board has engaged the wider community at every stage of the programme in order to maximise the impact of regeneration in relation to perceived local needs. Similarly, the development of the Opportunities Centre in Hangleton Knoll directly involved the local community in the development of a project to enhance labour market opportunities/training. The Sandfield Neighbourhood Renewal Area Project in Rochdale, in which community capacity building was a feature, also provided a number of opportunities for the direct involvement of local people.
- 5.2.3 Research across the 20 SRB schemes has enabled a clearer profile to be constructed about community involvement and community capacity building. The evidence suggests that the early involvement of local people at the planning and developmental stages of regeneration programmes is a key factor in building sustainable development, particularly when linked to partnership working with existing community organisations/groups. While the scope for community participation may vary from programme to programme (according to project mix, existing community activity, perceived local needs etc.) this does not detract from the requirement to involve local people at every stage in the regeneration process.
- 5.2.4 It is desirable to enhance the capacity of key community groups and voluntary organisations that have already built a solid reputation within an area because these are then in a stronger position to encourage the participation of local people in the regeneration process. This approach can also leave in place robust mechanisms that offer increased opportunities to draw down further resources to the area beyond the life of the SRB programme. This chapter adopts conventional definitions. Thus:
- **community groups** are characterised as locally based often informal organisations in which activity and control are exercised by local residents, with and without paid staff;
  - **voluntary organisations** usually constituted as a charity or company limited by guarantee that deliver a specialist service often with paid staff supported by voluntary help and may have national, regional and/or local coverage.
- 5.2.5 Where local communities have been nominally involved in SRB schemes (i.e. their opinions may have been sought through surveys and meetings but they have not been actively involved in the delivery of projects), it has sometimes been difficult to build sustained local interest. As a consequence, this has often led to apathy, particularly during the initial developmental stages where there are often few tangible benefits to meet rising expectations. The development of an early rapport with local communities helps to enhance the delivery of projects, resulting in a clearer understanding on the part of local people as to the wider aims and objectives of the regeneration programme overall.

### **5.3 Community and voluntary organisations as lead partners in SRB partnerships**

- 5.3.1 Out of the 1028 approved SRB schemes in all six rounds only 31 were led by community groups and 93 by voluntary sector organisations. Table 5.1 presents the lead partners for the first two rounds of SRB where most of the nine round one schemes were originally classified as being led by the voluntary sector, although some were actually led by community groups. The thirteen schemes in round two were more precisely differentiated between community groups and the voluntary sector. In any event, the evidence from the national SRB database shows that, compared with schemes led by other types of lead partner (e.g. local authority, private sector), those led by community groups and voluntary organisations tended to have below average expenditure and be of shorter duration.
- 5.3.2 Some 10% of community/voluntary sector led schemes were targeted at ethnic community problems and disadvantaged groups such as children and the elderly. A further 20% of schemes were linked to improving the physical environment/facilities for the local community. Over a third of these schemes were operating in London, where the capacity of community groups and voluntary organisations has generally been more developed, with 20% from the North East. None originated from the East Midlands (see Table 5.1).
- 5.3.3 Given the characteristics of the vast majority of the schemes it was often difficult for communities, community groups and voluntary organisations to be involved as an equal stakeholder alongside local authorities and the private sector. In the majority of cases local authorities were the accountable body and have often thus assumed responsibility for the overall development/delivery of the scheme. In some instances this created some early tensions and mistrust within communities and meant a slow engagement of local people in the regeneration of their area. It also led to problems in subsequently delivering projects in which local co-operation was a prime requirement. There was little evidence of funding being specifically allotted for capacity building in the early rounds of SRB, although the position improved considerably in later rounds.
- 5.3.4 Although Councillors were sometimes involved in individual SRB projects, the main influence of local authorities was through Officers who had responsibility for the operation of SRB schemes, generally as lead partners and/or the accountable body. While Councillors participated in the development of projects (e.g. in terms of sitting on the Boards of existing community organisations), this type of involvement did not appear to have been significantly enhanced as a direct result of the SRB schemes. In reality, Councillors were involved in a range of local development initiatives that have included projects within SRB programmes.

<b>Table 5.1: SRB schemes with lead partner from the voluntary/community groups</b>				
	Duration of scheme (yrs)	Region	Total SRB cost £m	Classification of local partner
<b>Round 1</b>				
Walker Open Learning & Fitness	2	NE	0.5	Vol
Social Partnership	2	NE	0.7	Vol
Miles Platting & Ancoats Young People	2	NW	2.0	Vol
Architecture Centre - N. Kent	3	SE	0.6	Vol
The Bloomsbury Project	3	LO	3.7	Vol
Cautioning Support Project	5	NE	0.5	Vol
Black Country Urban Forest	5	WM	0.8	Vol
Action for London's Environment	5	LO	4.7	Vol
Royds Bradford *	7	YH	29.5	Com Group
<b>Round 2</b>				
The Brentwaters Partnership (Suffolk)	3	E	0.1	Com Group
Wolverton: Youth Community Business	3	SE	0.2	Vol
Casac Partnership (Leeds)	3	YH	0.2	Com Group
Amble Challenge Bid	3	NE	0.3	Com Group
Hardwick Comm Partnership Regeneration	3	NE	0.4	Com Group
Enhancing the dev't of ethnic minorities	3	LO	0.6	Vol
Stratford Regional Station	4	LO	1.6	Com Group
Hangleton and Knoll *	4	SE	1.6	Com Group
Children and Neighbourhoods in London	5	LO	0.3	Vol
Developing Park Royal's Offer	6	LO	2.0	Com Group
Older People: Harnessing Potential & Prov supp	6	LO	2.1	Com Group
Pan London Comm Regen P'ship (Ethnic Communities)	7	LO	0.8	Vol
Vital Centres and Green Links	7	LO	8.2	Vol

\*Indicates schemes that are included in the National SRB Evaluation.

Source: ODPM Dataease.

## 5.4 Community and voluntary sector involvement within the 20 SRB Schemes

- 5.4.1 At the midterm stage of the national evaluation of SRB the evidence indicated that community and voluntary sector involvement in SRB had been modest but was increasing through time. Although this impact had been variable across individual schemes and projects within schemes, the evidence from SRB indicated that there had been a growing interest among community and voluntary organisations in taking a stronger role in locally targeted regeneration schemes.
- 5.4.2 For those schemes that were geared towards thematic programmes it proved difficult to engage local communities beyond initial consultations and/or meetings to inform the public of programme developments. Moreover, it was often a complex process involving numerous local communities spread across wide geographical areas.
- 5.4.3 From its inception SRB placed greater emphasis than previous regeneration programmes on the requirement for schemes to address community need. This was achieved in the early years by Government Offices encouraging the involvement of communities and ethnic minorities within communities in the regeneration process. However, GOs generally acknowledged that the majority of round one schemes/partnerships were weak in this regard and by round six specific guidance had been issued to strengthen the position. This guidance is generally acknowledged to have been of significant use.



- 5.4.4 While part of the early community involvement problems stemmed from the comparatively short time-scale involved in bringing SRB on-stream, it was also evident that the majority of community groups and voluntary sector organisations did not have the resources or range of skills to play an active/lead role in the individual schemes. This has remained a key issue for all local area-based regeneration initiatives and emphasises the need to allow sufficient funding for community capacity building. A clear example is when a community or voluntary group wishes to make an effective contribution to managing a key theme in a partnership but requires some funding for salaries and/or specific training in order to meet their commitment.
- 5.4.5 However, it should also be pointed out that community groups often have their own agenda that does not always involve co-operative working with a range of other community partners. While it is an issue for communities in general, it is also of crucial importance for black and minority ethnic groups who may often feel isolated within local communities. Tensions can arise in terms of the ownership of community-based projects when local people do not feel they have been adequately consulted regarding the scope and tenure of specific initiatives, a message reinforced when the membership of Partnership Boards is heavily biased towards local authorities, voluntary sector and other public sector bodies.
- 5.4.6 In thematic case study schemes such as Northumberland Community Safety, Brent & Harrow, the Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership and the Merseyside Learning Partnership, there was little evidence of community influence and/or involvement in the management planning and development of the SRB schemes. Moreover, even where SRB schemes had been linked with major physical regeneration (as in Limes Farm and Chalkhill) community involvement was minimal.
- 5.4.7 However, in other case studies the position was quite different. As part of the Canalside Rochdale SRB scheme an extensive community consultation exercise was carried out. It showed low levels of participation in community groups, little sense of community identity and considerable fragmentation between local groups. As a result, the scheme began to address this issue by supporting local community groups and convening a Community Empowerment Working Party. This Working Party evaluated the current situation and determined a strategy for future capacity building in the area. Their recommendations were subsequently taken on board in the roll-out of a Round five SRB scheme.
- 5.4.8 In Hangleton and Knoll, where the SRB scheme was community led, there were significant opportunities for residents' participation in the development and operation of projects. Thus, the variable approach to community engagement across SRB schemes has, in part, reflected the degree of local community-based capacity and also the attitude and perceptions of key regeneration partners that can often be poorly informed.
- 5.4.9 Despite the initial difficulties for round one schemes, they generally increased the involvement of both community and voluntary sectors over their lifetime and this continued across successive rounds of SRB. In this respect, the SRB experience strengthened the validity of capacity building among key local players/communities. This was amply demonstrated in the case of Hangleton Knoll Partnership where a modest £1.6 million of SRB expenditure resulted in an effective regeneration programme for the two estates concerned, strengthened the operations of existing community-based groups and involved the wider community in the regeneration process. The scheme thus provided evidence of the positive aspects of capacity building and demonstrated how projects may be developed within existing

community-based activity. In the case of Hangleton Knoll this was achieved through the involvement of two estate-based community associations that had been involved in previous community-based regeneration prior to SRB.

- 5.4.10 In Royds Bradford there was a clear commitment to community participation that was demonstrated in the planning, developmental and operational stages of the programme. The scheme also benefited from a high level of partnership working with the private sector, local council, the police, primary care trust and local schools. Residents were in the majority on the Board and were actively involved in the development of projects to meet locally defined needs (e.g. Healthy Living Centre, housing renovation/designing out crime, raising educational standards in schools, environmental improvements).
- 5.4.11 Across the 20 SRB case studies a number of projects actively involved the community. Examples include:
- community safety/crime prevention;
  - health and drugs initiatives;
  - training/employment programmes;
  - raising educational standards in schools;
  - community forums;
  - environmental projects;
  - community-based businesses;
  - housing development initiatives;
  - black and minority ethnic projects particularly linked to education and training;
  - the provision of community chests for new community groups;
  - the development of existing community organisations.
- 5.4.12 While various projects offered opportunities for community participation this was also achieved through public meetings, consultations and participation in social surveys. In some cases local communities feel that they have not been sufficiently involved in local regeneration activity and this has been a continuing tension which has implications for sustainable development and the design of a viable forward strategy beyond SRB. Community groups clearly have a key role to play in the design of sustainable outcomes but can often require extensive outreach support to achieve this.
- 5.4.13 This issue was taken on board by ODPM through the development of the Bidding Guidance for successive rounds of SRB. In round six guidance (December 1999), greater emphasis was placed on community participation and community capacity building as an integral part of the regeneration process.
- 5.4.14 The Home Office report of the 'Policy Action Team on Community Self Help' (September 1999, chapter five) sets out the principles and action plan for community self help through the work of the Active Community Unit (ACU). It was envisaged that the work of the ACU would link with other programmes such as SRB, NDC, NRS and the Social Exclusion Unit within the Cabinet Office in encouraging a more proactive community role in the development of local areas.
- 5.4.15 From the national evaluation of SRB it is evident that sustainable development is inextricably linked to the positive and active engagement of local communities and community organisations/groups that are already operating in the area and therefore understand the scope and complexities of local need. In developing a more coherent community engagement framework local communities could benefit from three crucial strategies:

- A systematic programme of training to bolster their existing collective range of skills in managing what are often complex regeneration programmes;
- A clear engagement strategy for the community to work in partnership with key local players whose expertise and resources could significantly increase the impact of local initiatives through 'joined-up' regeneration;
- The requirement to bend main programmes as a key factor in the achievement of sustainable development.

## 5.5 Community led regeneration - the Royds experience

5.5.1 The Royds Bradford SRB case study embraced three housing estates (Buttershaw, Woodside and Delph Hill) with a population of 12,000 residents. The estates were generally characterised by poor quality housing stock, a lack of amenities and a negative image within the wider Bradford conurbation. The Royds Community Association (RCA) was formed in 1994 in response to the need to regenerate the three estates. In 1995 it was successful in winning a £30 million SRB bid for a seven-year programme that secured £37 million of other funding accounting for total expenditure of some £68 million. The Royds initiative was somewhat unique across the 20 case studies evaluated since RCA led the scheme and acted as the accountable body. The main focus of the scheme was on the refurbishment of the houses on the estates with additional projects focused on employment, training, education, health and further community development. (Further detail of the programme is contained in part three of this Report).

5.5.2 RCA demonstrated the value of working in partnership with the local authority, private sector and housing associations in the physical regeneration of the area, with the Police in reducing property crime and the PCT in developing health care initiatives. English Partnerships, the Church Urban Fund and the Countryside Agency have worked closely with the RCA in developing local amenities in the creation/improvement of 'village centres' across the three estates. In encouraging partnership working residents have had an opportunity to work with various private sector and mainstream players in regenerating their estates within a sustainable development strategy.

5.5.3 The broad impact of the programme on local residents is presented in Table 5.2.

<b>Table 5.2: Selected gross outputs for Royds Bradford</b>	
<b>Type of resident activity</b>	<b>Numbers involved</b>
Residents into employment	868
Residents accessing employment through training	414
Number of training weeks	3,760
Residents into self-employment	78
Number of residents visited re housing renovation/physical improvements	3,671
Number of children benefiting from educational support	5,680
Number of young people involved in crime prevention initiatives	2,725
Numbers benefiting from advice	7,000
Number of volunteers recruited	446
Number of volunteers trained	112
Number involved in health initiatives	6,000

Source: Department of Land Economy

- 5.5.4 The marketing of the Royds initiative to the local community focused on the production of regular newsletters, an annual report and numerous articles in both local and national newspapers/journals. The Royds Consultation Bus mounted an exhibition across the estates, involving some 5000 local residents with such success that a second bus came into operation in the summer of 2002. Building on these initiatives residents were involved in detailed consultation regarding the scope and development of projects in meeting their identified needs.
- 5.5.5 At the national level RCA exhibited at the Harrogate Housing Conference in conjunction with SRB partners, while several awards were won by the scheme including the RTPI National Award for Planning Achievement, BURA Best Practice in the Community Award and the Development Trusts Association Good Practice Award. While groups and organisations visit Royds from all over the country, visitors also come from Australia, Russia and the USA, though local interest from adjacent geographical areas resulted in the RCA providing support to local initiatives. The RCA is also involved in Neighbourhood Action Planning and Neighbourhood Management for Bradford Vision, Yorkshire Forward and the Government Office. The RCA has been given two years to develop Neighbourhood Management proposals and pilots in seeking to modernise local service provision.
- 5.5.6 The Royds SRB programme has demonstrated that community led regeneration can play a key role in developing projects to meet the needs of local communities and sustain such regeneration over time. While the RCA has been supported by a relatively small number of very committed residents, many community-based organisations and groups have developed their operations through working in partnership with the RCA, which has enabled a wider spectrum of the community to become involved in the regeneration process. A significant number of volunteers have also been recruited, with some residents receiving training.
- 5.5.7 In broad terms the Royds SRB supported partnership has been able to demonstrate the viability of community-led regeneration and thus recognise the value of a community-based development strategy that can address local need and social exclusion. It has linked physical regeneration to socio-economic initiatives in building a balanced programme in addressing deprivation that improves the quality of life for local communities through increased amenities, facilities and environmental improvements.
- 5.5.8 With the formal completion of the original SRB round one scheme in 2002 RCA sought to diversify its operations to develop revenue streams that can support future activity on the Royds estate (e.g. regeneration consultancy involving Yorkshire Forward, the LSP and New Opportunities Fund, management of the New Enterprise Park and rental income/land rates). It has also undertaken a fundamental review of the way in which the capital and social assets of the Royds area are managed, including the delivery of local services that relate to residents' priorities, the delegation of responsibility to local organisations and the recognition that services could be operated to include adjacent areas to avoid displacement/duplication effects across wards.
- 5.5.9 In delivering an effective SRB scheme the Royds experience has:
- Demonstrated the viability of a community-led regeneration programme;
  - Recognised the value of a community development strategy that addressed social inclusion;

- Recognised the positive aspects of working in partnership with existing community organisations/groups, mainstream players and stakeholders;
- Demonstrated the need to link physical regeneration to socio-economic initiatives in building a balanced programme in addressing area-based deprivation;
- Improved the quality of life for local communities through increased amenities; facilities and environmental improvements;
- Recognised the need for a forward strategy that includes:
  - A fundamental review of the way in which the capital and social assets of the Royds area are managed, including the delivery of local services linked to residents' priorities, the delegation of responsibility to local organisations and the recognition that services could be delivered to include adjacent areas to avoid displacement/duplication effects across wards.
  - RCA diversifying its operations by developing revenue streams that could support future activity on the Royds estates (eg. regeneration consultancy involving Yorkshire Forward, the LSP and the New Opportunities Fund, management of the new SRB6 Enterprise Park, rental income from the village centres and land sales).
  - RCA seeking further regeneration funding in partnership with mainstream players.

## **5.6 Community led regeneration - the Hangleton Knoll experience.**

- 5.6.1 Hangleton and Knoll are two local authority housing estates to the north of Hove physically isolated from the Brighton and Hove urban area. This isolation excluded local residents from the regeneration activity taking place elsewhere in the urban area. The Knoll Estate was built in the 1920s, whilst the Hangleton Estate was built mainly in the 1950s. The Council stock is of traditional construction and low rise. There are about 8,000 people in the target area. The Estates have no locally-based/focused employment opportunities and few leisure facilities and there are serious problems of crime and disaffection amongst young people. The SRB round two scheme secured in 1996 provided an opportunity to offer local people a greater stake in regeneration linked to their identified needs.
- 5.6.2 The Hangleton and Knoll scheme operated in conjunction with an existing Community Development Agency called The Hangleton Knoll Project (HKP) that was working with local community organisations, charities and the local authority. HKP commenced its operations in 1983 as a Community Development Agency through the efforts of a small group of residents. The agency subsequently built a reputation for working to improve the quality of life for local residents. In its early years it employed just one community worker and for the first three years was funded solely from community resources. Over the period 1983 to 1995 HKP's work on the two estates attracted over £3 million of expenditure, including the input from the Community Centres and substantial amounts of unpaid voluntary work by the community itself.
- 5.6.3 This Hangleton & Knoll SRB scheme employed ten staff and helped to initiate over 80 local community groups with 180 residents regularly helping to organise and run community activities and attend meetings. This was achieved through direct involvement in the planning operation of projects and/or participation in the various projects as beneficiaries. Local residents were directly involved in many projects including planning environmental improvements, the Opportunities Centre (support for entering the labour market), the Community Festival, improvements to the

physical and social amenities at the two community centres and the Youth Music Project. The numbers of local residents involved are indicated in Table 5.3 below.

<b>Table 5.3: Selected gross outputs for Hangleton and Knoll</b>	
<b>Type of resident activity</b>	<b>Numbers involved</b>
Residents accessing employment through training	323
Number of training weeks	1,760
Young people benefiting to promote social & personal development	1,289
Number attending youth crime prevention initiatives	473
No local people given access to new sports opps/facs	3,066
Number local people given access to new cultural opps/facs	3,006
Number using improved cultural facs	1,402
Number voluntary organisations supported	2
Number community organisations supported	23
Number individuals employed in voluntary work	404
Residents receiving emp/training/education advice	938
Residents receiving referral to jobs and/training	1,353
No volunteers receiving training	145

Source: Final evaluation of Hangleton & Knoll

- 5.6.4 The other main partners in the SRB scheme were the Hangleton Community Association, the Knoll Community Association, the Hangleton and Knoll Community Festival and Brighton & Hove Council (formerly Hove Borough Council). Part of the programme was delivered by East Sussex Careers Service and Sussex Chamber of Commerce Training and Enterprise. Each project was managed by its own steering group that included representatives from the main partners, though steering groups were required to report back to the HKP Board regarding progress. This created a degree of continuity while enabling the community to retain a measure of control on the scope of the individual projects.
- 5.6.5 The partners agreed that Brighton & Hove Council should act as the accountable body for the partnership. It should also be responsible for the financial management of SRB funds using the Council's financial management systems to enable accurate and timely budget monitoring and receipts and payment systems to be carried out. Where grant aid is awarded to community groups they are required to account for these and enable auditors to access records under the accounting guidelines set out by the Charity Commissioners.
- 5.6.6 In partnership with the two community associations a number of projects were developed to expand the scope of community-based activity and enable residents to increase their skills in relation to wider employment opportunities. The SRB programme built on previous community development work on the two estates and in consequence provided an opportunity for local residents to design and deliver a programme for the local community.
- 5.6.7 The SRB scheme exceeded the majority of its targets and sought to leave in place a robust framework to enable the Hangleton Knoll Partnership, in conjunction with other community organisations, to encourage further regeneration on the two estates and increase community involvement in that process. The Opportunities Centre provided support to adjacent communities through the opening of a second office. The Trust for Developing Communities plans to operate in the wider Brighton and Hove conurbation as a support agency that can draw upon the Hangleton & Knoll

experience in encouraging other communities to become involved in regenerating their areas.

5.6.8 The Hangleton & Knoll SRB scheme is a good example of intensive community involvement in regeneration in which the community can play a significant role. The local authority played a secondary supporting role as was the case in Royds Bradford. The Hangleton Knoll SRB scheme brought badly needed extra resources to the community sector to enable it to broaden its regeneration activities and work in partnership with other bodies that have expertise in economic, social and environmental regeneration. Although a simple and effective community structure was already in place, SRB funding enabled the partnership to enhance its capacity to undertake more comprehensive regeneration. However, as is usually the case, much of the responsibility for the SRB scheme fell to a relatively small number of local individuals who had experience of community development through the operation of the Hangleton Knoll Partnership. In delivering an effective SRB scheme, the Hangleton & Knoll experience has:

- linked SRB projects to local needs as defined by the estate-based communities;
- recognised the value of developing and extending existing community-based organisations and initiatives in terms of capacity building and community participation;
- attempted to build wider opportunities for local residents in terms of their future economic security, particularly through the Opportunities Centre and its links with the wider Brighton & Hove labour market;
- improved the amenities available to local communities through increased social facilities and environmental gains.

## **5.7 Community groups and voluntary organisations as partners in the remaining (non-community-led) SRB Schemes**

5.7.1 Table 5.4 below indicates the nature and extent of community group/voluntary sector involvement in schemes led by other types of lead partner organisations such as local authorities and Training and Enterprise Councils. In all but two of the remaining eighteen case studies there was at least one partner from the community/voluntary sector, though participation has varied widely between the case studies. Some of the reasons for this variation were:

- Round two schemes were able to involve community groups and voluntary organisations more effectively than round one schemes;
- Schemes focusing mainly on economic objectives and thematic schemes generally had relatively lower involvement of community groups/voluntary sector than multiple objective schemes, e.g. Engineering in Education, Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership, City of Sunderland, Merseyside Learning Partnership;
- Small area estate-based schemes had a greater opportunity to promote community group involvement because community groups were directly and intimately affected by the scheme, e.g. Chalkhill, Hull City Vision, Nottingham, South Leytonstone and Limes Farm;
- Town and city-wide schemes were characterised more by umbrella community groups/partnerships and city-wide voluntary organisations acting as partners in a more representative fashion as opposed to direct involvement, e.g. Wolverhampton, Bristol, Canalside Rochdale, Woolwich and Central Brighton;
- Schemes extending over more than one District which also tended to be thematic were more likely to have token representation of a voluntary sector organisation or none at all, e.g. Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership, Merseyside Learning

Partnership, Northumbria Community Safety, West Cornwall Initiative and Engineering in Education;

- Some schemes recognised that the community sector was relatively under-developed and lacking in capacity and consequently did not involve community groups directly as partners but rather build up their capacity through involvement in individual projects. To some extent this applied to Nottingham, West Cornwall, City of Sunderland, Swadlincote Woodlands and Canalside Rochdale;
- Community groups and voluntary organisations were less well developed in remote and scattered communities in more rural areas than in heavily urbanised areas, e.g. West Cornwall, Swadlincote Woodlands;
- In Central Brighton, Hull and Sunderland the Partnership Boards developed unified programmes that encompassed several SRB rounds and/or other linked regeneration activities. This resulted in an increase in the number of community/voluntary organisations as partners and thus enhanced the impact of the regeneration process. However, in the case of Hull CityVision an SRB Steering Group was developed to oversee several SRB rounds.

<b>Table 5.4: Community groups and voluntary organisations as partners across the 20 case study schemes</b>	
<b>Name of scheme</b>	<b>Community/Voluntary Sector Partner(s)</b>
Regenerating Central Brighton	Brighton & Hove Housing Partnership PACT Community Projects Community & Voluntary Sector Forum (4 partners) Brighton Festival Society West Hill Community Association Sussex Racial Equality Council
Chalkhill Estate	None
Swadlincote Woodlands	South Derbyshire Council for Voluntary Services
Canalside Rochdale	Rochdale Voluntary Sector Forum
Regenerating Wolverhampton	Wolverhampton Voluntary Sector Council Community Partnerships sub-committee
Merseyside Learning Partnership	Merseyside Council for Voluntary Service
Brent and Harrow (North West London TEC)	Community Works Partnership Forum Kilburn Skills
Limes Farm Estate	Limes Farm Residents Association The Vineyard Church Citizens Advice Bureau
Northumbria Community Safety	Racial Equality Council Northumbria Coalition against crime
South Leytonstone Community Partnership	Stratford Community Forum Cathall Road Estate Steering Group Avenue Estate Steering Group Waltham Forest Forum
Woolwich Revival	Greenwich Waterfront Community Forum (3 out of 9) Council for Racial Equality
Bristol Regeneration Partnership	Bristol Black Voluntary Sector Voluntary Sector Standing Conference on Urban Regeneration (VOSCUR)
Hull CityVision	Gipsyville Focus Group Tenants Representative Goodwin Resource Centre Hull Council for Voluntary Services Inter Faith Forum
Nottingham - Capturing the Dynamics	Broxtowe Estate Forum Voluntary Sector Urban Regeneration Forum
West Cornwall Initiative	None (except at project level)
Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership	None
City of Sunderland	Sunderland Council for Voluntary Service Voices City of Sunderland Forum
Engineering in Education	West Midlands Industrial Club (charity) Education/Business Partnerships TELS Partnership

Source: Department of Land Economy



- 5.7.2 There were also variations in the numerical strength which community groups/voluntary sector carried in the partnership relative to other partners on the Board. The most common practice was for each partner to have one representative on the Board. In some cases the local authority lead partner or partners had three or four representatives on the Board whereas other partners only have one. For example, in Wolverhampton there were fifteen Partnership Board Members of which the local authority had six, the TEC two and other partners one each, two of which were voluntary sector organisations. In other schemes the community/voluntary sector was given more weight on the Board and therefore greater influence on decision-making. However, it was more typical for the community/voluntary sector to have a Board representation of the order of 10% or even less. This often reinforced the view of the community that they were somewhat isolated and peripheral to the decision-making process, leading to marginal or token involvement.
- 5.7.3 SRB programmes that purport to address community involvement in regeneration should offer greater opportunities for community/voluntary sector organisations and local communities to have more direct involvement in the planning and operation of projects. This necessarily raises issues of capacity building, training and resource allocation as an integral part of the regeneration process and may involve a longer period in the consultation and planning stages of projects. In balancing the overall success of projects these early planning 'costs' could lead to increased effectiveness associated with the number of beneficiaries and the sustainability of initiatives through attracting longer-term funding.
- 5.7.4 While the involvement of community organisations/groups has been found to be a crucial element in building the regeneration process, engaging the wider community continues to be a key objective in addressing the issue of sustainability beyond the life of specific programmes. Clearly this feature of local area-based regeneration has been recognised in the New Deal for Community and Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder Initiatives

## 5.8 Assessment of community involvement in the 20 case studies

- 5.8.1 An assessment was made of the extent to which effective community involvement had been achieved in the 20 case studies drawing upon information from field research and social surveys. The results are summarised in Table 5.5. In only two cases was there high and effective community involvement. In six cases there was evidence of medium community involvement, with low involvement in seven cases and the five remaining case exhibiting negligible community involvement. However, in making this assessment some care should be exercised as thematic schemes spread over large geographical areas were generally less able to engage local communities than estate-based programmes.

<b>Table 5.5: Assessment of Community Involvement Across 20 SRBs</b>	
<b>Degree of community involvement</b>	<b>No. of case studies.</b>
HIGH: involved at several levels within the regeneration process.	2
MEDIUM: some involvement/consultation	6
LOW: limited consultation	7
NEGLECTIBLE: little evidence of planned involvement or consultation.	5

Source: Department of Land Economy

- 5.8.2 Only two schemes (Royds and Hangleton Knoll) had high and effective community involvement as discussed in sections 5.5 and 5.6 above. The Royds scheme enabled local residents to exercise a hands-on approach in the development and operation of the programme across the three housing estates. In Hangleton Knoll the local authority (as the accountable body) recognised the capability of the community and its organisations to lead the regeneration process, based on the latter's previous community development experience.
- 5.8.3 In general, local authority lead partners were more effective in involving community groups in the regeneration process than the private sector or Training and Enterprise Councils/Learning and Skills Councils. However, where the community played a major role in the regeneration process, some tensions between councils and the partners needed to be resolved. The skill required to resolve such tensions should not be underestimated and the strong leadership and negotiation skills needed are sometimes, unfortunately, in short supply.
- 5.8.4 According to our estimates six of the case studies were in the medium category. This included Limes Farm, where community-based initiatives were added alongside the physical upgrading of old housing stock. While the community was consulted, their involvement in the design and operation of the scheme was limited, with little evidence of capacity building leading to effective resident participation in this regeneration programme. Although there were intentions to involve the community there is little evidence of clear strategies and/or coherence in engaging the voluntary sector, community organisations or the wider community within the SRB areas. In part this may be due to the limited capacity of community groups, but could also be linked to umbrella organisations of community groups finding it difficult to represent local community interests.
- 5.8.5 Another example in the medium category has been Hull CityVision where the initiative was managed through an SRB Steering Group that reported to the HCV Board and the Technical Advisory Sub-Board that had responsibilities for regeneration across the City of Hull. While some residents were involved with the Steering Group and had direct links with the SRB Management Team for the Gipsyville Estate, there were only limited opportunities for residents to become directly involved in the physical and socio-economic regeneration of their estate to the degree found within the Royds experience. A significant input from the community in the Gipsyville case was through existing community organisations and the use of communities development workers who encouraged wider community involvement via the Community Regeneration Forum and focus groups.
- 5.8.6 Although there were four community representatives on the South Leytonstone SRB Board, these were drawn mainly from local residents, tenants' associations or the church, with a Chairperson from the community. Partnerships meetings were open to local residents who could contribute to meetings, but had no voting rights. While local people were involved in the planning stages of the scheme, tight deadlines for the bid prevented all their ideas being fully explored. This led to the perception, on the part of some residents and community organisations, that they did not have a significant voice regarding the development of the SRB. Stratford Development Partnership Ltd. managed the day-to-day operation of the scheme, worked in close partnership with the Community Forum and Waltham Forest HAT, but also consulted with the local community. This enabled all parties to become involved in such processes as project appraisal. Many SRB projects targeted the local community, with a Community Development Fund to provide grants for individuals and local organisations to enhance capacity building and involvement in the economic life of

the area. A University of East London (UEL) evaluation indicated that the Neighbourhood Development (Agenda 21) project had empowered local people through increased influence over the regeneration process. This project, which aimed to improve the quality of life of local people by giving them the means to make decisions and implement strategies, was enhanced through a Community Forum that functioned as a link between the local community and the Partnership Board and continued post-SRB acting as a consultative group on many local issues including the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund. While the UEL study indicated a low level of public awareness of SRB among their community sample, this appeared to relate to the initial consultation process, but was partially addressed through the subsequent Agenda 21 project. From our evaluation there was an overall perception that SRB had encouraged the development of a more cohesive community.

- 5.8.7 The Central Brighton round two SRB scheme, while having some voluntary organisations directly involved on the Board and representatives from the Community Sector Forum playing a role, had few mechanisms for the community to make a direct input regarding the planning and development of the initiative. During the early days both the community and voluntary organisations considered that the partnership was clearly local authority led. Although there has been an increase in voluntary sector membership there has been no significant increase in representation for local people at Board/Sub-Board level. At the project level, however, local people have benefited from key socio-economic projects linked to training/employment, youth development, health initiative, minority groups and community business development many of which were managed by local voluntary organisations.
- 5.8.8 The Nottingham SRB2 scheme provided an opportunity to articulate the needs of local communities through six Local Area Partnerships with links to the Implementation and Policy Groups. Through these Area Partnerships the community, in conjunction with the voluntary sector, has been involved in the strategic planning and delivery of projects. This enabled communities in the three SRB areas to engage with a range of organisations and participate in opportunities from which they were partially excluded prior to the SRB initiative.
- 5.8.9 In Canalside Rochdale at the outset the partnership carried out an extensive consultation exercise with the local community which found low levels of participation in community groups and little sense of community identity in the 'Canalside' area. Many residents continued to look to traditional organisations to represent them, such as the local council and trade unions and identified with the community in which they live, rather than the whole of Canalside. This affected the SRB scheme in that it had a geographical focus on Canalside and the impact of the scheme on residents varied considerably between areas. Residents in the Sandfield Renewal Area who were subject to a comprehensive set of projects aimed at economic, environmental, housing and community issues, which had a strong emphasis on community engagement, took an active part in the implementation of the programme. The Canalside experience has shown that without the involvement of well established community organisations/groups it is difficult to capacity build and engage the community effectively with fairly limited funding. Nevertheless, the scheme did encourage the growth and strengthening of 46 local community groups and convened a Community Empowerment Working Party to produce an overview of work taking place to empower the communities within Canalside.
- 5.8.10 Twelve of the case studies were placed in the low/negligible categories where representation on the partnerships and development of individual projects only amounted to a minimal involvement on the part of the community/voluntary sector.

Some of these were thematic schemes where the relevant target community had not been clearly identified. However, some schemes had multiple objectives covering a wide geographical area of a whole district or more in which there were several local communities that created major difficulties in ensuring their representation on any partnership structure.

- 5.8.11 In the case of the Wolverhampton round one scheme there was little evidence of any direct involvement of the community in the management structure as the partnership was heavily biased towards the council and the Chamber of Commerce, with no direct community representation. In many respects this set the tone regarding the role of the community in the regeneration process. Although there were closer links with the community at the project level where consultation and capacity building are in evidence, projects were reliant on project officers taking the lead. The local authority was quick to learn the lessons from this SRB scheme in subsequent area-based regeneration initiatives.
- 5.8.12 Within Woolwich SRB there was involvement of residents and community organisations via a community forum representative who sat on the Board. However, this approach was criticised in the final evaluation of the Woolwich Revival Scheme (UK Research Partnership, 2002) as being insufficiently representative with no underpinning from other groups/residents who could have articulated wider community interests.
- 5.8.13 In Swadlincote the partnership pre-dated the SRB originally focusing on economic objectives that did not include the community and voluntary sector (CVS) in the original bid stage. Subsequently CVS became more involved, though this did not lead to an increase in community involvement to any significant degree in terms of influencing the objectives or delivery of the programme. CVS has been able, to some extent, to influence the partnership in terms of delivering projects that have provided benefits to local people in terms of the community chest, community safety and volunteer training.
- 5.8.14 In the Sunderland case, the round one SRB scheme offered only limited opportunity for direct community involvement in the physical/economic programme. Though the voluntary and community sectors had some representation on the SRB Board, their influence was somewhat limited in reaching a consensus on major strategic planning issues. The subsequent round two SRB had a socio-economic focus that offered greater opportunities for community involvement in project development and a direct input via the voluntary sector led Focus Groups.
- 5.8.15 The community sector in Bristol was represented at Board level in part through Voluntary Organisation Standing Conference on Urban Regeneration and the Black Development Agency. However, since the sector also includes many smaller community groups and, of course, local residents who do not participate through groups, overall the sector has been poorly represented on the partnership.
- 5.8.16 The policy in Northumbria ensured that the overall strategy priorities and decisions about funding were taken by a Strategy Board with members drawn from each of the key partners including some involvement of community-based groups. Policy initiatives were implemented by Local Area Groups that worked at grass roots level.
- 5.8.17 Community involvement and interest in the Merseyside Learning Partnership has been low in terms of strategic scheme management aspects and there is no evidence

of local engagement through consultation with community groups that could have promoted opportunities for wider community participation. Community and voluntary sector partners did not attend Board meetings on a regular basis, and little effort was made to change this situation. The main engagement with the voluntary sector was through project delivery (e.g. Rathbone Community Industry and Merseyside Youth Association). The Merseyside Education On-line Network did offer some opportunities for pupils, parents and members of the wider community to become involved in ICT training.

- 5.8.18 In Chalkhill the intention was that two places be made available on the Partnership Board for representatives of Chalkhill residents and one further place was proposed for a representative of CETACs Customer Users Group. It was a declared intention to ensure strong links and good communications with Chalkhill SRB scheme customers and “through this Customer First Approach, help to ensure the effective delivery of individual projects.” In the event, however, the partnership had no community representation or direct involvement in the SRB scheme. The community were informed about SRB progress through regular reports from the SRB partnership to the Housing Renewal Partnership. Today, this would be regarded as totally inadequate.
- 5.8.19 Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership, West Cornwall, Engineering in Education and Brent and Harrow displayed little more than a ‘passing interest’ in direct community involvement in the development and operation of the scheme. In some cases it is not clear that direct community involvement was appropriate but in others the failing has been not to identify who the relevant community is at the outset. All regeneration schemes need to at least ask the relevant questions in this respect before proceeding to articulate the shape and form of their regeneration scheme.

## **5.9 Evidence of changing community perceptions of their local area from social surveys**

- 5.9.1 Seven of the case study areas (Chalkhill, Hangleton Knoll, Canalside Rochdale, Royds, Nottingham Swadlincote and Sunderland) were the subject of household social surveys from which it has been possible to discern the scope of community activity in terms of residents’ informal support networks via family and friends and commitment to voluntary work/community organisations (more description of the surveys involved is given in Chapter Eleven). Collectively, these data enabled the research to build a picture of local conditions and the context in which local people become involved in their community. The survey work also enabled an assessment to be made of the perceptions of the local residents of the SRB schemes and crucially how this changed through the lifetime of the SRB support in the area.
- 5.9.2 When invited to comment on whether they felt closely involved in the community, there were strong increases in those responding positively in Chalkhill, Rochdale and Nottingham (see Table 5.6). These responses may be linked to the fact that the black and minority ethnic groups in Chalkhill, Rochdale and Nottingham had more developed networks within their own communities. The general trend across the seven areas was an increase in ‘feeling closely involved in the community’ with the exception of Sunderland. However, participation in voluntary/community activity was significantly higher in Hangleton Knoll compared with all other case study areas. This could be attributed to the history of community led initiatives on the Hangleton and Knoll estates and the fact that the SRB initiative was a community led scheme. Those who strongly agreed that they were able to rely on friends and family were greatest in Sunderland and Swadlincote. This position remained largely unchanged

by the time of the follow up surveys, although Chalkhill and Rochdale experienced slight falls. The low response from Chalkhill may be linked to the disruption of community life due to major physical regeneration.

- 5.9.3 Across all seven areas 17% of survey respondents had heard of the Single Regeneration Budget by the completion of the scheme, compared with 9% in 1996. Awareness was particularly high in Bradford at 30% and in Hangleton Knoll at 27% compared with only 3% in Chalkhill and Rochdale. The low level of participation in Chalkhill and Rochdale reminds us that relatively low SRB expenditure or the concentration on physical regeneration will not bring direct benefits to/or result in the involvement of many residents from deprived areas.
- 5.9.4 Hangleton Knoll was interesting in that SRB funding of only £1.6 million brought direct benefits to 36% of survey respondents. This was a scheme designed for the community. Being led by community groups that were in touch with residents, it was possible to use the funding to develop community facilities, improve access to public services, training and the labour market, and improve the local environment. This resulted in an effective scheme that was closely linked to locally defined regeneration needs and could, therefore, draw on the established pattern of residents' involvement - albeit from a relatively small number of people.
- 5.9.5 Although changes in community perceptions cannot be directly linked to participation rates in SRB initiatives, it is suggested that communities exhibiting a more positive attitude towards the social fabric and operation of their community are more likely to participate in further regeneration activities. This should be considered a starting point in building local capacity and sustainability.

## **5.10 Participation of black and minority ethnic communities in SRB funded schemes**

- 5.10.1 Ethnic groups often experience particularly severe difficulties in deprived areas. During the course of the national evaluation of SRB statistical analysis was undertaken of the household social survey data to enable an in depth assessment of the characteristics of those residents who were experiencing some form of exclusion. The socially excluded were defined as the unemployed, on low income (Income Support) and those who did not feel involved with their local community. A number of variables were introduced to the analysis as explanatory factor one of which was whether the head of household is non-white or white.
- 5.10.2 The results from this piece of work showed that for both low income and unemployed residents there was a statistically significant probability that they would be in rented accommodation, have relative ill health and be non-white. While it was also found that non-white residents were more likely to feel closely involved with their community, the analysis showed that of all residents likely to move out of the area in the next two years there was a greater probability of them being male, under 45 years of age and non-white.

Table 5.6: Changes in Outcomes																
	Bradford				Nottingham				Sunderland				Swadlincote			
	1996		Change 96-01		1996		Change 96-01		1996		Change 96-01		1996		Change 96-01	
	%		%		%		%	%		%		%	%		%	
Community involvement																
Those feeling closely involved in the community:	19	(19)	+5	(+7)	20	(28)	+8	(+8)	24	(42)	-3	(-7)	26	(42)	+1	(-2)
Whether taken part in voluntary/community activity in last year	11	(13)	-1	(-1)	13	(18)	+3	(-4)	11	(11)	+2	(+5)	17	(18)	-2	(-4)
Agree if alone could rely on friends/ relatives in area to help	86	(89)	0	(-3)	76	(84)	+4	(-2)	91	(95)	0	(0)	90	(93)	+2	(+2)
Agree could count on friends/ relatives to keep an eye on home	85	(90)	+5	(0)	74	(83)	+7	(+5)	95	(97)	-2	(-2)	95	(97)	-1	(0)
Agree could turn to friends/ relatives locally for advice or support	77	(80)	+6	(+3)	71	(94)	+6	(+1)	88	(90)	+1	(+3)	87	(89)	+1	(+2)
Ethnic breakdown																
White	96	(97)	+2	(0)	82	(81)	-2	(+1)	99	(99)	-1	(0)	99	(100)	0	(-1)
Black/Asian/other	4	(3)	-2	(0)	18	(19)	+2	(-1)	1	(1)	+1	(0)	1	(0)	0	(+1)

Source: MORI

Table 5.6: Changes in outcomes (contd)																
	Chalkhill				Hangleton/Knoll				Rochdale				England			
	1996	Change 96-99			1996	Change 96-99			1996	Change 96-99			%	% change		
	%	%			%	%			%	%			1996	96-9**	96-01	
Community involvement																
Those feeling closely involved in the community:	28	(27)	+11	(+8)	25	(28)	+1	(-2)	28	(30)	+10	(+5)	-			
Whether taken part in voluntary/community activity in last year	12	(13)	-2	(-3)	22	(26)	+1	(-1)	10	(15)	+1	(-1)	-			
Agree if alone could rely on friends/ relatives in area to help	71	(85)	-5	(-14)	87	(90)	+2	(0)	86	(86)	-2	(-4)	84	+7	+5	
Agree could count on friends/ relatives to keep an eye on home	64	(81)	0	(+9)	90	(92)	+2	(+2)	87	(90)	+1	(+1)	85	+7	+8	
Agree could turn to friends/ relatives locally for advice or support	63	(73)	+2	(-3)	79	(84)	+6	(+3)	82	(80)	-1	(+3)	79	+6	+5	
Ethnic breakdown																
White	35	(48)	+1	(-1)	98	(98)	0	(0)	77	(74)	-2	(-1)	95	-1	-3	
Black/Asian/other	65	(52)	-1	(+1)	2	(2)	0	(0)	23	(26)	+2	(+1)	5	+1	+3	

\*Those surveyed in 1999 answered for the previous 3 years, those in 2001 for the previous 5 years. The baseline response was for the previous 3 years. \*\* For Crime and Safety figures no 1999 survey results available, used 2000 British Crime Survey. \*\*\*Very unsafe only.

Source: MORI. NB Figures in brackets relate to panel only. British Crime Surveys 1996, 2000 and 2001. Survey of English Housing 1995/5, 1998/9, 2001/2. ONS Omnibus Surveys 1996, 1999 and 2001.



5.10.3 Examination of the case study final evaluations provides examples of where projects were conceived to focus specifically on encouraging ethnic minorities to take up the mainstream training and education programmes<sup>3</sup>. Thus, in Canalside Rochdale three pre-vocational projects were funded by SRB to help alleviate this problem:

- The first of these was the **English as a Second Language** project, which provided pre vocational training in English for four years aimed specifically at the Bangladeshi community. The project ran well and had a good take up, with 200 in total on the programme. This was managed by the Rochdale Borough Chamber of Commerce, Training and Enterprise (the Chamber) and was subsequently absorbed into the mainstream;
- The **Vocational Preparation for the Asian Community** project had similar aims to the ESOL project, running courses in literacy and numeracy, IT, administration, catering. This training, provided by the Kashmir Youth Project (KYP), continued for four years and attracted over 200 trainees, 30 of whom went on to gain employment. KYP went on to run the project with ESF money under Objective Two status;
- **Vocational Preparation for Asian Women** was designed as an outreach project and focused on the Deelish community of Rochdale. It was delivered by Pitman and Safara Training and was run initially from the women's homes and then from local community centres to overcome some of their concerns of training on unfamiliar ground and in English speaking environments. It was developed sensitively with a view to enabling trainees to learn at their own pace and gradually familiarise them with the learning environment. Training included numeracy and literacy, administration and IT. This project also ran for four years and was very successful with over 160 women taking part. It was the first project of its kind in Rochdale and was absorbed into the mainstream, benefiting other communities in the local area.

5.10.4 All three training programmes were the subject of a beneficiary survey undertaken by the SRB research team. A total of 67 trainees responded to the survey, which represented an estimated response rate of 21%. As this was quite low the results can only be treated as indicative but, nevertheless, they are quite encouraging. Main findings showed:

- 94% of respondents indicated that this had been the first course they had attended in the last five years. This suggested that the project had been successful in targeting people who had not recently taken part in mainstream training programmes;
- Views on the quality of training received were very positive, with 81% rating the training as excellent or good whereas only 5% thought it was poor. The main comments on training were of confidence that their English had improved and a recognition of good teaching from the staff along with a general encouragement and friendliness which had helped in the teaching process. When asked whether a similar course could have been found elsewhere, 63% felt they would not and a further 17% felt unable to comment;
- As one of the main aims of the projects was to encourage further uptake of training or education programmes, respondents were asked if they had sought to do this following the course. Just under a third (30%) had sought further training and a quarter had sought further education. 40% said they had more confidence

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<sup>3</sup> "New findings on the nature of economic social exclusion in England and the implications for new policy initiatives", Department of Land Economy Discussion paper 101, 1998.

in seeking work and, in fact, 15% have now gained employment;

- It is also encouraging to see that 42% of trainees went on to use at least one other service/seek further information following participation in their course. Of those seeking further information nearly a third used the Employment Service and 19% approached voluntary organisations. It is also important to note that of those seeking further information 43% had been directed to them from their training course.

5.10.5 The results of this survey suggest that the three training projects had been successful in reaching their targeted population and that the training they received was considered of a good standard. Bearing in mind the respondents had generally not engaged in previous training programmes, it should also be considered a measure of success that nearly a third of trainees were encouraged to seek further training and 25% proceeded to further education. It is also important that the training programmes built confidence among participants and that 15% have now entered the labour market. In addition evidence from the Chamber in Rochdale showed that there had been an increase in take up of mainstream programmes by people from ethnic minorities.

5.10.6 A further example was the Chalkhill SRB scheme which was designed to assist Chalkhill residents, three-quarters of whom were from the ethnic minorities, in obtaining some job benefits from the housing renewal scheme which was running alongside through construction industry related training. In addition, it sought to raise residents' employability in competing for jobs in the wider Wembley labour market. As part of this objective a number of projects were designed specifically aimed at the local ethnic population:

- **ESOL** was the first of these projects, which assessed clients for whom English was not their first language to determine their level of English in order to assign them to the appropriate class. The classes were offered at different times to suit the client's schedule and provided a much needed service in an area which receives many refugees and, therefore, has a great need of ESOL training;
- **Basic Education** was a project designed to assist disadvantaged young people, the majority of whom were refugees, to move onto employment or further education and training. Participants took English language and numeracy classes as well as studying information technology. In the second term they had the opportunity to spend one day per week in a work placement. Throughout the course they had access to a guidance worker and complete action plans for their participation during the year - after which the majority of the students were able to move onto further education rather than employment;
- **PACE** (Practical Action for Choice of Employment) also worked with young people to prepare them for the world of work. Clients trained for 20 weeks combining classroom training, including IT skills, with on-the-job experience with employers who had genuine job vacancies. Participating employers were expected to guarantee clients a job interview at the end of their work experience. This project was particularly successful in targeting residents from the ethnic minorities.

5.10.7 Overall, the evaluation evidence showed that the scheme was effective in targeting its activities towards ethnic minorities and some projects such as PACE were very effective indeed. Of all the residents trained into jobs by SRB 54% were from ethnic minorities.

- 5.10.8 The Wolverhampton regeneration scheme, which was a multi objective programme with a key focus on improving the economic base of Wolverhampton, had a specific objective to remove obstacles to learning and development, with a particular focus on realising the full potential of citizens from black and minority ethnic groups. The **community-based guidance project** was a key project managed by GATE - an agency within the Council's Adult Education Service providing vocational guidance. It focused on two deprived areas of the Asian population (mainly women) in Blakenhall and the Asian and African Caribbean population of Penn Fields. The intention of the project was to bring together existing initiatives in the areas to introduce an integrated approach. Initially residents were interviewed about their employment and training experiences before work on the ground commenced.
- 5.10.9 This project proved to be very successful. Among its key outcomes were the establishment of an Asian Women's group, an initiative to promote improved self-images of young black men through working with local schools and the establishment of an area Community Forum with links into the Borough's Network Consortium.
- 5.10.10 Health has also been an area of concern related to ethnic minorities from our case studies. In Canalside the **Ethnic Health** Project was set up to work with the local Asian community and healthcare providers to establish the uptake of services and preventative strategies to help tackle the high incidence of poor health within the Asian community (e.g. diabetes). Advice and guidance on diet, screening and other preventative measures was offered as a service which was enthusiastically taken up by the local community. The project was SRB funded for three years and received further funding for a year by the Health Promotion Unit then taken into mainstream funding to cover a wider geographical area. Coverage of the programme was extended to include physical fitness, changing habits and to promote greater awareness. The project now has funding for a dietician.
- 5.10.11 In Wolverhampton the **Women and Health** courses were targeted on women from ethnic groups to equip them with skills, information and confidence to enable them to make positive changes for themselves, their families and their communities as well as address health issues of importance to them. The take up of the scheme was extremely good as it was located centrally in a library, having good links with existing networks. One of the important outcomes from this project was the empowering of women to start new groups, e.g. The Asian Women and Diabetes Group was set up and has continued successfully to secure further funding through the National Lotteries Charities Board.
- 5.10.12 Finally, in Brent and Harrow black and minority ethnic community businesses were targeted within the **Community Works** strand of the scheme. Community Works included members of the Equal Opportunities Group which had a strong representation from voluntary and community groups, many of which represented ethnic minority communities. Thus, the community representation was strong in a part of the scheme that was allocated about 10% of the SRB budget, which represented a significant proportion to devote to community capacity building.
- 5.10.13 Nevertheless, this small budget was devoted entirely to building the capacities of local community and voluntary groups and mainly those from ethnic minority neighbourhoods in the most deprived parts of South and East Brent. Some fourteen ethnic minority community businesses were established, 90 residents from ethnic communities were provided with vocational/business skills training and 205 ethnic minority voluntary groups were supported. An additional 73 residents were provided with training in voluntary work. This was targeted through a publicity initiative with

the existing support agencies and local advertising, e.g. a newsletter, leaflets and direct media advertisement. Overall, this was evidence of a significant contribution to capacity building in the ethnic minority communities of Brent.

5.10.14 These examples suggest that although the SRB schemes were able to build the capacity of BME community groups it was generally only a first step. It has been found that the engagement of the wider community is extremely variable across the SRB schemes evaluated and that where community involvement is low, the opportunities for minority groups are that much more limited. Many smaller community groups/BME groups do not have a history of participation in the regeneration process and/or lack the resources and capacity to develop their involvement.

5.10.15 While SRB provided evidence of BME communities becoming involved in key capacity building, training, education, employment and small business development projects, there was little evidence of a strategic and coherent framework for BME community engagement across the board. It is suggested that BME communities generally find it difficult to participate in the regeneration process and often feel that they have not been sufficiently consulted regarding the objectives of regeneration programmes.

5.10.16 In moving towards a more inclusive framework it is necessary to:

- set in place a consultation process for local BME communities;
- engage BME communities in the planning process;
- directly involve BME communities in the operation of projects;
- engage BME communities in the forward planning process.

5.10.17 Such a framework must accommodate the varying needs of different ethnic groupings within the identified geographic areas of deprivation and develop an engagement strategy that fosters longer-term sustainable development.

## **5.11 Further policy development for community involvement**

5.11.1 The research shows that building robust community structures and involving local people cannot be a rapid process. It should be viewed as a strategic element commencing at the pre-bid stage and enshrined in the bid document/delivery plans that constitute the regeneration framework. This has been recognised in subsequent rounds of SRB through the development of the Bidding Guidance for new schemes and in the DETR publication 'Involving Communities in Urban and Rural Regeneration - A Guide for Practitioners' (September, 1997). Round five guidance marked a significant step forward in offering a more coherent framework for community involvement/engagement in terms of the need to:

- involve local people (including ethnic minorities, the voluntary sector and faith communities, in planning and operation of regeneration activities;
- involve communities in regeneration as a means of effective delivery and ensuring sustainable development;
- support those from the community who wish to become directly involved in the management of regeneration;
- develop community capacity building as a key objective of schemes. In some

cases this may require that the bulk of their activities and resources be devoted to the effective engagement of local communities (in addition to SRB administration costs, up to a further 10% of resources can be devoted to capacity building projects over the life-time of the bid);

- encourage communities to develop their own community-based regeneration initiatives, encourage other bodies to operate initiatives on their behalf or become involved in partnerships that could lead to such activities as Credit Unions, Development Trusts, Local Exchange and Trading Systems and Community Enterprise.

5.11.2 The Community Development Foundation's publication 'SRB6: Involving the Community' (December, 1999) also provided detailed information regarding the involvement of communities in regeneration. This sits alongside ODPM round six Bidding Guidance (December, 1999) which developed the themes from round five guidance by offering more precise details regarding the role of communities in local regeneration. More specifically, Part 1, Section 4 'Community participation' (paragraphs 1.4.1-1.4.4 and 1.4.7) provide a clear picture of the scope for community engagement and the implications of achieving that engagement. In paraphrasing the ODPM guidance it is suggested that:


- The involvement of those people in the target area at the earliest stage in the proposed regeneration initiative ensures that schemes are better focused on their needs and priorities;
- Bids should encompass the talents and resources of all sectors of the community, including minority ethnic groups, young people, the voluntary sector, community organisations and faith-based groups;
- There must be a clear indication of the ways in which local communities and the voluntary sector have been involved in developing the bid, their role in implementing the scheme and the framework for funding community projects;
- Community representatives in partnerships need to play a full and effective role in the decision making process and be the conduit for informing local people of scheme decisions;
- The partnership will need to set in place adequate support for community representatives to undertake their role effectively.

5.11.3 While SRB rounds one and two laid some of the foundations for partnership working and community involvement in regeneration, the research evidence vindicates the decision by the then ODPM to subsequently offer more robust guidance to SRB schemes. Across the 20 SRB schemes evaluated there was a wide-ranging approach to community engagement, from community led initiatives to those in which local people were involved in limited consultation exercises with minimal representation on the decision-making bodies developing the regeneration schemes.

5.11.4 In making recommendations for a sustainable developmental framework it is helpful to build a clear understanding of the elements and the stages that contribute to the regeneration process. Figure 5.1 provides an indication of the potential scope for community involvement at every stage within the regeneration process in building a real sense of ownership, confidence in planning and delivering the programme and as a key element in the sustainability of local projects that meet locally defined need.

5.11.5 From the 20 case studies in the evaluation, a total of seven schemes were the subject of an initial and final social survey. The survey work has provided valuable

information regarding the local impact of SRB schemes over time and has provided data that can be compared with national surveys and trends. However, it has become evident that such surveys may, in the future, also provide information linked to social audits in developing an effective strategy regarding community capacity building and participation. Such information would be invaluable in the provision of appropriate training programmes that might usefully be implemented in advance of any regeneration activity within an area.



Source: Department of Land Economy

## 5.12 Lessons for partnership working and community involvement.

- While voluntary and community groups are key to enhancing the quality of life for local people, they are often poorly resourced, too fragmented to carry out substantive regeneration activity and can sometimes view the community as a junior partner.

- Although SRB was designed to encourage community involvement in local regeneration, local people did not always possess the knowledge, skills and administrative resources to be effective partners and/or lead on regeneration. Limited budgets within SRB (5%-7% of SRB spend) for capacity building/management and administrative expenses left limited scope and in any event lead partners/accountable bodies tended to retain this element of the funding.
- The SRB competitive bid approach for regeneration funding did in the first two years result in local communities becoming dispirited but the position improved in subsequent rounds as the Government Offices provided further guidance and assistance.
- Over rounds one and two of SRB, few schemes developed a robust and coherent training/capacity building strategy specifically linked to the delivery of regeneration programmes, or focused on increasing the participation of communities in the regeneration process.
- Both Hangleton Knoll, Brighton and Royds, Bradford have provided some evidence that significant community involvement is possible and can have a positive impact in terms of the scheme effectively meeting its targets and the needs of the local community.
- Where projects have been designed to link with existing community-based structures/organizations/groups and meet locally defined need, then the community has been more proactive in the regeneration process.
- An early and active engagement of the local community in the initial planning stages of the regeneration process, through public meetings, consultations, focus groups and social surveys, has been a key factor in building more robust regeneration delivery and sustainable development.
- It was generally more effective to work in partnership with and build the capacity of community groups and voluntary organizations that have a proven track record, as they often have strong links into the local community and are therefore in a position to encourage wider community participation.
- It has often been difficult for communities, community groups and voluntary organizations to operate as equal partners with local authorities and the private sector. In some instances this can lead to mistrust and misunderstandings in building partnership working, as communities/community groups often have limited resources that may preclude their playing a lead/key role in individual schemes, particularly given the short lead-in time for many schemes.
- Tensions may arise from community groups/organizations having their own agenda that may not necessarily involve partnership working and may also raise issues for the wider community in terms of the ownership of community-based programmes and the identification of priorities within those programmes.
- Notions of partnership working, management systems, project delivery, evaluation, monitoring and forward planning strategies have, in the absence of adequate training for local people, often become abstract concepts rather than essential elements for managing regeneration/capacity building within the community.
- Overall there was only limited evidence of local community members having a significant say in the planning and delivery of their SRB scheme, though this was, in part, linked to the attitude and perception of key regeneration partners regarding community capacity/potential.

- Where communities were nominally involved in SRB schemes through surveys and meetings, but not actively engaged in the planning and delivery of projects, it was difficult to develop sustained local interest.
- Despite the initial difficulties for SRB1 initiatives, they generally increased the involvement of both community and voluntary sectors over the lifetime of the various schemes and this has also improved over subsequent SRB rounds. In this respect the SRB experience supported the validity of capacity building among key local players and communities as evidenced in Royds SRB1 and Hangleton & Knoll SRB2 schemes.
- Ethnic groups/BME communities often experienced particular difficulties regarding social exclusion and a generally low level of engagement in the regeneration process, though the ethnicity of SRB areas varied greatly across the 20 case study schemes.
- In moving towards a more inclusive regeneration framework, it will be necessary to address the issue of BME consultation in identifying need, involvement in the planning process, direct involvement in project delivery and engagement in the forward planning process.
- More generally, the engagement of local communities and their organizations should be linked to a sustainable development framework. As such it is essential to recognize the potential for local communities to be involved in the various elements of the regeneration process that necessarily include the proposal, design, development, delivery, evaluation and forward planning stages of the programme, that could lead to opportunities for sustainability and further regeneration activity.



## 6. Partnership working and the role of the private sector

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This section of the report considers the role played by the private sector in SRB regeneration schemes. It draws mainly on the evidence of the 20 case study evaluations as well as the national evaluation database covering SRB Rounds 1 to 6. The analysis uses this evidence base to highlight the types of regeneration programme and type of role in the regeneration process where the private sector is more or less likely to participate. It also draws out lessons for future policy from the private sector experience of the first two rounds of SRB.

### 6.1 Introduction

#### *Defining the private sector*

- 6.1.1 As in the national evaluation mid-term report, we have defined the private sector to include private firms with limited liability operating alone, companies limited by guarantee and companies in either of these categories which have formed a group or association or partnership to achieve common goals. The last group may either be industry/sector based or may also be more public spirited and focus on the regeneration problems of a particular region or local area. As in the mid-term report, we have excluded the voluntary sector, community groups, former TECs (now LSCs) and universities from the definition.

#### *Nature and timing of private sector engagement*

- 6.1.2 Private sector involvement in regeneration is complex because of the scope for it to play different roles at different stages in the process. In the mid-term report we identified several private sector roles in SRB-funded regeneration schemes, including leadership roles in SRB partnerships and other partnership roles. Section 6.2 considers the nature of private sector participation at partner level across the 20 case studies. In addition we identified a wide range of other roles, beyond the partnership itself, including financial or in-kind contributor to projects, property developer, beneficiary (e.g. of business support), employer of individual beneficiaries, supplier of goods or services (including sub-contractors responsible for delivery). These are considered in section 6.3.
- 6.1.3 In Chapter five, which assessed community and voluntary sector involvement in SRB, we set out a range of different types of engagement in the regeneration process at different points in of a programme's life cycle. Thus, it was interesting to observe the extent to which, across the 20 case study schemes, the voluntary and community sectors were able to engage with the process at the earliest proposal stage, during the design and consultation stage, throughout the programme's development and operation, during its evaluation and later, as successor initiatives were considered. The same potential types of engagement apply just as readily to the private sector. This chapter considers the different pathways to involvement, the inclination of the private sector to become involved in different areas and projects, and, once they are involved, the issues that arise in managing relationships between the private, public, voluntary and community sectors.

### *Drivers of private sector engagement*

- 6.1.4 The discussion above demonstrates that the potential contribution of the private sector to regeneration extends beyond the easy to define partner and/or funder to encompass those making in-kind contributions, those who have become employer destinations for individual beneficiaries of project delivery, and those who have actively participated in (and profited from) the delivery of the programme.
- 6.1.5 In spite of the variety of types of involvement, intuitively one would expect private sector involvement in regeneration programmes in the most disadvantaged areas to be far from automatic. After all, programmes in these areas are often designed to tackle multiple deprivation caused by deep-seated market and institutional failures. Motives for involvement are likely to vary according to the local circumstances, the priorities of the SRB programme (which may or may not have drawn on private sector views), and the nature of the projects themselves. However, even where conditions for private sector involvement are most fertile, the objectives of firms operating under the Companies Act are likely to reduce the effective participation in many cases. Firms with limited liability, for example, are expected to compete effectively and make profits supplying goods and services.
- 6.1.6 These operating principles in themselves suggest that if they were to behave rationally, many firms would only participate in a regeneration programme where there were reasonable returns to be made on their investment of time or money. That implies some project-based, rather than directorial or management role, as the latter is not a profitable exercise and involves a considerable amount of time and risk. Firms might, however, seek to work with other, like-minded businesses if there were common interests at stake and ways of achieving some scale economies in their involvement. For that reason we would expect to see more groups of businesses involved than individual firms. Where single firms do participate at a strategic level, we would expect them to be larger, with higher profiles, and with – perhaps – resources available for corporate social responsibility activities. Nevertheless, the need for most businesses to see some fairly direct business benefit, even if long-term, means that engagement beyond projects in which they have a direct interest is likely to prove difficult.
- 6.1.7 The rest of this chapter draws on the evidence provided by the 20 case studies to see what patterns emerge in respect of:
- The types of private sector organisation involved in regeneration
  - The roles they played
  - Their likely motivations for participating in different kinds of SRB schemes and different types of projects (especially those beyond the obvious property and business development spheres)
  - The extent of their involvement (financially and in other ways)
  - The benefits of private sector involvement for the design, delivery and effectiveness of the regeneration programme
  - The constraints on private sector involvement
  - Evolution of government policy on business engagement in regeneration
  - The lessons for future policy.

## 6.2 Types of private sector organisation involved at partner level

6.2.1 Table 6.1 shows the organisations involved in the 20 Round one and two case-study schemes. They are a mix of the three types described earlier in this section, although business groupings tend to be the norm, with individual businesses rarely represented at partner level.

### *Private sector leadership of SRB schemes*

6.2.2 Across all 1028 SRB schemes in Rounds one to six, only 51 (5%) are led by the private sector. In our sample of 20 case-studies, two are described in national monitoring data as being “led” by the private sector (West Cornwall Initiative (WCI) and Engineering in Education), though it could be argued strongly that only the latter has genuine private sector leadership. In previous national evaluation reports we have noted that while the WCI had its origins in a group of local business people with a common interest in the development of Cornwall, many of these were retired and did not represent either their companies or the Chamber of Commerce. The informality of their structure, and lack of a legal entity meant that they could not become a lead partner, a role which was filled instead by one of the three District Councils involved.

6.2.3 The Engineering in Education initiative, classified as voluntary sector for national monitoring purposes, is, on the other hand, one of SRB’s rare examples of genuine private sector leadership in partnership with the public sector. The West Midlands-wide scheme has involved significant private sector time inputs by over 440 firms which has led to the provision of a wide range of information and direct and indirect advice to school pupils on careers in engineering industry.

### *Other private sector involvement at partner level*

6.2.4 In the section above on drivers for private sector involvement, we noted our expectation that individual firms would be much less likely than groups of firms to participate in the direction and management of regeneration schemes than individual businesses. Overall the evidence in Table 6.1 would seem to bear this out. The 20 case-study schemes have a total of 68 private sector partners. Of these, 35 (51%) are individual firms. However, if we exclude the Nottingham case study, with its unusually large number of private sector partners, the proportion of private sector partners that are individual firms falls to 37%. Many of the individual firms listed in Table 6.1 are major companies which either have a strong operating profile in the area or land ownership or property development interests. There were relatively few examples of individual small firms taking a management role at the programme level.

6.2.5 Business groups include Chambers of Commerce (in nine of the 20 case-studies), Education Business Partnerships and Careers Partnerships (e.g. Limes Farm), or – more rarely - sub-regional and local industry groups (e.g. Epping Forest Industry Matters). Only two of the SRB schemes (Regenerating Central Brighton and West Cornwall Initiative) had representation at partner level from Business in the Community, though BITC was also active in a number of other schemes at project level. Although there were also a number of enterprise or development agencies and one Housing Association, we would argue that these organisations are so heavily backed by the public sector that they should not be labelled private sector.

**Table 6.1: Types of private sector organisations involved at partnership level in case-study SRB schemes (private sector led-scheme in bold)**

Scheme name	Names of private sector partners	Types of private sector partners (where known)	Summary type
<b>West Cornwall Initiative (private sector led)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ BT</li> <li>▪ Barclays</li> <li>▪ WCI</li> <li>▪ Cornwall Chamber of Commerce</li> <li>▪ West Cornwall Enterprise Trust</li> <li>▪ Business in the Community</li> </ul>	Individual firm (plc) Individual firm (plc) Grouping Grouping Grouping Grouping	<b>General, sub-regional, business groups – established pre-SRB- plus 2 major plcs</b>  <b>WCI origins informal and partnership dominated and led, in accountability terms, by public sector interests</b>
Northumbria Community Safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Northumbria Coalition Against Crime</li> </ul>	Broad-based coalition which includes a number of private sector representatives	Grouping, but private sector involvement at partnership level very limited
<b>Engineering in Education (WM) (private sector led)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ TELS Partnership</li> <li>▪ WM Industrial Club</li> </ul>	<b>Groupings (incl. Engineering Employers Fed – the Accountable Body)</b>	<b>Groups, dominated by private sector interests</b>
Limes Farm Partnership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ W. Essex Business Education Partnership</li> <li>▪ Essex Careers &amp; Business Partnership</li> <li>▪ Epping Forest Industry Matters Group</li> </ul>	Grouping Grouping Grouping	Specific interest groups – sub-regional - two with public sector backing.
Brent and Harrow	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Brent Business Venture</li> <li>▪ Harrow in Business</li> <li>▪ HSBC Bank</li> </ul>	Enterprise Agency Enterprise Agency Individual firm	Two Enterprise Agencies plus one major bank
Hangleton & Knoll	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Sussex Chamber of Commerce</li> </ul>	Grouping	One general group only
Chalkhill	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Wimpey Construction UK</li> <li>▪ Metropolitan Housing Trust</li> <li>▪ Onyx</li> <li>▪ Ujina</li> </ul>	Individual firm Individual firm Individual firm Individual firm	Two housing developers and two other firms with local presence.
Canalside Rochdale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rochdale Chamber of Commerce</li> <li>▪ Rochdale Development Agency</li> </ul>	Grouping Development Agency (primarily public sector)	Three groups, one with regeneration/economic development remit (effectively public sector regeneration agency), the other a general business forum.
Regenerating Wolverhampton	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce</li> <li>▪ Wolverhampton &amp; District Trades Council</li> </ul>	Grouping Grouping	Two general groups only
Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Enterprise plc</li> </ul>	Individual firm	One economic development consultancy/property developer
Hull City Vision - Gipsyville	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Springfield Group UK</li> <li>▪ Northern Foods plc</li> </ul>	Individual firm Individual firm	Individual firms at Board level (though wider range, including groups, on subsidiary Stakeholder Group)
Royds Community Association	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Keepmoat Prtn</li> <li>▪ Brunel Housing Association</li> </ul>	Individual firm Housing Association	Individual firms with direct interest in SRB property projects.



Table 6.1: Types of private sector organisations involved in case-study SRB schemes ( <i>continued</i> )			
South Leytonstone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Invincible Contracts</li> <li>▪ Leytonstone Auction Rooms</li> <li>▪ Waltham Forest Chamber of Commerce</li> <li>▪ Boots the Chemist</li> <li>▪ Waltham Forest Housing Action Trust</li> </ul>	Individual firm, representing wider Traders Association Individual firm Grouping Individual firm Individual organisation	Combination of individual firms and representatives of wider groupings

Source: Evaluation case study reports

6.2.6 What is striking about the evidence is how few sub-regional business groups (beyond traditional Chambers of Commerce) have participated in SRB at strategic, partner level. The small number of examples seem to have done so when their own internal strategic and delivery structures are well developed, where there are thematic, single issue, schemes which are clearly aligned with the business interests of their constituents and/or where they have a strong regeneration or economic development dimension. The best example of this amongst the 20 case-studies is the Engineering in Education scheme which is directed, designed, managed and delivered by the private sector partners to a consistent format in each of eleven sub-regions across the West Midlands.

### **6.3 Roles played by the private sector in regeneration**

6.3.1 Looking beyond its role at partner level there has been a widespread and diverse engagement by the private sector in regeneration schemes funded through SRB. Table 6.2 summarises the ways in which the private sector has participated in the 20 case-study schemes.

6.3.2 Only one of the schemes has had no private sector involvement at all (Hangleton & Knoll<sup>4</sup>). The private sector has played a property development role in twelve of the other areas. Examples of private sector involvement in land and property projects are too numerous to list here, but include, for example, the programme of renovation, housing association new build and private sector new build in Gipsyville, Hull and similar (though smaller scale) housing projects in Royds Bradford and Bristol, as well as commercial land and property projects in Rochdale, Lancashire Manufacturing, Brighton, Bristol and Woolwich.

6.3.3 Individual businesses have been the recipients of support through SRB-funded projects in twelve schemes, with examples of support including help for start-ups (e.g. South Leytonstone), ethnic minority businesses (e.g. Woolwich), advice on environmental management (e.g. Swadlincote), and community enterprises (e.g. Bristol).

6.3.4 The final column of Table 6.2 helps to illustrate the wider range of private sector participation. Examples include individual firms acting as mentors for under-achieving school children in Brent & Harrow, or promoting the engineering industry in the West Midlands; a large firm (Procter & Gamble) committing over £150,000 towards a drugs fact file for parents in Northumbria; a major supermarket chain (ASDA) participating in a local recruitment scheme in Chalkhill; and a Business in the Community-promoted scheme in Brighton to encourage links between business, community and the voluntary sectors. Other areas have also had private sector involvement in project delivery – especially where this has taken the form of training or business consultancy.

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<sup>4</sup> The leverage ratios for Hangleton & Knoll suggest otherwise, but expenditure counted as private sector in fact was sourced from community based organisations including the long-standing Hangleton Knoll Project. We would argue that genuine leverage from organisations with a corporate profit motive is negligible.

Table 6.2: Role played by the private sector in regeneration					
Case-study scheme	Private sector "led"	On partnership	Property developers	Beneficiaries	Other (specify)
West Cornwall Initiative	✓ (in name only)	✓	✓	✓	
Northumbria Community Safety		✓			✓ (substantial financial contribution by individual firm to project)
Engineering in Education (WM)	✓	✓			✓ (mentors for schools)
Limes Farm Partnership		✓	✓	✓	
Brent and Harrow		✓		✓	✓ (mentors for school pupils)
Hangleton & Knoll					
Chalkhill		✓	✓		✓ (training delivery, employing local residents)
Canalside Rochdale		✓	✓	✓	
Regenerating Wolverhampton		✓	✓	✓	✓ (project delivery)
Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership		✓	✓	✓	✓ (project delivery)
Hull City Vision – Gipsyville		✓	✓	✓	✓ (project delivery)
Royds Community Association		✓	✓	✓	✓ (project delivery)
Swadlincote Woodlands		✓	✓	✓	✓ (project delivery, including environmental management for business scheme)
Regenerating Central Brighton		✓	✓	✓	✓ (project delivery, including business community partnership project)
Bristol 2020		✓	✓	✓	✓ (training delivery, project advice, sponsorship, placements)
Woolwich Revival		✓	✓	✓	✓ (project delivery)
Merseyside		✓			✓ (project delivery)
Nottingham		✓	✓	✓	✓ (project delivery)
Sunderland		✓		✓	
South Leytonstone		✓	✓	✓	✓ (project delivery, housing development)

Source: Evaluation case-studies



6.3.5 These other forms of private sector engagement will only rarely show up in financial leverage ratios, as they represent time inputs or other in kind support which is often not accounted for with the same rigour as money. We would argue, however, that these other pathways to involvement are just as significant in terms of their potential impact on scheme performance.

## 6.4 Motivations for private sector involvement and the extent of involvement

6.4.1 Looking at the different roles played by the private sector in the 20 case studies, clear profit motives (whether short or long term) are apparent in almost every case. For the vast majority of its engagement, the private sector has not donated significant amounts of time or money to causes which are not worthwhile in its terms. This applies across the full spectrum of involvement, from leadership, through other partner involvement, to direct participation on projects. Amongst the 20 case studies one of the few exceptions we can find is the example of the Business Community Partnership which formed part of the Regenerating Central Brighton scheme which encouraged links between business, community and voluntary sectors and promoted employee volunteering as a means to business engagement in regeneration.

### **Business Community Partnership project**

The Business Community Partnership project was run by Business in the Community. This was a five year project which sought to forge links between business, community and the voluntary sectors. It emanated from a Working Group of local businesses, voluntary organisations, local authorities and the TEC. By the end of SRB2 funding it had supported 118 voluntary organisations and 93 local people with 15 employers involved in volunteering schemes. In 1999 the project received the Business in the Community Award for Excellence. Business in the Community contributed £165,000 to the project with other smaller private contributions of around £30,000. SRB2 funds were £93,500. SRB2 funding ceased in March 2000 and in October 2001 it became an independent business and has continued with some funding from SRB6 and the Active Community Unit at the Home Office.

6.4.2 Earlier in this section we set out the hypothesis that financial leverage from the private sector is most likely to be generated in those schemes where projects offer developers or other businesses scope to improve their competitive position – notably land and property projects and business support initiatives. In the mid-term report, which was based on only ten case study schemes, the data suggested a positive correlation between the proportion of public sector expenditure on these types of project, and the extent of private sector leverage. When analysed statistically, the information for all 20 schemes presented in Table 6.3<sup>5</sup> reveals a slight, positive correlation, but one which is not significant in statistical terms. What this suggests is that while high levels of leverage may well be generated by land and property and business development projects, these SRB schemes exhibit a much richer mix of projects, including projects beyond traditional “high leverage” areas that generate substantial private sector leverage. There are also numerous land and property projects and business development projects that, for a variety of reasons, have not generated substantial private sector leverage. The last group is likely to include at least some large scale housing renewal schemes that involve substantial levels of public sector funding.

<sup>5</sup> Excluding Chalkhill, where the leverage ratio is not considered to be an accurate reflection of the links between the scheme and the private sector funding in question

**Table 6.3: Financial and non-financial inputs and variation according to scheme emphasis**

Case-study scheme	Leverage ratio (£ private per £1 public)	Non financial in-kind contributions (time, gifts or core (non-project) funding)	Summary of involvement (very high, high, medium, low, very low, none).	Extent to which scheme emphasised potentially higher leverage activities, based on ...	
				% public sector scheme spend on land & property projects	% public sector scheme spend on business support projects
West Cornwall Initiative	0.26	Time inputs by partners	Medium – clawback thought to have prevented higher leverage. Not genuinely private sector led.	27%	27%
Northumbria Community Safety	0.10	Significant contribution by one large employer to an information campaign	Medium, given the scale of contribution and the nature of the scheme	0%	0%
Engineering in Education	0.37	Substantial contributions of time-based inputs by 442 WM firms in project delivery and through leadership of scheme	Very high. Substantial time-based leverage taking a variety of strategic and project-related forms.	0%	0%
Limes Farm Partnership	0.13	None	Medium. Note that Very Low in the absence of the Housing Trust activity.	91%	<1%
Brent and Harrow	0.15	Substantial time inputs by 650 firms, or 5-10% of business population in area as mentors	Medium to High	0%	58%
Hangleton & Knoll	0.33	Effectively no input at all from private sector. Leverage ratio represents community based inputs	None	43%	0%
Chalkhill	6.10	Links to separate housing renewal programme; local recruitment, training delivery	High	0%	1%
Canalside Rochdale	2.12	Time inputs on partnership working.	High	81%	4%
Regenerating Wolverhampton	0.98	Time inputs on partnership working	Medium to high	32%	26%
Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership	0.92	Time inputs on partnership working. Delivery	Medium to high	23%	48%
Hull City Vision - Gipsyville	0.94	Time inputs on partners	Medium	82%	0
Royds Community Association	0.39	Time inputs by partners	Medium	80%	0.6%
Swadlincote Woodlands	3.05	Time inputs by partners	High	29%	13%
Regenerating Central Brighton	0.15	Time inputs by partners and by 15 firms in business community partnership project. Equipment.	Medium	88%	0
Bristol 2020	0.30	Time inputs by partners	Low to medium	59%	21%
Woolwich Revival	0.27	Time inputs by partners	Medium	75%	2%
Merseyside	0.65	Time inputs by partners	Low to medium	0%	0%
Nottingham	0.95	Time inputs by partners	Medium	31%	21%
Sunderland	0.53	Time inputs by partners	Medium	53%	20%
South Leytonstone	0.69	Time inputs by partners	Low to medium	63%	10%
<b>All case-studies</b>	<b>0.71</b>				
<b>All SRB schemes Rounds 1 to 6</b>	<b>0.59</b>				

Source: Dept Land Economy \* includes TEC funding

- 6.4.3 An example of substantial “leverage in kind” where there is a strong fit between corporate motive and regeneration need is the case of Asda in Chalkhill where the supermarket actively participated in a local customised training initiative to provide current or former residents of the Chalkhill Estate with training which would enable them to take up employment opportunities at a new superstore. While Asda obviously invested significant time resources, it was significantly assisted in finding a pool of available, low cost, appropriately skilled labour for its new store. It will probably have made savings in management time and expenditure on recruitment and training and may also have lowered its overall wage bill by being able to recruit so many of those returning to the labour market from unemployment or inactivity. Moreover the firm will have gained considerable kudos (and, we assume, initial customer interest) from being seen as actively involved in the regeneration of the area.
- 6.4.4 In Brent & Harrow, the motivation for businesses to provide mentoring support to underachieving pupils in schools is likely to have its origins in similar labour market motivations, albeit those of a much longer time horizon. These employers were looking ahead to the time when these pupils might become potential recruits. They were building the profile of their own firm, of their sector, and leaving positive messages behind about a career in either – as well as helping directly to improve educational attainment and the quality of those potential recruits.
- 6.4.5 Similar labour market concerns predominated in the Engineering in Education scheme in the West Midlands, where concerns over the limited numbers of school leavers entering industry, or taking further or higher education courses of relevance to manufacturing, were at the heart of the scheme’s rationale and design.
- 6.4.6 As noted above, the Business Community Partnership scheme in Brighton demonstrated that, when approached in the right way by an organisation with a track record in business participation, considerable numbers of businesses can be encouraged to spend time engaging with voluntary and community groups for no direct financial reward.

## **6.5 Benefits from private sector involvement**

- 6.5.1 Some of the most obvious benefits of private sector involvement in regeneration are that it:
- Has the potential to reduce the gross public sector cost of regeneration, especially in relation to land and property development, and offers the potential to transfer risk from the public to the private sector through a range of joint venture and other mechanisms.
  - Brings to bear a range of business disciplines to the strategy development, business planning, project management, accounting and monitoring tasks of any regeneration scheme.
  - Subjects projects to more rigorous assessments of market demand, competing supply, and short and long-run viability, which may aid their effectiveness and long-term sustainability.
  - Can bring innovations to a process which can, at times, be perceived as slow and bureaucratic, whilst ensuring accountability and probity in the use of public funds.

- Provides a broader range of views and expertise, including an insight into the concerns and needs of businesses – a “hotline” into the local economy, which can reveal different viewpoints on regeneration priorities.
- Breaks down often significant barriers and misunderstandings about the work of the public, private and voluntary and community sectors.

6.5.2 Good examples of the private sector developer role can be found in Rochdale, Wolverhampton and West Cornwall, all of which managed to attract and sustain private sector interest in, mainly, brownfield sites for commercial, employment-generating, use. The best example of a complete private sector role in the process, which embodies all of the features above, is Engineering in Education which was led and delivered by the private sector. This scheme is described in more detail in the box below.

#### **Engineering in Education**

The Engineering in Education Scheme was led by The Engineering Liaison Service partnership (TELS), which is a forum for the promotion of engineering, science and technology activity in the West Midlands. TELS is, in fact, an umbrella for a wide range of other industry partnerships and organisations, which in addition to strong private sector representation include, for example, education business partnerships, careers information services, universities, secondary schools and the Government Office for the West Midlands. The partnership was motivated to bid for SRB in an attempt to bring more co-ordination and focus to the wide range of existing industry-education initiatives. Studies had suggested that the lack of coherence reduced the potential impact of the initiatives (in terms of school children choosing a career in engineering and manufacturing industry), that duplication of effort was inefficient, and that the confusing plethora of schemes dissuaded managers from becoming involved.

The accountability body for the scheme was the Engineering Employers Federation in the West Midlands. In addition to the Steering Group and a dedicated Project Director, there were project managers and project co-ordinators in each of the nine sub-regions which was covered by the programme. A wide range of projects were funded by the programme, but with the common theme of employer involvement and participation in education, at both primary and secondary school levels. Examples included the Young Engineers Clubs, promotion of involvement in the CREST (Creativity in Science & Technology) Awards Scheme, promotion of Technological Advanced GNVQs and the Year in Industry (gap year) scheme.

In all, over 440 separate employers were involved in these and other collaborative projects, and 156 of these had developed employee volunteering schemes as part of the SRB programme. In addition to the strategic leadership role of the EEF and its partners, individual employers were involved as mentors, accreditors, hosts for student and teacher placements and in setting challenges for students and advising and supporting teachers with the delivery of particular aspects of the curriculum. In all, over 13,600 students were involved in the range of projects.

Given the scale of these activities, it is not surprising that the in-kind contributions from the private sector were substantial – estimated at almost £250,000, which together with a similar level of public sector funding was used to match the £416,000 SRB award. The scale of commitment by all involved, and of the achievements generated, was judged to be impressive.

The partnership was highly regarded, and considered to have worked effectively and efficiently, with an appropriate amount of control to maintain consistency, yet delegated authority and flexibility to sub-regional managers and co-ordinators to meet local needs.

- 6.5.3 There have been some examples, however, where private sector involvement could have been better managed, especially in terms of the transparency of the relationship between key private sector partners and the SRB programmes in those cases where private sector partners were also responsible for delivery. In one scheme one of the three partners was a private sector economic development consultancy and property developer. The organisation had a long history of involvement in economic development support. As a public limited company it was one of only three partners and had responsibility for delivering multi-million pound business support and/or property development projects, with no apparent checks or balances on its participation in the contract awards. A similar situation arose in another scheme where the housing renewal contractors from a related initiative played the dominant private sector role on the SRB committee. More than two-thirds of the SRB expenditure (£2 million) was awarded, through a single project, to the lead housebuilder to deliver construction training.
- 6.5.4 Neither scheme performed particularly well, though we have no evidence that the participation of either private sector organisation restricted the schemes' performance, or that the involvement of alternative private sector partners or project deliverers would have altered the outcome. What is clear from our evaluation of both schemes, however, is that the use of public funds requires transparent processes to ensure that conflicts of interest are avoided and seen to be avoided. There are strong arguments for separating the roles of partner and participant. Where this is not possible or desirable, steps need to be taken to ensure that conflicts of interest are declared early and that best value is secured for the public purse through rigorous development competitions or tendering procedures.

## **6.6 The limitations of private sector involvement in regeneration**

- 6.6.1 Whatever the benefits of business participation in the regeneration process, it is clear that private sector participants can play a variety of roles, from strategist to supplier, from financial contributor to the merely vocally supportive.
- 6.6.2 The circumstances where such involvement is more or less likely – or desirable (see above) - are also many and varied. Unqualified guidance that states the private sector involvement is, without exception, a good thing is unhelpful. The private sector clearly does not need to operate energetically at all levels in the regeneration process whatever the circumstances to make the process effective or efficient. Amongst these case-studies at least, the number of examples of dominant private sector involvement of unsuccessful schemes equals those which have been successful.
- 6.6.3 This analysis suggests, on the strength of 20 case studies, that there are some types of regeneration initiative where private sector involvement is critical (notably those with a physical regeneration or business development objectives), and some others where *substantial* engagement is unlikely, or where it could be distracting in terms of limited regeneration resources available for other solutions. The latter are most likely to be the community-based regeneration schemes in neighbourhoods where there is a limited business base, or in schemes where mainstream service delivery improvements are being pursued. There may be roles for the private sector to get involved, especially through service delivery and/or activities which play well to the corporate social responsibility urges of larger, higher profile, employers. However, it would be unrealistic to expect SMEs to participate in schemes of this kind, either at a strategic level or in terms of significant financial contributions to projects. Common

issues raised by businesses are the time burdens required by frequent and lengthy meetings, the perceived lack of flexibility built into SRB and other ABIs, lack of precision surrounding aims and objectives, and lack of convergence between public sector views of regeneration priorities and those of the private sector.

## **6.7 The evolving policy response to private sector engagement**

- 6.7.1 Since we published our mid-term report, there has continued to be an increasing interest in corporate social responsibility. Shareholders, regulators and the wider public are more concerned and anxious about corporate governance and ethics. The role of private enterprise in the delivery of public services has been the subject of ongoing debate throughout this government's tenure, asked the perceived power of global businesses. The private sector's response is a gradual trend towards more social reporting, mainly by the largest companies, aided by the development of tools and standards for accountability and reporting, as well as both market and CSR indices such as those promoted by Business in the Community.
- 6.7.2 At the same time, policy makers and programme managers within government have continued to evolve and promote guidance targeted at meaningful engagement by the private sector in regeneration. Thus, for example, a pilot initiative funded by the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit promoted the concept of Business Brokers, whose role is to promote private sector engagement in LSPs and in neighbourhood renewal more generally. Business in the Community and the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit are currently undertaking an evaluation of the Business Broker pilots. It is understood that in general the nine pilot Business Brokers will influence mechanisms for business engagement on LSPs as well as brokering a wide range of individual relationships between businesses and voluntary and community organisations, though there is considerable variation across LSPs.
- 6.7.3 At the same time the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit launched its private sector panel and has continued to sponsor research into business engagement in deprived areas (e.g. the Business Investment in Under-Served Markets research project). The London Assembly published a scrutiny report into "organisational civic-mindedness" which reviewed private sector engagement in regeneration in the capital. Further afield, the EU has published a number of reports on CSR and is encouraging networking by businesses and national CSR bodies within the EU.
- 6.7.4 Business in the Community also published "Local Strategic Partnerships and Neighbourhood Renewal: Why Business Should Get Involved" (aimed at business) and "Working with Business in Local Strategic Partnerships" (aimed at local partners). Dissemination of key lessons from research projects through resources such as Renewal.net as well as publicity campaigns aimed at business audiences and regeneration practitioners has been, and is expected to continue to be, a major dimension of the government's regeneration agenda.
- 6.7.5 During 2003 the NRU also published its Good Practice Guide called "Changing Practices", demonstrating how businesses have adapted their mainstream policies and practices to operate more effectively and profitably in regeneration areas and in so doing bring benefits to local communities. This document identified a range of lessons for businesses and for regeneration practitioners. It urged regeneration practitioners to understand what matters to business; make the business case; seek

business leadership and invest time in supporting business collaborations; and adopt a more flexible and responsive attitude to the needs of local businesses.

6.7.6 The findings of the SRB national evaluation correspond closely with the research above, namely the need to be pro-active in identifying and creating opportunities for private sector involvement, as well as advising businesses of existing opportunities to participate in regeneration activity. There are undoubtedly schemes – even small, community-based regeneration initiatives - where business participation, even from local SMEs, could be secured, but appears to have been largely ignored so far by scheme partners and managers. Once appropriate opportunities for business involvement have been identified, it is essential that there is a persuasive approach to selling the benefits of private sector involvement.

6.7.7 A range of practical lessons emerged from the 20 case studies, including:

- Considering at the outset the skills and resources needed to deliver regeneration, and the potential roles that could be played by the private sector
- Involving the private sector at the earliest opportunity – before the big agendas and strategic priorities have been set – so that they can have a genuine say alongside the public and voluntary and community sectors.
- The need to get businesses talking together through local networks, as a way of sparking off new ideas and supporting fora through which businesses can make their voice heard – evidence suggests that the more this activity can be focused on particular themes or issues of relevance to business, the more likely it is that businesses will participate.
- Working through local business organisations such as Chambers of Commerce and existing partnerships such as Education Business Partnerships, as well as local traders associations – harnessing existing networks, however imperfect sometimes, is easier than building new ones from scratch;
- Holding Board, theme group or project meetings at breakfast time, or in the evening, rather than during the day, to encourage broader participation
- Having shorter, more focused, agendas and ensuring that meetings are efficiently chaired, with shorter papers circulated well in advance.
- Improving awareness of regeneration activity in the immediate areas where businesses operate – often (especially if it is not physical and visible) it is not obvious what activity is occurring
- Once engaged, considering in more detail ways in which business objectives and those of regeneration activities can work together – e.g. could training companies improve their market penetration of “hard to reach” groups by recruiting local residents? Could companies supply needs and issues be remedied by local sourcing, including from community businesses?

## **6.8 Summary and lessons for future policy**

6.8.1 This Chapter has demonstrated the range and extent of private sector involvement in 20 SRB case-study areas. It shows that most schemes have secured some form of private sector involvement. There are also isolated cases of genuine private sector leadership of regeneration schemes.

6.8.2 However, private sector participation in the regeneration process is far from automatic. Consultation amongst businesses at the bid development stage for many

of these early SRB schemes was very limited, and even when they have been persuaded to join partnership boards, active participation is not guaranteed - just as it is not guaranteed with any other type of partner, whether public, voluntary or community.

- 6.8.3 The private sector is not a homogeneous group. Each firm will have different markets, different managers, a different history and, overall, will “tick” slightly differently from every other. What most firms do have in common, though, is an urge to make profits. The management of regeneration schemes does not offer such opportunities, except for a small handful of specialist regeneration firms. Participation in certain projects will offer profit-making opportunities, however, depending on the risks and rewards. These are most likely to be found in relation to land and property development and business development – though in each case, market or institutional failures may mean that considerable persuasion is necessary before the private sector engages. There is some (though limited) evidence from our case-studies to demonstrate that financial involvement by the private sector in SRB is positively associated with these types of project.
- 6.8.4 There is a growing tendency for firms to consider and engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions. While these inclinations are as likely to be driven by shareholders’ return on investment as they are by philanthropy, the SRB case-study evidence reveals that some businesses are making substantial, meaningful contributions to regeneration which have been motivated by their concerns over long-term competitiveness. The evidence suggests that some of the most significant examples of business leadership in regeneration have been related to education, and resulted from concerns over the quantum and quality of the future labour market. That businesses are prepared to pool resources and work alongside their competitors to help tackle the consequences of institutional failure is revealing of the importance attached by business to getting mainstream policies right in the long-term. It offers some signals of the important role which the private sector can play in informing public policy, both mainstream and discretionary, even if business participation does not extend much beyond that in some areas of regeneration activity.
- 6.8.5 Recent research sponsored by the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, Business in the Community and the London Assembly has acknowledged the complexity of the potential roles for business engagement in regeneration and set forward a range of mechanisms to aid the process. The evidence from this evaluation suggests that private sector involvement is not the be-all and end-all of regeneration in every case – and there are as many cases of poorly performing or managed private sector schemes as star performers. But there should be a core level of involvement at the strategy development stage and a consistently applied minimum effort to identify where private sector participation makes sense, what benefits it would bring, which businesses would be best suited to help, and how they could be persuaded to join in. At that point in the decision-making process, there might be various routes in terms of membership (and leadership) of the partnership, participation (beyond partner level) in core support for the scheme, and participation in individual projects, whether as developer, beneficiary, supporter or deliverer.
- 6.8.6 Getting the private sector to change their mainstream actions to more evenly meet the regeneration needs of the local area means improving awareness but also making the case effectively to them. The private sector has to be involved at the earliest opportunity in seeking to tackle local problems that emerge – so that it can provide a genuine response alongside the public and community sector. Thus, it is important to get companies, in and around the area being regenerated, to think



across the range of their normal day-to-day business activities and how relatively small changes might help with the problems of the area, for example, can companies adjust their training programmes to meet the particular needs of local residents? Can companies' supply problems be remedied by local sourcing? This can mean identifying emerging agendas (shortage of school leavers etc) at an early stage and seeking to work with other local players to do something about them. Throughout it is helpful to seek customised responses that recognise key interfaces between organisations/groups in a local area and regeneration that is an ongoing continuous process with no quick fix.

- 6.8.7 Finally, the case studies allow us to draw some conclusions on the appropriateness of SRB, or a similar vehicle, for encouraging private sector participation. The diversity of SRB, in terms of the nature of the areas targeted and the objectives pursued, has demonstrated that the private sector will participate in areas with the most deep-seated market and institutional failures. The multi-faceted regeneration needs and opportunities presented by these areas, and the objectives pursued by SRB schemes, have elicited many different forms of private sector involvement. The flexibility of local management and delivery embodied within SRB has also provided good opportunities to engage with an appropriately energised private sector, although these opportunities have not always been fully exploited.
- 6.8.8 In comparison with other schemes, SRB has also generated quite a good level of financial leverage from the private sector, which is all the more impressive given that there are many schemes without a strong property or business development focus. A good number of schemes have been successful in engaging the private sector beyond the "traditional" property or business development roles. The case studies demonstrate the importance of innovation in project design and delivery which has been enabled through SRB and which has led to more cases of successful business mentoring. These different types of participation also serve as a reminder that financial leverage ratios should not be used as the sole measure of private sector involvement in regeneration.

## 7. The contribution of SRB to thematic issues with key lessons

### Summary of chapter:

Thematic schemes have been able to make an effective and telling contribution by developing strategic approaches to common problems.

Thematic schemes cannot, by their very nature, fully address the multi-dimensional regeneration needs of local areas within any single scheme. They have worked across different spatial levels and in the best cases have improved the degree and quality of interagency working

### 7.1 Introduction

7.1.1 Thematic regeneration schemes have been designed to focus on one particular aspect of the problems that face residents and businesses in relatively depressed areas and there have been a wide variety of examples. Table 7.1 provides evidence on how SRB schemes varied according to their main objective. In general terms, some 70% of SRB schemes contained more than one objective and were not thematic. The thematic issues that were addressed varied considerably, with attention given to enterprise, education, training ethnic minorities and young people.

Main Objectives	Number of schemes	Total SRB (%)	Total Expenditure (%)
Community	27	0.82	0.63
Crime	48	1.44	0.81
Economic growth/enterprise	70	6.89	6.47
Education	113	4.80	4.19
Training/employment	62	3.68	3.70
Environment	20	1.27	1.07
Ethnic minorities	40	4.29	4.95
Health	6	0.43	0.25
Housing	13	2.94	3.10
Youth	45	3.41	2.14
Multi objective	584	70.03	72.69
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,028</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Department of Land Economy

7.1.2 That there have been a variety of thematic schemes is reflective of the origins of the SRB scheme. The funding for SRB comprised eighteen smaller existing programmes that were brought together from a number of different Government Departments. Many of these existing programmes were thematic, e.g. concerned with small business development, school-industry links or crime prevention. It would clearly have been problematic, at least at the outset, to take funds from these former programmes and not permit SRB to accept thematic schemes that had previously been the subject of these programmes.

7.1.3 The eighteen programmes themselves had previously established with the Treasury the rationale for intervention in their particular thematic area. To an extent, therefore, there was no need for SRB to re-establish the justification for funding schemes under

those themes, unless circumstances had changed. The original rationale for a thematic programme was often based on the existence of particular aspects of institutional failure that were not being satisfactorily addressed by existing mainstream programmes. In some cases, and perhaps increasingly within SRB, the thematic scheme has sought to address areas where existing mainstream provision was seen to be failing or not sensitised enough to the particular service delivery needs of the socially disadvantaged in deprived areas. In other cases the rationale for a thematic intervention was to seek to provoke a specific innovative response to a particular set of problems.

7.1.4 In the first two rounds of SRB individual partnerships were not pressurised to set out a formal justification for individual thematic schemes. In the later rounds of SRB, however, changes to the composition and area targeting of initiatives within mainstream programmes themselves (e.g. Health Action Teams, Education Action Areas, Employment Zones) meant that the arguments for further specific intervention by a regeneration initiative like SRB had to be more tightly defined. At the same time mainstream funders increasingly focused on targeting residents in specific areas in seeking to address key problems using innovative approaches. The evidence suggests that the SRB thematic schemes were well placed to meet this need.

7.1.5 There was considerable variation in the objectives of thematic SRB schemes, but prominent examples were:

- Enterprise;
- Education, employment and lifelong learning;
- Health;
- Crime, and particularly youth crime;
- Drug misuse;
- Tourism, culture and leisure;
- Black and minorities ethnic communities;
- Transport.

7.1.6 It is also possible to consider the objectives, and thus ultimate achievements of regeneration schemes, according to a broader over-arching theme, like promoting urban or rural development, reflecting Government attention to these spatial divisions as manifested in the two White Papers. The common thematic issue is thus that such areas have been linked, somewhat arbitrarily, according to their geographical identity. In relation to the rural agenda this issue is often centred around relative remoteness or peripherality. In the case of the urban agenda it has often been more focused on physical dereliction and decay and a lack of flexibility in the resource base to adjust to change. Throughout both urban and rural thematic schemes, transport-related issues and problems have predominated.

7.1.7 The main thematic issues examined in the sections that follow are:

- Creation of enterprise;
- Building links between schools and the world of work;
- Community safety and reducing crime (including drug abuse);
- Enhancing mainstream service delivery in relation to employability, training and the environment;
- Promoting urban renaissance;
- Promoting rural regeneration.

## 7.2 The creation of enterprise

7.2.1 In relation to the creation of enterprise we focus on two case studies. The Brent and Harrow regeneration scheme was concerned with increasing the start-up rate and quality of new businesses within the two London Boroughs of Brent and Harrow in order to create a small firm enterprise culture in the area. The Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership was devoted to the single regeneration theme of providing advice and assistance to the manufacturing sector in the large county of Lancashire. The scheme also included an element that sought to improve business education links.

### *Brent and Harrow*

7.2.2 The Brent and Harrow SRB scheme was led by the former local Training and Enterprise Council. It was a three-year scheme which began in 1995. The scheme had three strands (New Business Development, Community Works and Understanding Business), two of which were directed towards the creation of enterprise.

7.2.3 New Business Development, which drew just under 60% of the SRB funds, was set up to bolster and link in with two existing local enterprise agencies (Harrow in Business and Brent Business Venture) by more closely targeting support services to new and existing small businesses in the area. This element provided counselling and planning support for new businesses and management support for existing firms. Soft loans and business audits were also carried out. This part of the scheme was successful in creating over 600 new businesses supporting over 1,000 jobs.

7.2.4 Community Works, which was only allocated 10% of the SRB budget, was designed to encourage community groups and individuals to set up community businesses and to develop community enterprise by providing start-up grants and allowance, skills training and business support. Despite its small budget, this part of the scheme made a significant contribution to capacity building in the area with seventeen new community enterprises being formed. The approach adopted in Community Works was very innovative for its time in that it targeted minority ethnic community-based businesses in an attempt to lay the foundations for economic sustainability within the local area. Targeting was achieved through a successful publicity initiative based on a newsletter, leaflets and advertisements in local media. However, the small scale of the scheme and the absence of effective successor arrangements meant that sustainable achievements have been elusive.

7.2.5 In relation to specific project attainments of relevance to the theme of encouraging local enterprise, there were examples of good practice in demonstrating how the private sector can make an important contribution to “people related” aspects of local regeneration at very little cost to the public sector or to the firms themselves. More specifically, this scheme developed the scope of **existing** support agencies and encouraged community-based businesses.

7.2.6 Thematic schemes are often able to bring forward good practice projects because of the focus they give to securing specific objectives. This concentration of endeavour often brings out good project design and Brent and Harrow was no exception in this respect. However, while an element of sustainability was achieved through the continuing operation of the business support agencies, it was unclear whether part of their operations would continue to be tailored to meet the specific needs of small businesses in Brent and Harrow. The weakness of such approaches, demonstrated

clearly in the case of Brent and Harrow, is that insufficient attention is given to how sustainable outcomes can be brought about. Too often good practice is not disseminated or effectively between the agencies/departments concerned.

### *Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership*

7.2.7 The Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership (LMP) was a Round one SRB scheme of five years duration. It was devoted to the single theme of providing advice and assistance for the manufacturing sector and business education links across Lancashire. The objectives of the scheme, namely to remove the long standing shortfall in manufacturing jobs by raising the competitiveness and growth of the manufacturing sector, seemed a valid way of limiting and reducing the incidence of long term unemployment and deprivation.

7.2.8 A difficult issue to resolve in the evaluation of all private sector support programmes operated by the public sector is how any improved competitiveness can be recognised and measured. The SRB monitoring system, although focused on output measurement, contained no indicators that remotely represented improvements in private sector competitiveness. The Lancashire Manufacturing Partnership (LMP) mechanically adopted the official SRB monitoring system. However, for thematic schemes of this kind the monitoring framework was inappropriate and much too limited in scope. Unfortunately, the local partnership did not take the opportunity to develop their own monitoring system which was appropriate to the scheme's activities and objectives.

7.2.9 To address this issue a survey of companies that had received assistance from one or more of the LMP sponsored projects was carried out as part of the final evaluation of LMP. Companies were asked whether they felt their involvement in the SRB projects had contributed towards an increase in their competitiveness. Evidence from the survey found that 29% felt they were more competitive as a direct result of participation in the scheme and 45% considered that the programmes had had longer-term benefits in improving the quality of ongoing subsequent decision making. To try to identify these improvements more specifically companies were asked to indicate how competitiveness had been improved. A summary of the findings is presented in Table 7.2 below.

<b>Table 7.2: Indicators of improved competitiveness for LMP surveyed companies</b>	
	<b>% of firms</b>
Improved business planning/financial control	55
Improved product development, innovation, production processes	36
Entry into new home and export markets	42
Improved reliability/delivery/after sales service	28
Increased sales	23
Increased profits	35
Improved management systems and training	28

Source: Lancashire Manufacturing company survey

7.2.10 Because improved competitiveness manifests itself in a variety of ways, many of which are not measured at the county level, it remains very difficult to quantify the extent of the benefit in terms of downstream macro indicators for Lancashire county as a whole.

7.2.11 It is important to consider whether or not highly thematic schemes at county-wide level should be a feature of locally-targeted initiatives such as SRB or neighbourhood renewal. If the theme is the promotion of competitiveness at the county level then

consideration must also be given to how benefits generated at the county level can be harnessed to the benefit of the neighbourhood if such themes are to be funded under locally targeted initiatives such as SRB.

- 7.2.12 On the plus side LMP was of a size that created some economies of scale in providing specialist technical support, such as innovation centres, for all manufactures in the county, something which would not be achieved by locally-targeted initiatives focussed more at the neighbourhood level. Moreover, LMP was successful in engaging the county's schools through Lancashire County Council as LEA.
- 7.2.13 On the downside the LMP was hampered by too many layers of management and administration - DETR, GO, LMP partnership, the two TECs, local service providers. It was a clumsy structure which failed to proactively supervise the actual delivery of services at the local level. Moreover, thematic SRB schemes are at their best when they take the form of innovative, experimental, pilot, small scale schemes set up to test new approaches to regeneration. However, LMP was a large county-wide scheme which was always in danger of doing more or less the same as mainstream programmes using the same pool of scarce delivery staff. New institutions and partnerships have since been set up at regional and district levels – RDAs, their sub-regional partnerships and LSPs, which together with the Small Business Service should provide a comprehensive structure for the provision of business support services at appropriate geographical levels - achieving necessary economies of scale whilst ensuring effective services delivery at the local level. There are thus important lessons from this research as to how RDAs should seek to deliver this service.
- 7.2.14 Meanwhile, the problems of regenerating deprived neighbourhoods are acute in relation to public funding available for regeneration programmes. Area-based initiatives such as SRB, NDC and Neighbourhood Renewal should focus on comprehensive regeneration at the neighbourhood level - rather than highly thematic schemes covering wide geographical areas. This by no means precludes neighbourhood partnerships becoming involved in business support programmes in or near to their target areas - indeed this will be an essential component if concentrations of deprived non-working residents of deprived neighbourhoods are to re-enter the productive labour force in a sustained way.

### **7.3 Building links between schools and the world of work**

#### *Engineering in Education*

- 7.3.1 In relation to school industry links we focused on the Engineering in Education scheme. The overall mission of this partnership was to attract, educate and train young people into occupations of relevance to engineering and manufacturing across the West Midlands. Assisting in the regeneration of the West Midlands Region through the attraction of capable talent into the manufacturing and engineering base was stated as the main mission of the partnership. A central feature of the approach was to ensure that individual activities, delivered in schools through existing programmes, could be tailored to reflect the needs and priorities of local industry while ensuring a core curriculum. This was achieved through the adoption of a 'master menu' of activities from which each local-based delivery team could select. There were eight core learning programmes in the scheme which covered the age range of pupils and students from five up to twenty-five years.

7.3.2 The Engineering and Education Scheme was successful in a number of important ways that suggest lessons for other schemes. Although a relatively small SRB scheme with a key thematic focus, it was able to establish an effective partnership to introduce young people into the world of industry. Regional coverage with a delivery mechanism that ensured there was a local project manager and co-ordinators customising and implementing the scheme at the local level proved to be a good design feature. Local schools worked more effectively with local industry and the scale of achievement and commitment was impressive. Thus, certain elements of the programme can be seen to have lessons in developing further initiatives in terms of:

- strategic co-ordination across areas through the establishment of area co-ordinators;
- building on a tried and tested pilot that was effective and well received;
- recognising the need for sub-regional differentiation;
- a commitment from volunteers and the strong support from schools and a relatively small number of companies in developing the concept of an "Engineering Related Curriculum";
- getting a committed and dedicated project manager who could deliver and focus on detail;
- the involvement of representatives from the full range of local agencies and relevant parties;
- activities and individual projects targeted and delivered across the regional labour market to accommodate the inter-dependencies between local labour markets;
- strengthening the links between an improved skill base and increased business competitiveness through the labour market;
- achieving wider private sector involvement in the overall delivery of vocational training;
- recognising that there were opportunities for intervention in schools within all age ranges to increase the understanding and importance of engineering;
- strong equal opportunities agenda in terms of gender and race in order to offer the programme to as many young people as possible and break down traditional boundaries;
- improving the image of engineering as a credible employment route.

7.3.3 However, success does not come cheaply, and achieving strategic, co-ordinated delivery in a joined-up manner is relatively expensive in terms of time and resources, both from salaried staff, volunteer staff and the private sector. Moreover, at the present time, against a background of significant change to the delivery of education, training and business services, it is very easy for the powerful gains from joined-up working to be lost. Recognition has to be given to ensuring that the baton is passed on after the original regeneration scheme has finished. This entails a forward strategy that would require a co-ordinating body willing to develop a coherent area-based strategy and an effective delivery mechanism that will encourage the continuing commitment of key agencies and schools in partnership working.

## **7.4 Raising educational achievements and skills**

### *Merseyside Learning Partnership*

7.4.1 The Merseyside Learning Partnership (MLP) was a Round two scheme which ran from 1996/7 to 2000/1. It was a thematic (education) scheme covering three local

authority areas on Merseyside: Knowsley, Liverpool and Sefton and corresponded to the (then) Training and Enterprise Council's area of operation. It aimed to raise the educational achievements and skills of disadvantaged young people and thus address the "enhancing employment prospects" Strategic Objective of SRB. MLP was designed to bring cohesion and economies of scale to these activities across the three boroughs, to address gaps in terms both of geography and of provision, reduce the chance of duplication of effort and to stimulate innovation.

- 7.4.2 The scheme comprised two general programmes of activity: the Reducing Disaffection programme included work to facilitate inter-agency working and targeted pupil action, while Raising Attainment included a range of innovative projects targeting motivation and study, education-business links and Merseyside Educational Online Network (MEON), the scheme's largest project. Most of the projects were well-received by their target group of participants and judged successful by partners, although it is impossible to attribute outcome performance specifically to Merseyside Learning Partnership's activities.
- 7.4.3 During the formation of the partnership and development of the bid, tensions arose between the partnership and the funding authorities over the inclusion of MEON which had initially been submitted for separate funding. It was very different from the other MLP projects, and ran independently from the rest of the scheme. However, most partners thought that the overall benefits to MLP would outweigh any difficulties surrounding the addition of MEON to the original scheme. Further tensions developed between both LEAs and schools surrounding the priority and allocation of the spend of other parts of the scheme.
- 7.4.4 The outcome targets set in the submission for funding for MLP were ambitious, especially given that the scheme's programme of activities was not decided until half way through year two and that much of the work on inclusion was innovative, and therefore untested in terms of its potential to deliver results, especially in relation to the baseline indicators. Thus the targets for attainment were so inappropriate and challenging that they were unlikely to have been agreed in the first place with those responsible for *delivery*, i.e., the head teachers of local secondary schools.
- 7.4.5 The Merseyside Learning Partnership's priorities closely matched those set out in the developing national agenda for education from 1997 onwards. National and other local initiatives brought additional resources to address the issue of attainment and disaffection amongst young people. At the same time, the delivery mechanisms for much of the relevant provision for these groups of young people were being changed, with the establishment of new statutory and non-statutory authorities and the announcement of new funding methods. By demanding a response, e.g., from LEAs or Social Services, the emerging national strategy for education, exclusion and attainment might be seen as offering an ideal environment for MLP to set up its succession arrangements. However, MLP partner agencies and individuals connected with the scheme appear to have been diverted by events closer to home: the well-publicised and highly critical 1999 Ofsted review of Liverpool LEA led to a complete overhaul of that organisation, with staff in all senior posts replaced; responsibility for SRB was transferred from Government Office for the North West to the North West Development Agency; and the planned demise of the TEC (in the final year of MLP) meant that TEC staff involved in the scheme were preoccupied with concerns about their joint and individual responsibilities when the larger Merseyside-wide LSC was formed.



- 7.4.6 As a partnership, MLP had not delivered enough of value to its stakeholders by way of joined-up activity or added value in terms either of strategy or process to be worth continuing and there is no evidence available that the Board at any time took steps to attempt to fit the partnership into any existing or nascent overarching sub-regional or regional strategy. MLP's geographic area of remit did not fit the emerging national "partnership map" for sub-regional and local partnerships: it did not cover all of Merseyside (Halton, St Helens and the Wirral were excluded), so was not a true sub-regional body, but it was not small enough to relate to local neighbourhoods as required by Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs). It was too closely associated with the TEC to be politically acceptable to many local players, and the new LLSC's strategic aims and objectives were different from those it replaced at the TEC. MLP actions to address disaffection and attainment are now the remit of new and different strategic and delivery partnerships, such as Anti-Social Behaviour Units, formed as a result of national policy changes.
- 7.4.7 The initial vision of the Merseyside Learning Partnership as the sub-region's single multi-agency, cross-authority partnership acting to draw together the range of provision relating to education, the skills of young people, and support for disaffected pupils, and addressing gaps in terms both of geography and of provision failed to materialise. Partner commitment to MLP was not sufficient for it to survive beyond the term of its funding. Had it operated as a true partnership, the Board could possibly have considered extending the scheme's scope by facilitating and leading a strategic sub-regional approach to the exclusion and disengagement of young people, especially given the close correlation between MLP's objectives and those of the government. However, given the state of the partnership, this would have been a major challenge.

## **7.5 Community safety, reducing crime including drug abuse**

### *Northumbria Community Safety*

- 7.5.1 In relation to drugs and crime we have focused on the Northumbria Community Safety Partnership led by the Northumbria Police Authority. This was a scheme to bring about a co-ordinated response to tackling problems of drug abuse and crime across the county of Northumbria. This thematic scheme was run by a newly created partnership prior to the success of the SRB bid and was not dominated by its lead partner. It was able to design good partnership arrangements and their usefulness is demonstrated by the fact that the partnership has continued following the ending of the original SRB funding.
- 7.5.2 Included in the community safety initiatives were:
- Seminars for parents, teachers, school governors;
  - The launch of a number of initiatives such as the free Infoline;
  - The appointment of Community Safety Officers and drugs Co-ordinators for each local authority area within Northumbria;
  - Workshops and student centre activities for primary and secondary schools designed to raise awareness of issues surrounding drug misuse/abuse;
  - Literature on drug abuse for young people;
  - The appointment of youth workers and development of youth projects which reinforced the message/impact of the drugs programme and the importance of understanding the key issues regarding drugs.

- 7.5.3 The Drugs Accord programme through its Strategy Board and Area Teams developed initiatives designed to reach the maximum number of individuals. Moreover, it set in place sustainable support structures using the resources of a wide range of organisations committed to tackling drugs related issues. Over 175,000 people benefited from the initiative, which represented 12% of the total population of Northumbria.
- 7.5.4 In essence, the success of the scheme was that a wide range of agencies were successfully encouraged to work together, whereas the innovative factor was the institutional delivery mechanism that came about. This inter-agency working has now become invaluable in implementing the Crime and Disorder Act in which local authorities, in partnership with the police and other agencies, are required to develop and implement a strategy to reduce crime and the fear of crime in every neighbourhood.

## **7.6 Enhancing mainstream delivery in relation to employability, training and the environment**

### *Chalkhill*

- 7.6.1 Some of the case study SRB partnership schemes have sought to concentrate on one component of regeneration, but with a very specific and often tight area focus, usually an estate. The theme element as such is promoted in relation to the regeneration needs of one very specific community of residents and the focus is on the bending of mainstream funding into the area to meet these needs. An example of this can be seen with the Chalkhill estate scheme. In Chalkhill the emphasis was on increasing the employability of the residents of the Chalkhill estate through initiatives that would link them more effectively into the wider labour market and away from a culture of benefit dependency. The Chalkhill scheme was complicated, however, in that it ran alongside a very large non-SRB Estate Action refurbishment programme, but this was, in many ways, a major opportunity.
- 7.6.2 The Chalkhill scheme was also designed to assist Chalkhill residents in obtaining some job benefits from the housing renewal scheme and to raise their employability in competing for jobs in the wider Wembley labour market area. The dominant theme of the SRB scheme was, therefore, that of improving training and raising employability of Chalkhill residents, with over 90% of the thematic SRB expenditure devoted to projects concerned with employment, training and employability. However, the evidence from the Chalkhill evaluation in terms of its achievements in this regard is relatively mixed. The scheme had a limited impact on the high levels of worklessness found on the estate, and there is no evidence that it helped existing mainstream services to become better focused.
- 7.6.3 In fact, the experience of Chalkhill was full of many of the ironies that feature in many British post-war local area regeneration initiatives. On a positive note, private sector participation was strong - and indeed dominant, unlike many other SRB schemes. By 2003 the SRB scheme, by working alongside a major housing renewal programme financed by Estate Action, delivered a major housing renewal scheme at very low cost to the public sector that transformed the visible appearance, external image and environment of Chalkhill. However, because of the failure of the scheme to bring together the entrepreneurial culture of the private sector, the highly regulated and regimented culture of mainstream programmes and the culture of multiple deprivation on estates such as Chalkhill, it failed to make serious inroads into the problems of

worklessness amongst the residents on the estate. In addition the mainstream, rather than alter its hitherto relatively unsuccessful policies in this area by drawing on innovative solutions, was effectively squeezed out by SRB activity.

- 7.6.4 The Chalkhill experience also contains invaluable lessons in relation to the nature of the welfare to work problems that exist on deprived estates. We focus on these specifically in Chapter Fourteen.

## 7.7 Promoting urban renaissance

- 7.7.1 Regenerating Wolverhampton, Canalside Rochdale and Regenerating Central Brighton were all multi-faceted schemes, and not thematic as such. However, it is helpful to refer to a number of issues raised in their approach to tackling urban regeneration as they are clearly relevant to the Urban Renaissance agenda, as described by the Urban Task Force and the Government's Urban White Paper<sup>6</sup>.

### *Regenerating Wolverhampton*

- 7.7.2 In Wolverhampton four main themes were addressed:

- The **Generating Wealth** theme reflected the need to tackle a number of issues that are currently impeding the pace of economic change in Wolverhampton. Particular attention was focused on bringing forward land and property for commercial development and upgrading landmark buildings and key gateways;
- **Learning and Development** was designed to remove obstacles to learning and development;
- The **Empowerment and Diversification of Housing** theme had the aim of moving forward the general process of stock improvement, tenure diversity and tenure empowerment in four estates in Bilston.
- The **Cohesive Community** theme was designed to help engage and anchor the voluntary and community sectors more effectively in the regeneration process.

### *Canalside Rochdale*

- 7.7.3 The strategy devised for regenerating the Canalside area of Rochdale was designed to operate 46 projects within four key programme areas. These were:

- **Economic Regeneration** with just over half the SRB budget dedicated to Economic development, which was designed to concentrate public investment into the physical regeneration of the Canalside area to create an environment that would attract private investment;
- **Training for Life and Work** was targeted at the most disadvantaged communities in Canalside. This theme sought to provide new training opportunities, create better access to jobs with new guidance and vocational preparation programmes, reach people most in need of training and guidance, strengthen education business links in local schools and establish a business start-up programme with a particular focus on the Asian community;

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<sup>6</sup> "Our town and cities: the future - delivering on urban renaissance". The Urban White Paper, DTLR, November 2000.

- **Environmental Renewal** was designed to enhance the image of Rochdale by improving the condition of buildings, streets, open and neglected spaces to make the area a better place to live and work;
- **Building a Safer Community** comprised a number of elements including drug awareness, security, youth crime, community safety, health issues, racial issues and community capacity building.

### *Regenerating Central Brighton*

- 7.7.4 Regenerating Central Brighton was based on 30 inter-related projects designed to address four overall themes linked to the regeneration strategy for central Brighton:
- **Cultural industries:** seeking to build upon Brighton's under-exploited capacity as a national centre for performance art and cultural tourism & as a centre for fashion and craft industries;
  - **Regency revival:** addressing environmental, business and community problems and opportunities in the area. This theme had three strands; regency area revival, community focus and Ocean Boulevard;
  - **Phoenix Brewery:** a redundant brewery complex conversion into social housing units
  - **Small business development:** turning a dated factory complex into a modern small business centre.

### *Some lessons for urban renaissance initiatives*

- 7.7.5 In their approach both Wolverhampton and Canalside Rochdale highlighted a solid appreciation of the issues that need to be addressed if there is to be a renaissance of Britain's old industrial areas. When economic systems lose a major part of their existing economic base there are a number of ways by which new industry could be attracted and economic prosperity restored.
- 7.7.6 Economic change has clearly taken place continuously across the British settlement pattern throughout the whole of the post-war period, with some areas adjusting to change relatively well. This cannot, however, be said to be the case in the majority of Britain's older industrial areas such as Wolverhampton and Rochdale. The reasons for the relatively slow rate of adjustment are fairly obvious. Physical and economic renewal can never be frictionless and rapid when the loss of the traditional sector in the area concerned occurs rapidly. This is because at the beginning of the period of adjustment so much of the existing stock of floorspace, human and physical capital of the area was committed to the production of goods and services which no longer exist or which are now made elsewhere. New investment at the margin can only change things slowly unless there are very large investment flows into an area. Dereliction, contamination and a whole range of imperfections and rigidities in land and property markets impede the process of adjustment, as it has been pointed-out clearly by the Urban Task Force and in the Urban White Paper.
- 7.7.7 It takes time for new infrastructure to replace the worn-out infrastructure in areas that have often been under-invested in for decades. The availability of good serviced land can be a critical constraint, at least initially. But some of the biggest challenges are to be found in the labour force where the existing skill base is inappropriate to meet the needs of the modern industries that might replace the old. The problem of adjustment reflects a raft of cultural and social issues that are associated with the need for radical change.

- 7.7.8 Moreover, it is not just about changing the characteristics of the indigenous workforce. Dynamic economic systems need to attract new people with the skills required by modern industries. Regenerating areas have to be attractive places to both people and industry if they are going to retain their longer-term economic vitality and to turn themselves around. In terms of bringing about business success they need to deliver a quality of life that is attractive to those people and companies who wish to be enterprising.
- 7.7.9 It is also important to consider that, whilst relatively declining areas are seeking to regenerate themselves, there are often other areas around them that are perhaps currently relatively better placed to meet the needs of modern industry. This is simply because they do not have the legacy of a previous industrial heritage to deal with and is often the case when it comes to offering a ready supply of land and premises. They can adjust relatively quickly to change because they have flexibility which more traditional areas cannot be expected to have. Economically, the terms of trade have been relatively inappropriate for old urban areas and in favour of the near accessible areas around them. It is this comparative disadvantage that areas like Wolverhampton and Rochdale have had to overcome in a short space of time.
- 7.7.10 In both Wolverhampton and Rochdale the regeneration schemes focused on improving the economic advantage of their locations. This requires that they have skilled and flexible workforces as well as a good supply of quality land and premises. This economic objective is complemented by the need to improve the quality of life of the local population by making selective improvements to the physical landscape including housing related factors. In both Wolverhampton and Rochdale the economic and environmental themes were reinforced in their Vision Statements by encouraging learning and development amongst the younger population, particularly those from ethnic minorities.

## **7.8 Promoting rural regeneration**

- 7.8.1 Government Support for rural regeneration has undergone radical change. From April 1999 the Regional Development Agencies took over much of the rural regeneration work of the Rural Development Commission (RDC), whilst the Countryside Agency, RDCs successor, continued to have an important role to play in rural regeneration in advising RDAs on rural problems. Meanwhile, the RDCs Rural Challenge Programme was incorporated into Round five of the SRB Challenge Fund, which had a strong rural element within it of an estimated budget to be £50 million per annum.
- 7.8.2 The PIU Report Economic (Dec 1999) identified a need to modernise the rural policy frame work so that efforts were focused on creating enterprising economies, a sustainable agriculture, an enhanced environment and thriving communities in rural areas. There is broad support for the five principles outlined in the Governments Rural White Paper consultation document 'Rural England', which was published in 2000.
- 7.8.3 Meanwhile, the SRB round six bidding guidance confirmed that, as with round five, 80% of SRB funding would be targeted towards comprehensive regeneration in up to 50 large schemes for the most severely deprived urban neighbourhoods. 20%, on the other hand, would go to other areas of need including rural areas, the former coalfield areas, pockets of deprivation in smaller market towns and coastal towns. In assessing bids for rural or partly rural areas particular regard has been given to bids

which address needs and priorities within Rural Priority Areas (formerly the 31 Rural Development Areas as designated in 1994 by RDC). Proposed schemes have also had to support the regional strategies which have emerged from the Regional Development Agencies.

### *West Cornwall Initiative*

- 7.8.4 The West Cornwall Regeneration Initiative was designed to regenerate the corridor of old industrial areas that stretch from Penzance through Hayle, Camborne and Redruth to Falmouth and Penryn.
- 7.8.5 The West Cornwall scheme enhanced the ability of its partners to improve the creation of enterprise across its extensive geographic area. This Round one scheme acted as a catalyst for change that continued to be enhanced over successive rounds of SRB funding. It is clear that in areas where existing partnership working capacity is relatively weak it will often take successive waves of funding over a sustained period before a critical mass can be attained. The SRB process through its project bidding, appraisal and approval elements did much to develop the regeneration skills and local expertise of those involved. This, in turn, enhanced the capacity of the partners across the regeneration corridor to attract funds from European programmes (5b programme-related initiatives), as well as Lottery funding.
- 7.8.6 The SRB requirement of partnership working acted as a catalyst to stimulate innovation and help to bring about institutional change. In the process it helped to build the infrastructure required.
- 7.8.7 A central message to emerge was that rural partnerships require a clear strategic approach at an early stage. Rural partnerships have to demonstrate to their partners early on the value of each individual component of the scheme and why each individual outcome is worthwhile. Partnership-based regeneration schemes will often include elements to help increase the economic potential of the whole area and projects that target the concerns of individual partners. This balance is difficult to achieve but the evidence from the West Cornwall case study scheme showed that it is vital if effective partnership-led regeneration is to be achieved in rural SRB schemes.
- 7.8.8 A further lesson from the West Cornwall scheme was that, with respect to the broader rural agenda other than enterprise, it is important that more mainstream involvement is secured at the outset, particularly with reference to the rural social exclusion agenda and issues such as health and education. Rural areas can experience particular problems in relation to mainstream delivery of these services because of the scattered nature of the settlement pattern. If the SRB scheme does not attempt to work with service providers to improve this, then any benefits to the overall process by which regeneration problems are tackled can be elusive and scattered. Economic measures on their own are not sufficient. In this context, the evidence suggests that locally targeted initiatives can identify innovative ways of addressing need that can then be adopted by mainstream service providers.
- 7.8.9 Another lesson from the West Cornwall scheme was that it is essential that such schemes detail at the beginning of their work how they expect scheme outputs to make a difference to desired outcomes, i.e. what are the supposed mechanisms that the projects concerned are supposed to effect the change envisaged. It is also

necessary to indicate how actions that are taken to strengthen the economy of market towns can help the wider community around them.

7.8.10 The West Cornwall scheme had some clear strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of the scheme were its:

- Commitment to rural enterprise, particularly in terms of its contribution to improving the advice and support to new and existing small businesses and the provision of workspace for new business start-ups;
- Contribution to the upgrading and expansion of the tourism infrastructure, facilities and attractions;
- Achievements in improving the environment, notably in clearing derelict and contaminated land and in bringing old decaying buildings back into use;
- Recognition of the need to undertake regeneration projects in market towns which provide services for disadvantaged residents in their rural hinterlands;
- Substantial achievements in building the regeneration capacity of local agencies and in greatly enhancing the extent of inter-agency working. SRB round one was instrumental in building up a centre of expertise in the design of schemes and the development, funding, implementation, appraisal and management of projects. This additional capacity had the effect of substantially increasing the overall number of regeneration projects opening in the area;
- Effectiveness as a catalyst for attracting other public sector funding and private funding for this larger volume of projects with relatively modest amounts of SRB funding;
- Contribution to the upgrading and modernising of skills and improving the employability of those groups disadvantaged in their access to the labour market.

7.8.11 The main weaknesses of the West Cornwall Initiative identified in the evaluation were as follows:

- A slow start and build-up of the scheme, which was a common problem amongst Round one schemes;
- A fragmented, project-based approach was adopted, lacking vision or coherent strategy for the scheme;
- The scheme failed to achieve any genuine community involvement in the regeneration process as a whole - although this failure was later corrected in the successor body partnership arrangements;
- The balance of project activity as between physical regeneration on the one hand and social/community/people related regeneration on the other was not thought through at the outset. Both were clearly needed but physical regeneration was given more emphasis because needs were more easily identifiable. Social issues that concerned, for example, community health were not addressed;
- Important current rural issues which were relatively low priority in the scheme were the provision of affordable housing, improvement in public transport and the accessibility to and delivery of public services in remote rural areas.

7.8.12 In spite of these limitations, the evaluation results, overall, indicated that SRB was a suitable vehicle for bringing together, co-ordinating and building the capacities of local regeneration partnership in rural areas such that effective regeneration takes place. In the case of West Cornwall a real impact was made in terms of employment,

tourism and environmental improvement outcomes. For example, in the case of employment in these Districts covered by the scheme, this increased by 3,000 during the lifetime of the scheme. The evaluation concluded that about half of these jobs were directly attributable to regeneration projects in which the SRB scheme made a contribution, along with other public sector funding organisations.

## **7.9 Small thematic schemes as a source of innovation**

7.9.1 The majority of the case studies considered in this chapter have been very small. However, small schemes tend to develop innovative approaches to regeneration and can be an important source of developing good practice. All those considered identified gaps in mainstream provision and developed initiatives to help fill them. They usually covered areas much larger than the neighbourhood. In some cases there was effective targeting on disadvantaged and socially excluded groups, for example, drug users in Northumbria and ethnic community groups and under achieving pupils in Brent and Harrow. In Northumbria a wide range of agencies were successfully encouraged to work with each other. In Brent and Harrow schools, private firms and community groups were encouraged to work together, whereas in Limes Farm the formation of the partnership was successful in encouraging mainstream departments to direct funding onto the estate. The Brent and Harrow approach to building the capacity of black and minority ethnic community groups and the voluntary sector was very innovative, although in the event not wholly successful.

7.9.2 Thus, the research indicates that relatively small thematic SRB schemes can be effective in working-up innovative approaches to local area regeneration problems. The innovation can occur through new institutional delivery vehicles as in the case of the Northumbria Community Safety Scheme, or through devising effective ways of delivering regeneration benefits to specific disadvantaged groups as in the case of Limes Farm.

## **7.10 Overall strengths and weaknesses to emerge from the thematic schemes**

### *Strengths*

- A notable achievement in Northumbria Community Safety, Engineering in Education and Canalside Rochdale was in building the capacity for improved inter-agency working and partnership working;
- Regeneration expertise was significantly enhanced particularly in West Cornwall where it had previously been very scarce. This expertise was instrumental in implementing subsequent SRB schemes, EU Objective 5b schemes and, in planning schemes and projects under Objective 1 funding;
- Schemes with a wide geographical coverage provide scope for involving private sector firms in regeneration. Engineering in Education was one of very few private sector led schemes where the private sector was engaged in collaborating in schools to make pupils and teachers more aware of opportunities for school leavers in the engineering sector. The West Cornwall scheme contained a high proportion of physical regeneration which provided opportunities to attract private sector leverage of funding from developers;
- Both Engineering in Education and the West Cornwall initiative identified limitations in the provision of education/business links and rural policies in their respective areas, promoting a strategy to fill these local gaps in a cost-effective



way. They were useful schemes, demonstrating good practice. How sustainable the benefits prove to be will depend on whether the legacy of inter-agency working and regeneration expertise is used to best advantage by the RDAs and the local Learning and Skills Councils;

- The small amount of resources available to smaller schemes provides an incentive to target their activities closely to small geographical pockets of deprivation or to particular thematic activities to specific client groups. There was evidence that early Round one schemes had some success in reaching their target client groups;
- Small schemes offer an opportunity to develop and deliver new types of regeneration initiative. Some case studies had been innovative in particular parts of their scheme. For example, Northumbria Community Safety was innovative with respect to developing an inter-agency and inter local authority strategy to counter drug abuse whereas the Brent and Harrow scheme was original by introducing mentoring for underachieving pupils and in attempting to build the capacity of black and minority ethnic community groups;
- In the light of Northumbria Community Safety and Brent and Harrow experience it can be shown that small schemes tend to be cost-effective as measured in the conventional way as the public sector cost per unit of net additional output. In many such schemes small benefits were associated with low costs, resulting in a favourable cost/benefit ratio relative to larger schemes. This could not be maintained if the scheme were greatly extended in scale.

### *Weaknesses*

- One problem with thematic schemes is to assess who is the relevant 'community' and this requires careful consideration, otherwise involvement can be weak;
- Small scale schemes find it difficult to achieve a critical funding mass in order to continue their work without adoption, if appropriate, by mainstream;
- In many of the case studies the lead partners were dominant. Use was made of some existing partnerships but some partners were marginalised and did not consider themselves to be involved in decision-making;
- The small scheme case studies had made genuine attempts to involve the community in their activities but had not been wholly successful, partly because of the short duration of the schemes;
- Private sector leverage of funding was below the average for all SRB schemes. In the case of small schemes this was partly due to the absence of larger capital projects;
- The extent of mainstream bending was limited across all SRB schemes. This created some limitations in terms of joined-up regeneration and partnership working;
- Successor arrangements were hit and miss depending on whether further regeneration funding was secured. In two cases where further regeneration funding was not secured the durability of the benefit was at risk;
- The impact of the schemes on area regeneration outcomes was small - almost by definition. Small schemes do not in themselves reach the threshold required to develop the momentum to secure dynamic improvements in neighbourhood outcomes, which will be sustainable in the longer term. In this sense they may only offer good value for money when closely targeted to small client groups in an innovative way;

- In some schemes the individual projects were assembled in a fragmented way. The lack of joined-up thinking and absence of coherent strategy is judged to have reduced the impact.

## **7.11 Conclusions on key problems in maintaining the momentum achieved by thematic schemes**

- 7.11.1 Bringing about strong and lasting solutions to regeneration problems at the local level requires a commitment over many years. It is a slow process and there is a significant role for thematic, locally targeted regeneration initiatives to assist mainstream recognition and focus on the problems concerned. However, maintaining the momentum is difficult. Thus, in the case of the Engineering in Education scheme, which was well received and highly regarded, it was very difficult to obtain funds to maintain its momentum from mainstream funding. In such cases the valuable benefits that accrue to the process of local area regeneration can readily be dissipated. The payback from investment in such schemes is often into the future, as it may be many years before the young people so inspired can make a contribution to the success of a company. Such schemes gradually change attitudes and perceptions so that longer-term goals can be attained. They work by making a continued, relatively small but significant, contribution that has a cumulative effect.
- 7.11.2 Small schemes of short duration are in danger of not having the time and resources to build up a regeneration momentum that can secure sustainable dynamic change, unless very sound successor arrangements are put in place to take on and expand the work of the partnership when it closes. On this issue, the evidence from the three case studies is mixed.
- 7.11.3 The work of the Northumbria Community Safety Scheme has been able to continue in a modified form due to the partnership's success in attracting later rounds of SRB funding. Moreover, the useful inter-agency work set up and developed by the round one scheme was invaluable in implementing the Crime and Disorder Act in which local authorities, in partnership with the police and other agencies, are required to develop and implement a strategy to reduce crime and the fear of crime in each local neighbourhood. This legislation has thus ensured, perhaps by good fortune, that effective successor arrangements were in place.
- 7.11.4 The exit arrangements for Brent and Harrow were less robust. The business support services for start-ups has reverted to Business Link and Enterprise Agencies, but their focus is moving back to supporting existing SMEs. Funding for new start-up support may be reduced. Before it became the LSC the TEC was able to continue to build the capacity of black and minority ethnic community groups for a time following closure, but on a much-reduced funding basis. Thus, in spite of the development of innovative approaches to changing the business culture in Brent and Harrow, the small scale and short duration of this scheme meant that it has proven very difficult to produce a sustainable enhancement of the business culture in the two boroughs.
- 7.11.5 In terms of future practice in area-based interventions it can not be presumed that there is a more or less permanent rationale for undertaking thematic schemes. The rationale for each scheme should be clearly set out in advance, covering the aspect of the market failure being addressed, the reasons why the failure is more pronounced in the local area concerned. It is necessary to set out the reasons why the mainstream programmes are failing to address the problems and why the

proposed thematic schemes might have innovative or good practice characteristics that can be tested in a pilot scheme.

- 7.11.6 Thematic schemes as a whole are not designed to tackle multiple deprivation and are rarely specifically targeted at disadvantaged households. They tend to address specific aspects of market failure that, if corrected, increase efficiency and output. In the early years of SRB they were less concerned with distributional issues relating to disadvantaged households *per se*, and this can be argued to be a weakness. However, in latter rounds of SRB more thematic schemes focused on the needs of specific groups and how they might be integrated more into mainstream society. In these cases the schemes have brought about genuine innovative responses to assist mainstream delivery.
- 7.11.7 Thematic based bids have been able to make an effective and telling contribution. In most cases they have assisted the development of a strategic approach to a common problem. By often concentrating on a more extensive geography - that is at the county or regional level, they can increase participation. Moreover, through a consistent and thought out approach they can enable economies of scale in scheme design and implementation to be achieved. However, if the scheme is to work there has to be a strong and effective central co-ordination.
- 7.11.8 In the best cases thematic schemes also appear to improve the degree and quality of inter-agency working and provoke the development of effective sub-regional and regional partnerships. These were often not in place when Round one schemes were bid for, but by the end of the schemes effective partnership working was apparent and was demonstrated by the continued operation of the partnership after the end of the Round one/two schemes. Regeneration skills have been enhanced and good practice projects have been designed that ensured continued funding from other sources as part of their successor arrangements. However, less positively, such schemes can also fail to bring about any lasting change if, during their life, there is insufficient attention paid to promoting effective partnership working and the structures that this requires.

## 8. Mainstream programme bending and the role of area based initiatives with key lessons

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A central objective of the SRB approach to area-based regeneration was to focus the activities of mainstream programmes more effectively to meet the needs of the areas concerned. This often meant customising mainstream delivery to address the particular circumstances facing these areas and their residents. The national evaluation identified considerable progress, particularly in engaging those mainstream departments that were conspicuous by their absence before SRB began.

Findings from the first ten were presented in the Mid-Term Evaluation Report and the evidence at that time was of some limited progress, perhaps not too unexpected given that these case study schemes were designed in 1994 when partnership working, holistic area regeneration and community involvement was in its infancy across much of England. In this Report it has been possible to extend the analysis to include the remaining ten case study partnerships which were, at least in part, more tuned in to the mainstreaming agenda. Again, some clear progress stands out but overall it is still quite modest and a step-change in delivery is not yet apparent from these results.

### 8.1 Introduction

- 8.1.1 Area-Based Initiatives (ABIs) such as SRB were introduced explicitly as a means of bringing together the activities of mainstream programmes (education, health, housing, crime and safety) to address geographical concentrations of deprivation and social exclusion found in local areas. Although ABIs usually bring with them an element of “top-up” funding to be spent exclusively in the deprived local area, their main stated function is to provide a co-ordination mechanism through which mainstream programmes come together to develop appropriate actions to help to solve the problems of these areas. The emphasis is on doing this in a strategic, co-ordinated and cost effective way. This process is often referred to as 'bending' mainstream activity into the deprived areas concerned.
- 8.1.2 A crucial part of the evaluation of SRB was thus to assess how far its activities had been able to 'bend' the main spending programmes in the local area with respect to education, transport, housing and other local government services. It was also important to assess the bending of mainstream training programmes through the former Training and Enterprise Councils, the Employment Service, the Benefits Agency and the National Health Service. SRB regeneration schemes were unlikely to bring permanent local area regeneration solutions unless they alleviated both failures in private sector markets and the failure of main programme services to concentrate sufficient resources on the areas of greatest need.
- 8.1.3 In the 1980s and 1990s ABIs, of which SRB is the prime example, were introduced with the principle objective of improving mainstream programme delivery into deprived neighbourhoods in order to more effectively reduce local area disparities. SRB was aiming to do this by:
- Promoting a more holistic approach to neighbourhood regeneration which addressed all the main aspects of deprivation and dereliction at the same time;

- Encouraging a more strategic rather than adhoc approach to area regeneration, so that all departments were targeting their services into the deprived area for a sustained period of time of three to seven years;
- Achieving better inter-agency working and improved co-ordination by the formation of partnerships at the neighbourhood level as a vehicle for mainstream departments to work more closely together;
- Involving local communities in neighbourhood regeneration and building their skills in regeneration in order to improve service delivery into the deprived area to raise service take-up rates and to secure longer lasting and sustainable regeneration benefits for the neighbourhood.

8.1.4 Using evidence from the evaluation of all 20 case study SRB schemes this chapter examines the achievements of SRB with respect to these four principle SRB objectives.

## **8.2 The experience of mainstream bending from some of the case studies**

### *Regenerating Central Brighton*

8.2.1 In terms of leverage £34.5 million of other public funds were attracted to this round two programme. However, when considering other public funding the distinction needs to be made between 'mainstream funds' and 'other regeneration programmes'. The former group of funding sources was allocated from the mainstream funding departments that included Brighton & Hove City Council, health authorities, the police, Sussex Enterprise, the Employment Service and local further education establishments. The total funding for this element amounted to some £10 million, the majority of which was from Brighton & Hove City Council. Discussions with partners did not reveal any significant bending of this money, although there was some evidence of small scale bending in relation to some projects, most notably the Dome complex project.

8.2.2 The Dome project involved the regeneration of three buildings within the complex, however, the Pavilion Theatre was in danger of becoming the 'poor relation' compared with the Dome auditorium and Corn Exchange improvements as no major renovation work was planned. Consequently, Brighton Festival who were running the project, made an approach for some additional SRB funding to facilitate a refurbishment programme and £250,000 of the SRB funds was allocated and Brighton & Hove City Council agreed to match the funding from its Capital Fund. Additional funding was also provided when a request for further funds was made when the fund-raising element of the project failed to achieve its target, this meant that £1.4 million of SRB was used from the unified budget for later rounds of SRB, local authority again provided some matched funding. Other projects were also in receipt of additional funding sources including the Museum and Art Gallery, the Equinox Centre and Housing Building Improvement Grants. It is difficult to assess, however, to what degree some of this funding would have taken place within the SRB2 area anyway and evidence from discussions with partners is that bending is likely to have been quite low overall. Some comment was made about how this has changed as the SRB programme progressed and mainstream bending came more to the forefront by later rounds.

8.2.3 'Other regeneration programme funding' accounted for over £24 million with the bulk being from the National Lottery scheme at £22.9 million. This funding was largely dedicated to the two linked projects namely, the Dome complex and the Museum and

Art Gallery and did increase by a further £2 million by the completion of the project. This increase in funding again attracted some increased funds from the local authority.

### *Bristol 2020*

- 8.2.4 This round one scheme was about the delivery of fifteen occasionally linked, but largely unrelated projects across twelve wards in the city. While the majority (9) were delivered by mainstream agencies, most were tackling gaps in service provision through the use of SRB funding on a discrete, time-limited basis, rather than aiming to improve mainstream service delivery in the areas or themes concerned on a long-term basis. Our consultations with partners repeatedly emphasised the lack of strategic context and direction for the implementation of Bristol 2020 – without which it would have been virtually impossible to justify and direct any additional mainstream support. None of those consulted suggested there had been any intention in the Bristol 2020 scheme to bend mainstream services. There is no reference to the issue of mainstream service provision in the bid document, nor is there any evidence to suggest that the Bristol 2020 scheme had an unintentional, positive influence on service delivery.
- 8.2.5 The discrete project focus which was so dominant in round one is thought to have prevailed through Rounds two and three, with mainstreaming issues becoming more apparent in round four (with the thematic YOUR youth services scheme), the area-based round five scheme which is being delivered in a manner more akin to an NDC by the Hartcliffe & Withywood Community Partnership, and the Bringing Bristol Together SRB six thematic scheme. It is clear from the local accounts of how SRB has developed, that as the objectives of SRB have become more refined and more explicit, new schemes have had more of a mainstreaming dimension than the early Bristol 2020 example. The 2001 Community Regeneration Framework, led by the Bristol Regeneration Partnership, was an attempt to set the agenda for more engagement by mainstream service providers, as well as providing direction for discretionary regeneration activity in the city. However, at the time of our research in January and February 2002, there had been no city-wide analysis of service provision which would have taken this agenda further forward. Some examples are quoted – particularly from the NDC programme, with its innovative approach to street cleansing provision – but these have not emerged from a city-wide analysis and strategy. The mainstreaming agenda is now being pursued by the Bristol Partnership (the Local Strategic Partnership) through its Community Strategy and Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy.

### *Hull CityVision – Gipsyville estate*

- 8.2.6 The key area for bending mainstream funding was linked to the physical regeneration that involved Hull City Council (HCC) housing finance, HIP, Housing Association Grant and the value of land made available by HCC. Within this project £7.8m of Round two finance attracted £21.1m of other public funding to meet the specific needs of Gipsyville and resulted in the local authority developing a new housing strategy involving partnership working and multi-tenure for this former council estate.
- 8.2.7 Although mainstream funders/service providers were members of the Hull Cityvision Stakeholder Group and the HCV Board, the ability of initiatives such as SRB to bend mainstream programmes has been limited. While some leverage has occurred, this has generally been modest and has focused on healthy living/sport (£186,000) equal

opportunities (£132,000) community capacity building (£1146,000) and employment/training measures (£537,000).

- 8.2.8 With the completion of the SRB scheme there have been no examples in which mainstream bending led to project incorporation as part of a changed policy on the part of service providers regarding local regeneration. Despite some involvement of Social Services, Employment Services and the Hull and East Riding Health Authority in SRB2, they have been unable to tailor their policies/services to meet the longer term needs of the Gipsyville community. This situation severely limited the Gipsyville forward strategy, as residents had limited opportunities to develop partnership working with service providers.
- 8.2.9 Hull CityVision's commitment to partnership working with mainstream players/service providers was demonstrated in the operational structure of the organisation as discussed in Chapter 4. However, building upon/developing the synergy created through the SRB2 regeneration process remained a difficult task and was demonstrated in the relatively modest long-term strategy of major players regarding local regeneration.
- 8.2.10 For example, the uncertain future of key projects such as the Gipsyville Multi-Purpose Centre (GMPC), health initiatives and training projects can be partially linked to the inability of mainstream funders to accommodate these projects within their own regeneration strategies/service provision. Although these projects attracted leverage funding, there is little evidence of mainstream bending that could have been linked to a coherent forward strategy. The GMPC were in negotiation with Employment Services and Sure Start for the operation of outreach services from the Centre, though this was nearly eighteen months after the Gipsyville Round two Scheme had finished.
- 8.2.11 Part of the problem stemmed from the allocation of mainstream funding at the level of small geographical areas such as housing estates. In some cases it was argued that ABIs actually discouraged mainstream funders to spread their limited budgets even more thinly, though the Gipsyville experience has indicated the scope for closer partnership working in local regeneration (eg. Health Trust, Francis Askew School, HCC Housing Department, Police)
- 8.2.12 When invited to comment on their perception of potential and actual mainstream bending, HCV Stakeholders were realistic in suggesting that actual bending within the SRB initiative had generally been moderate or limited. However, with respect to the housing project there was a clear indication that the local authority had significantly bent its housing programme, in partnership with the private sector and housing associations, in order to meet the specific needs of Gipsyville. The potential for bending was more positive and was considered a necessary element in implementing a robust regeneration strategy, though few stakeholders had clear ideas as to how individual mainstream funders might realign their budgets while continuing to meet the demands of national/regional policy making. In this respect some hope was linked to the development of LSPs as it was felt that they had the potential to play a co-ordinating role in local regeneration.
- 8.2.13 The experience of project managers had been much clearer cut as they faced the reality of partnership working and attempted to develop a forward strategy beyond SRB. While managers considered partnership working had been positive, they were well acquainted with the problems of bending mainstream budgets rather than leveraging funding on a short-term basis over the life of their project. For managers

there was a continuing problem of bending mainstream programmes in four key respects:

- The necessity to develop a viable forward strategy, building on SRB project initiatives;
- The need for continuation funding to enable the development of the original project;
- Working in partnership with mainstream expertise to enhance capacity building within local communities;
- The expansion of local services for relatively isolated communities such as Gipsyville.

8.2.14 Although the experience of SRB in terms of bending mainstream funding was limited this should be viewed in the wider context of the national/regional operation of organisations such as Health Trusts, Police Forces, Employment Services and DfES that have increasing pressure on their budgets. In this context it is not surprising that Stakeholders and project managers were unsure regarding the potential for discrete regeneration programmes to significantly influence mainstream programmes beyond short-term leverage.

#### *Merseyside Learning Partnership (MLP)*

8.2.15 In Merseyside it can be argued that, by default - or serendipity - from year two of the SRB its activities were being progressively mainstreamed (or offered access to successor funding) as a result of changes in national policy. However, there is little evidence to suggest that MLP itself had a significant impact on mainstreaming provision in Knowsley, Liverpool, and Sefton or that the Board attempted to connect MLP's activities with the emerging policies in order to continue to be relevant. The TEC ceased to exist at the same time as MLP wound up, and the new LSC's strategic aims and objectives were different from those they replaced at the TEC. Where mainstreaming did occur, e.g., the Inter Agency Development Programme's 'Action to Reintegrate' strand, how much can directly be attributed to MLP rather than to other funding streams or one of other, similar initiatives on Merseyside at the same time is difficult to establish. Likewise, there is no evidence that there was any ambition at Board level to bend mainstream services, despite repeated prompting by the consultants who carried out annual evaluations of the scheme. MLP contributed to change locally, but was not a key driver of change on Merseyside, neither did it contribute to the development of consistent Merseyside-wide policies, e.g., reintegration strategies, nor reduce the duplication of services between the boroughs.

8.2.16 A review of the targets and strategies of the three Councils (Merseyside, Sefton and Knowsley) showed that they responded to the DfES' five national education priorities and to the National Guidelines setting key outcomes in their Public Service Agreements (PSAs) which related to increasing school attendance and post-16 participation in education. They earmarked pump-priming grant money and unsupported credit approvals for support, for example, to "at risk" pupils, and study centres, much in line with the strategic objectives of MLP. School Improvement Programmes across the three boroughs also highlighted tackling exclusion, and placed high priority on raising achievement and supporting ICT developments, including CPD activities for teaching staff.

8.2.17 The new national policy environment made it harder for schools to exclude pupils than when MLP was set up, and put the onus on Local Authorities *with* other



agencies to ensure coherent, focused delivery, e.g., through Crime Reduction & Disorder Partnerships and Youth Offending Teams. Many of the new policy initiatives, such as the Standards Fund, came with their own funding attached which led to a repositioning of MLP activities within local services, and would have affected any forward strategy that might have been being developed for the 'Disaffection' strand of projects.

- 8.2.18 Although MLP in SRB terms had seven "projects", in fact the number of individual projects during the life of the SRB was much higher: for example, the Modular Programme comprised 38 individual demonstration projects; the numerous Study Centre projects varied in scope and delivery between LEAs (and then, between schools); and Merseyside Educational On-line Network (MEON) was customised for delivery in twelve schools or adult education centres. However, each project involved at least one mainstream agency (the school), and the vast majority involved mainstream agencies in their delivery, if not as the accountable body. The capacity building nature of IADP, and the additional provision of equipment and capacity building element of MEON and the Study Centres projects were of immediate and direct benefit to mainstream organisations.
- 8.2.19 In the Year three evaluation, the consultants (GHK) noted that IADP had helped to create "*more ingrained links across boroughs and across agencies within boroughs*", such as educationalists working with the health authorities and Social Services; had helped to encourage wider participation in local authority working groups as a result of individuals having already worked together and had led to better working relationships with higher education institutions in the area. GHK concluded that there was a consensus that IADP was having a "*subtle long-term effect on [mainstream] policy making*", citing the attendance of the project coordinators at New Start meetings and on various working groups across Merseyside. In Year four, the coordinators actively sought to ensure IADP integrated into the relevant emerging local strategies for preventing and managing disaffection by networking with partner agencies including Merseyside New Start Partnership, and attending a range of working groups, e.g., Social Inclusion Task Groups of each LEA, the health authority and the Multi-Agency Approach to Guidance Planning Group. Independently of the rest of MLP, and uniquely among the SRB's project managers, the two coordinators formed strategic links between IADP and other organisations and working groups with similar interests across Merseyside (Careerdecisions, Merseyside Consortium for Careers Education & Guidance, Excellence in Cities, the University of Liverpool, Liverpool John Moores University). In work of local and national significance, they enabled the development and agreement of a common pupil transfer form across the three authorities.
- 8.2.20 For the extension of Compact Activities, the Study Centres and Understanding Industry projects, MLP funding addressed gaps in provision that were, elsewhere in the area, funded by mainstream agencies - most commonly the LEA. In these examples, MLP had little effect on mainstream thinking; rather, for a fixed time it enabled the activities to be spread more widely than the existing mainstream funding would support.
- 8.2.21 The flagship MEON programme, which seemed to have a high potential for mainstreaming as a part of the National Grid for Learning (NGfL) had a slightly disappointing end result in part because it was based on earlier technology: ISDN, not high bandwidth cable. The 1999 Ofsted Report for Liverpool LEA noted in relation to the development of NGfL, "*Some schools expressed frustration that the time and investment in the MEON initiative was not being directly built upon*". In a follow-up

report the next year, Ofsted noted that Liverpool schools can still use MEON as a tool to deliver aspects of the National Curriculum. Similarly, the 2000 Ofsted Report for Sefton LEA criticised the LEA for its lack of a coherent vision, shared with schools, of the future of ICT within the borough and noted, “*Many schools are rightly dissatisfied with the implementation of the NGfL initiative*”. Knowsley’s integrated ICT model, acknowledged as one of the country’s most successful, does not build on MEON (which was only delivered in one of the ten secondary schools in the borough).

- 8.2.22 MEON activities, and those of its successor projects, MEON 2 (ERDF-funded), Primary Step (for primary schools, funded through SRB) and Community Step (ICT for the community, in primary schools, ERDF-funded) are now provided through MGL, an independent private sector company based in Liverpool which was set up in 2001 by the MEON team in order to continue to deliver curriculum training and ICT support, etc, for a wide range of LEAs and EAZs in the area. The MEON project manager, one of the founders of MGL, confirms that the MEON schools, and many others on Merseyside, continue to purchase ICT services through their mainstream LEA funding streams.

### *Swadlincote Woodlands*

- 8.2.23 Other public expenditure for this scheme reached £6.6 million, of which just over £1 million was from South Derbyshire District Council (SDDC) and over £0.25 million from Derbyshire County Council. Southern Derbyshire Chamber (formerly the TEC) contributed £2.75 million largely through the main training programme which was a complementary project to the round two programme. The low cost housing project also brought in £846,000 from the Housing Corporation. The National Forest Company, National Forest Tender Scheme and Forest Authority combined contributed over £100,000 which was all related to the development of the Forest Park. Other mainstream funders were the police, health authority and the Further Education Funding Council.
- 8.2.24 Further public sector contributors were made from ‘other regeneration programmes’ rather than mainstream players, these included the Heritage Lottery Fund which was the main funder for the Sharpes’s Resource Centre project (at almost £1 million), and English Partnerships at over £200,000 which part funded the managed workspace project along with a further £170,000 from RECHAR.
- 8.2.25 There was very little evidence of mainstream funding being bent in to the SRB area following discussions held with partners. SDDC expenditure was curtailed to some extent by internal financial problems which gave little opportunity for bending to occur. Despite these internal difficulties SDDC did manage to maintain its support of the SRB2 programme throughout the lifetime of the scheme. The South Derbyshire Chamber also did not appear to bend in extra funds, infact actual expenditure for the Chamber was £1 million less than had been originally targeted. Other mainstream funding was quite limited with the exception of the Housing Corporation which increased it’s funding by around £400,000.
- 8.2.26 With regard to ‘other regeneration programme’ bending, the funding of the Sharpe’s Resource Centre largely through the Heritage Lottery Fund, bent some money into the area. This project replaced the proposed Heritage Centre which was to have been set in the Forest Park until the feasibility study, funded by SRB, revealed some problems related to the proposed car park, marketing and escalating costs. The decision was taken not to go ahead with the project and it was replaced by the Sharpe’s Resource Centre which proceeded once Heritage Lottery Funding had been

approved. SRB monies funded the formation of the Sharpe's Pottery Heritage Trust Ltd and a feasibility study which recommended a high quality visitor attraction that opened in January 2003. While it is likely that this project would have gone ahead at some point the SRB programme brought it forward and attracted nearly £1 million of Lottery funding which had not been secured prior to SRB. In addition the Centre, which is the first museum for the town of Swadlincote, will receive revenue support from SDDC for the first ten years of its operation.

### *Nottingham – Capturing the Dynamics*

8.2.27 From discussions with partners there was a feeling that some bending of funds had taken place from most of the key organisations. Specifically, these included: local authority education, sport/cultural services and housing; the police authority; employment service; and the Learning & Skills Council. All bending was considered to have come from within the relevant authority areas. Issues linked to the bending of support related primarily to the competing agendas of the different partners involved in the Round two programme.

8.2.28 There was also a generous match of Round two funds by both the public and private sectors. Concerning additionality, of those projects for which information was available, it was stated that they would either not have gone ahead without SRB2 funding, or have been of a lower quality or scale. Based upon this, it can be expected that a good deal of SRB2 funding was additional to what would otherwise have existed. Further, where projects would not have gone ahead without SRB2 funding (thirteen projects, for which data was available), it is clear that SRB2 funding had a major impact. It is also clear that in these cases bending from private and public sources took place.

### *Royds Bradford*

8.2.29 From a total budget of some £67.5m (SRB, public and private expenditure) over the lifetime of the Royds Scheme, some £19m had come from public finances in which mainstream players were involved, in delivering their services across the three estates. By far the largest proportion of public expenditure involved Bradford Metropolitan Borough Council finance (£14.4m, mainly HIP funding) in the renovation of council housing, the demolition of flats and improvements to the physical environment across the three estates. This funding was linked to £24.2m of SRB and £14m of private sector expenditure.

8.2.30 Although mainstream bending resulted in gains for the Royds Community Association (RCA) and the wider Royds community, it was difficult to provide precise information on the levels of saving on the provision of services as a result of working in partnership with the SRB programme.

8.2.31 Projects linked to designing out crime, debt advisory services to keep individuals out of the court system, youth diversionary projects linked to sport/education and the development of the Healthy Living Centre not only brought short term benefits to the local community, they offered 'hidden' savings to service providers. However, the increased effectiveness and cost savings in delivering services were difficult to audit so that future contributions to local regeneration, from mainstream players, could not always be met from current/future operational cost benefits.

8.2.32 In developing a sustainable strategy involving mainstream players, Royds moved some way towards the local management of services by drawing up an agreement with each service provider. As the chief executive of the RCA stated in an article in *Regeneration and Renewal* ('*Lending a guiding hand to residents*'; October 2001):

"it would make sense for a whole lot of services to be locally managed, without letting go of the strategic support of the local council. ....Communities must be encouraged to draw up their own plans and be given support to elect their boards and have some real control over budgets"

### *Woolwich Revival*

8.2.33 This round one scheme was focused largely on physical and economic renewal. It included modest spending on education support, nothing directly related to health, social services, *maintenance* of the local environment, or to policing activity. Some aspects of the scheme will have affected mainstream service provision, but only where the mainstream service providers themselves were directly involved.

8.2.34 The only noteworthy example of this in the case of Woolwich Revival was the language support project and the effective schools partnership. Both of these were judged to have played a valuable role in sensitising the LEA to the particular needs of deprived communities, and in particular to issues of school leadership and language support in a challenging environment. It is understood that the platform and learning curve provided by SRB led on to Mini Education Action Zones, as well as these school standards issues being placed more at the heart of the education service and its forward planning.

8.2.35 Beyond this example, it is difficult to find any signs of mainstream services being bent into the Woolwich Revival area, whether by accident or design. In large part this result derives from the nature of the programme, which was largely physical in nature. Those projects which addressed other social issues tended also to provide capital support (e.g. security improvements in the home or at railway stations) rather than bring about a change in the way services were delivered. Although the health authority attended Woolwich Development Agency Board meetings, there was no real health dimension to the scheme.

## **8.3 Summary evidence from the 20 case studies**

8.3.1 Table 8.1 below presents the actual expenditure achieved by the 20 case study Partnerships through the operation of their SRB programmes. Overall £173.6 million of SRB was spent in the areas with a total expenditure overall of £722.9 million, of which £248.8 million came from other public expenditure. Table 8.1 also shows a breakdown of the public sector sources from mainstream programmes including spend from local authorities, Housing Corporations, health authorities/Primary Healthcare Trusts and the Police.

8.3.2 Three other public sector sources are also shown to be large contributors to case study schemes. European Structural Funds, the National Lottery/Millennium Commission and English Partnerships with other government department programmes such as New Deal for Communities (NDC). These are not mainstream programmes under the normal definition of the term but rather other regeneration programmes similar to SRB itself. These programmes account for £96.66 million (38.9%) of other public expenditure which leaves £152.14 million (61.1%) remaining as the gross contribution of mainstream programmes.

Table 8.1: Breakdown of actual expenditure for all years

Case Study Name	£m															
	SRB £m	Other Public £m	Private £m	Total £m	Target area pop (000s)	LA	TECS /Bus Link	Health Auths/ PCTs	Educ/ college s	DfES/ DWP	HO/ Police	Hous Corp/ Ass	EP/oth ODPM/ OGD	EU	Herit/ Lott/mil	Other
1 Northumbria Community Safety	0.9	0.9	0.2	2.0	1400	0.3	0.1	0.07	0	0.1	0.07	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.06
2 Engineering in Education	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.8	6100	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3 Limes Farm Partnership	1.0	7.9	1.2	10.1	2.5	7.3	0	0.4	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0
4 West Cornwall Initiative	2.7	11.6	3.7	18.0	230	3.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.1	6.5	0	0
5 Brent & Harrow	1.6	0.4	0.3	2.3	440	0.02	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6 Hangleton Knoll Challenge Fund Prog	1.6	0.6	0.8	3.0	13	0.3	0.2	0	0	*	0	0	0	0	0.1	0
7 Bristol 2020	7.6	7.0	4.4	19.0	135	5.6	0.9	.02	.03	0	0	0	0.06	0.1	0.29	0
8 Merseyside Learning Partnership	4.5	2.0	4.3	10.8	1500	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	0	0	0
9 Chalkhill Estate	3.3	0.9	25.4	29.6	6.2	0.3	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.2
10 Manufacturing Partnership	8.1	8.3	15.1	31.5	1400	2.9	3.3	0	0.1	0	0	0	1.2	0.8	0	0
11 Canalside Rochdale	10.5	11.6	46.7	68.8	14	4.9	0.6	0	0	0	0	0.9	0.9	2.6	0	1.7
12 Regenerating Wolverhampton	16.4	16.0	31.8	64.2	242	2.6	6.2	0	0	*	0.3	1.0	0.3	5.5	0	0.1
13 Swadlincote Woodlands	3.4	6.6	30.2	40.1	32	1.3	2.8	*	0	.02	.05	0.9	0.2	0.2	1.0	0.1
14 South Leytonstone Community Partnership	10.0	12.1	15.3	37.3	22	6.7	0	.02	0.1	0.16	0.3	4.2	.06		0	0.6
15 Regenerating Central Brighton	11.8	34.5	7.1	53.4	17	6.1	0.3	0.5	.07	0.13	0.13	3.7	0.6	*	22.9	0.05
16 City of Sunderland Partnership	10.8	4.3	7.9	23.0	55	1.4	0.13	0.1	0.46	0.43	0.24	0	0.19	0.75	0	0.6
17 Hull CityVision First Challenge Fund	11.7	23.2	32.9	67.8	37	21.6	0.06	*	*	0.21	0.01	0	0.53	0.7	0.09	0.02
18 Nottingham Capturing the Dynamic	12.9	19.4	30.8	63.1	32	6.1	.07	*	1.7	1.3	0.37	0.5	3.9	4.7	0.7	0.06
19 Greenwich Regeneration - Woolwich Revival	24.9	62.3	23.4	110.6	25	16.22	0.44	0.06	1.13	0.37	0.32	6.06	36.17	0.41	1.07	.05
20 Royds Bradford	29.5	19.0	19.0	67.5	12.5	10.6	0	4.7	0.3		0	3.0	0.1	0	0.3	.05
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>173.6</b>	<b>248.8</b>	<b>300.7</b>	<b>722.9</b>	<b>11715.2</b>	<b>97.74</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>5.87</b>	<b>3.89</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>1.99</b>	<b>20.36</b>	<b>46.31</b>	<b>23.9</b>	<b>26.45</b>	<b>3.59</b>

\* Negligible

Source: Department of Land Economy

- 8.3.3 There is evidence from discussion with case study partnerships that SRB has had an effect in bending both mainstream programmes and “other regeneration programmes”. Before considering a detailed assessment of both types of programme bending in each case study a further distinction should be made between short distance and longer distance bending.
- 8.3.4 Longer distance programme bending would occur where mainstream public expenditure was diverted **INTO** a local authority area or a TEC area, or a health authority area as a direct consequence of an SRB scheme within a part of one of those areas. Short distance programme bending occurs when public expenditure is diverted from one local area to another **WITHIN** a local authority, TEC or health authority area. The evidence suggests that longer distance mainstream programme bending has been the exception rather than the rule and has consequently been relatively small in magnitude. Short distance bending of programmes has occurred frequently and has been of more importance quantitatively.
- 8.3.5 This is not surprising as mainstream departments allocate funding to their main delivery areas according to a formula reflecting each department’s geographical needs assessment. The local authority system is a standard expenditure assessment of a central judgement of each local authority’s need to spend on its own client groups such as primary school children, secondary school children, old people, the under 5’s, miles of road to maintain etc. Similarly, the DfES central formula for LSCs takes account of an area’s unemployment and long term unemployment in allocating funding and the Department of Health carry out health authority area spending allocation based on health based needs indicators. In none of these mainstream department expenditure allocations by geographical area are their provisions for changing the allocation according to whether the area has been successful or not in obtaining SRB schemes. At this wider area level it is not possible for SRB to bend mainstream programmes unless there are discretionary elements within the mainstream programmes which are not allocated on a formula basis. Increasingly, more financial discretion is being given by mainstream providers to enable the needs of specific areas and their residents to be targeted explicitly and a good example has been the Police.
- 8.3.6 There is more opportunity for the bending of main programmes over short distances because local authorities and LSCs etc. have more flexibility in the allocation of project funding **WITHIN** their own boundaries. This allows them to join with SRB schemes as partners to help tackle small localities of acute multi-faceted deprivation and disadvantage where unit costs of provision tend to be high but where SRB funding can cover the higher unit costs. However there is a binding constraint on the extent of short distance programme bending that can occur. Local authorities and LSCs have statutory and other obligations to provide a basic level of service to all the sub-areas within their boundaries which limits the funding which can be diverted into the target location of SRB schemes.
- 8.3.7 The opportunities for programme bending may also exist in the case of other regeneration programmes such as English Partnerships, EU Structural Funds, NDC and the national Lottery. These programmes are in any case more area selective or targeted and they also require matching funding before projects are allowed to proceed - and like SRB, tend to be delivered through local/sub-regional partnerships. SRB has provided an invaluable framework for building regeneration projects involving matched funding - because, once approved, SRB funding is certain and provides an opportunity to build project partnerships which use and provide matching

funds from other regeneration programmes. The effect of this is to bring forward those projects in English Partnership and EU Single Programming documents which are part of SRB funded schemes and in some cases to increase the aggregate project funding moving into the area at the expense of non-SRB areas lacking in matching funding opportunities where projects may be delayed or finally cancelled.

8.3.8 Keeping these distinctions between mainstream and regeneration programme bending and between short and long distance bending in mind discussions with lead partners and other partners in case study schemes has enabled the evaluation team to make estimates of how effective SRB has been in bending mainstream programme expenditures. These estimates are subject to wide margins of error and should be regarded only as orders of magnitude.

8.3.9 The results of the assessment are shown for the 20 case studies in Table 8.2. For mainstream programmes mainstream programme bending across local authority district boundaries accounts for £7.4 million out of total mainstream spending of £152.2 million. Programme bending within District boundaries is significantly higher at £44 million. There was also some bending of other regeneration programmes into SRB target areas, amounting to £5.2 million across District boundaries and £11.2 million between localities within Districts.

	Mainstream Programmes (expenditure £s million)			Other regeneration programmes (expenditure £s million)		
	Total	Short distance bending	Long distance bending	Total	Short distance bending	Long distance bending
1. Northumbria Community Safety	0.8	0	0	0.1	0	0
2. Engineering in Education	0.2	0	0	0	0	0
3 Limes Farm Partnership	7.9	3.5	1.3	0	0	0
4. West Cornwall Initiative	3.0	1.5	0.1	8.6	2.1	2.1
5. Brent & Harrow	0.4	0.1	0	0	0	0
6. Hangleton Knoll	0.5	0.2	0	0.1	0	0
7. Bristol 2020	6.6	0	0	0.4	0	0
8. Merseyside Learning Partnership	0.5	0	0	1.5	0	0
9. Chalkhill	0.9	0.4	0	0	0	0
10. Lancashire Manufacturing	6.3	1.5	0	2.0	0.6	0.5
11. Canalside Rochdale	8.1	3.4	0.8	3.5	1.3	0.6
12. Wolverhampton	10.2	2.0	0.2	5.8	1.0	0.5
13. Swadlincote Woodlands	5.1	1.7	0.3	1.5	0.2	0.2
14. South Leytonstone	12.0	3.0	0	0.06	0	0.06
15. Central Brighton	11.0	3.3	0.5	23.5	1.1	0
16. Sunderland	3.4	0.5	0	0.9	0.1	0
17. Hull City Vision	21.9	8.8	0.2	1.3	0.5	0.1
18. Nottingham	10.1	3.0	0	9.3	1.2	0
19. Greenwich/Woolwich	24.65	4.8	1.0	37.65	3.1	1.1
20. Royds Bradford	18.6	6.3	3.0	0.4	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>152.15</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>96.61</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>5.16</b>

Source: Department of Land Economy

8.3.10 These figures should be set against case study funding from SRB itself of £173.6 million. Thus for pure mainstream programmes every £1 of SRB funding resulted in the bending of main programmes across District boundaries of a modest 4 pence but between local areas within District boundaries of another 25 pence - some 29 pence in all. If other regeneration programmes are added to mainstream programmes the figures rise to 7 pence (long distance), 32 (short distance) and 39 pence (total) respectively.

8.3.11 As far as the evaluation team is aware previous evaluations of other regeneration programmes have not attempted a quantification of mainstream programme bending achievements which will mean it is not possible to compare these results for SRB

with the achievements of any other regeneration programme. However, the stand alone results for these case studies are not entirely discouraging. The modest programme bending achievements at the inter-local authority district (LAD)/LSC level are not unexpected given that each department has its own independent formula for allocating its funds geographically - irrespective of what other Departments are doing. At the within LAD/LSC level main Departments are operating more flexibly and entering into local partnerships more enthusiastically and have shown more willingness to divert programme expenditure between localities accordingly.

## **8.4 Bending the mainstream – key constraints**

8.4.1 The evidence from the case study research undertaken since the Mid-Term Report indicates that the degree of mainstream bending achieved in the case studies has been relatively limited. As described in the Mid Term there are a number of reasons for this and we conclude this section by reiterating them.

### *Statutory limitations relation to objectives*

8.4.2 Some mainstream delivery agents have clear statutory objectives which limit what they can do as partners in holistic regeneration schemes - and, in particular, the type of project to which they are able to contribute funding. This constrains their ability to develop innovative approaches to tackling the problems of deprived areas and encourages them to support only the conventional type of project which they would themselves otherwise undertake.

8.4.3 Perhaps the best example of this was the former Training and Enterprise Councils, which had a key labour market/training function. TECs had a statutory objective which limited their activity to economic renewal and, therefore, could not participate in projects with wholly or partly social and/or community objectives. In areas of multiple deprivation social and community actions are a necessary pre-requisite to providing pure economic skills training of job search assistance. Many unemployed residents of such areas are not "job ready".

### *Departmental regulations, procedures and targets*

8.4.4 Mainstream programme expenditure and initiatives have their own set of guidance and rules, dictated centrally by the Department, which are applied strictly and evenly to delivery agents throughout England. In most cases these regulations/rules and eligibility criteria had also to be applied to any funding contribution made by the mainstream department to an SRB scheme. There was little discretion given to local delivery agencies to relax these rules in order to tackle, more flexibly, the particular problems of deprived neighbourhoods. Departments frequently have guidelines which limit the permissible cost per unit of project output, which act as an incentive to avoid the high unit cost of delivering services into deprived areas. Thus, in some of our case study areas the TECs in particular were discouraged from contributing to high cost high quality training projects which some partnerships sought to implement.

8.4.5 In this context, local authorities are the delivery agent for some mainstream services such as school education and social housing. As a convention they have been charged with delivering a level of service into their various neighbourhoods, which is commensurate with the relative needs of neighbourhoods. Their funding from Central Government is partly based on indicators of relative need at the District level - but relative needs at neighbourhood level are not systematically measured. In



practice, neighbourhoods may receive equal provision of services rather than provision according to relative needs, and political pressure to maintain high levels of expenditure in more prosperous neighbourhoods is in many cases intense. Thus, when local authorities target a service to a deprived neighbourhood - such as housing in Chalkhill, Brent Council faced judicial reviews brought by residents of other neighbourhoods.

### *Rationalisation of mainstream service delivery*

- 8.4.6 Over recent decades successive cost cutting exercises have had the effect of increasing the area covered by local mainstream service providers. There are fewer and larger local authorities (e.g. Learning and Skills Councils are larger than their predecessors, the TECs). Health authorities may cover several local authority Districts, police authorities cover whole cities or even regions. The same process has continued at a more local level where each of organisation reduces the number of local offices and rationalises into larger local offices. In some of our case study deprived neighbourhoods the nearest job centre was two or three miles away. Under these circumstances mainstream service provision has become more remote to residents of deprived neighbourhoods who do not regard them as accessible. Take up of service remains low. To deliver a service directly into a deprived neighbourhood mainstream service providers have increasingly relied on sub-contracting to locally based organisations such as local training providers or community-based projects, which tend to be small, financially insecure, not necessarily well managed and providing an uneven quality of service.
- 8.4.7 An important consequence of rationalisation is that a local mainstream service provider may be asked to become a partner in a large number of SRB schemes. In some of our case studies mainstream service providers were partners in as many as ten SRB schemes as well as partners in other types of local partnership. At the same time, the rationalisation process has been going on within mainstream delivery agencies, which have been under constant pressure to reduce staffing levels.

## **8.5 Bending the mainstream – good practice**

- 8.5.1 As we have argued extensively during the course of the SRB evaluation, the nature of the regeneration problem is such that here are multiple interactions that generate a genuine circulation of causes and effects. Determined policy intervention at one point in the cycle is not sufficient because its beneficial effects will be offset by adverse interaction elsewhere – a genuine comprehensive approach is required that drives relentlessly, the actions of the market and the public sector towards the objective of regenerating the area concerned and improving the well-being of its inhabitants.
- 8.5.2 Such an approach will only be effective if locally based regeneration activities are combined with action by mainstream spending departments to provide the facilities and incentives for families to break-out of the cycle of multiple deprivation. There is a need to customise the mainstream response with each Provider assessing:
- What works well, rigorously exploring causality between impacts and projects and between impacts and need, understanding the links between regeneration actions and the final impacts on the desired beneficiaries;
  - How cross-cutting impacts between area-based initiatives and mainstream measures can be obtained;

- How sustainable impacts can be secured with lasting outcomes for areas and individuals;
- How best to measure the impact of actions and the value that can be placed on these impacts to improve the cost-effectiveness of policy interactions;
- The opportunities that exist to co-ordinate benefit regimes and the delivering of mainstream services that seek to help individuals to improve their circumstances;
- Moves to co-ordinate benefits and job take-up, there are different interfaces in deprived areas that require customised responses that can be provided by an area-based approach.

## 9. Scheme outputs, additionality and value for money

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This chapter considers the cost effectiveness of the SRB programme. With evidence from the 20 case studies the outputs achieved are examined. Assessments of additionality drawing on the final evaluations of the case studies allow estimates of net outputs to be made. Using the results from the previous chapter on mainstream bending net additional public expenditure is calculated and used to examine the value for money of the programme.

The chapter concludes by estimating the overall impact of the first two rounds of the SRB programme to give an indication of the key net benefits attributable to the scheme.

### 9.1 Introduction

9.1.1 One feature of a good evaluation framework is that it should enable the outputs or benefits of a policy or programme to be compared with the inputs or costs. It is only with information of this kind that an assessment of value for money can be made. The standard approach as contained in the EGRUP guidelines (HM 1995) and more recently *Assessing the Impacts of Spatial Interventions* (the 3R Guidance, The Treasury), has evolved over a number of years and it is to establish a cost benefit account for the regeneration measure concerned. More recently, it has been recognised that in assessing the effectiveness of an initiative we should bring the inputs and outputs together and assess the overall impacts on **net outcome change** in the areas concerned and this last step is contained in Part Three. The framework that has been used to assemble the evidence on activities, outputs, outcomes and expenditure is described at length in Annex (1) to this Report. This chapter presents evidence relating to cost effectiveness, private sector leverage.

### 9.2 Case study gross outputs: achievements and expectations

9.2.1 Table 9.1 below sets out the gross outputs in aggregate form for all 20 case studies. The "actual outputs" column shows what has been attained for all years of each of the schemes. While it is difficult to gauge these achievements in broad terms without suitable benchmarks for comparison, it is clear that there have been some important successes.

9.2.2 In terms of jobs, training and education more than 14,000 full-time equivalent jobs were created as a result of the SRB activity with almost 13,000 more safeguarded. Over 370,000 pupils also benefited and there were over 40,000 people obtaining formal training qualifications. Over 5,500 obtained a job following training (of which 80% had been previously unemployed) and 1460 entered self-employment.

Table 9.1: Summary of gross outputs for the 20 case studies (all years)						
Description	Actual outputs	Forecast outputs	Actual as % of target	BME outputs as % of actual	BME outputs as % of EM targets	
<b>Jobs, training &amp; education</b>						
1a1	No FTE jobs created	14119	14657	96	13	112
1a2	No FTE jobs safeguarded	12976	9901	131	14	185
1a3	No FTE construction jobs (person wks)	170492	149956	114	7	90
1b	No pupils benefiting from projects assigned to enhance/improve attainment	373191	267570	140	9	144
1c	No people trained obtaining qualifications	41122	37081	111	27	124
1d	No residents accessing employment through training advice or targeted assistance	9408	8782	107	25	98
1e	No training weeks	131446	118354	111	-	-
1f1	No people trained obtaining jobs	5569	6146	91	27	78
1f2	▪ Who were formerly unemployed	4456	5286	84	25	70
1g	No entering self-employment	1460	1048	139	13	100
1g2	▪ Who were formerly unemployed	406	409	99	27	97
1i	No from disadvantaged groups being targeted who obtain a job	651	643	101	24	144
1j	No young people benefiting from projects to promote personal & social development	142317	111545	128	11	135
1k1	No employers in collaborative projects with educational institutions to improve student performance	6768	5652	120	0	
1k2	No students in collaborative projects	93711	43071	218	8	129
1l1	No teachers in target area on placement into business	4543	2671	170	0	
<b>Economic growth</b>						
2a	No new business start-ups	4651	4418	105	16	111
2b1	Business/commercial floorspace improved (m2)	111186	156742	71		
2b2	New bus/commercial floorspace (m2)	298876	121446	246		
2c1	New businesses supported	2135	1508	142	13	101
2c2	▪ Surviving 52 wks	1258	971	130	9	65
2c3	▪ Surviving 78 wks	644	786	82	11	52
2d	No businesses receiving advice as a result of SRB assisted activities	20652	15457	134	9	125

**Table 9.1: Summary of gross outputs for the 20 case studies (all years) Contd**

Description	Actual outputs	Forecast outputs	Actual as % of target	BME outputs as % of actual	BME outputs as % of EM target
<b>Housing</b>					
3a1 No private dwellings completed	1085	2083	52		
3a2 No private dwellings improved	1822	1294	141		
3a3 No local authority dwellings completed	0	0	-		
3a4 No local authority dwellings improved	4118	3850	107		
3a5 No Housing association dwellings completed	1086	1200	91		
3a6 No Housing Association dwellings improved	119	127	94		
3b No dwellings in tenant management organisation	150	2371	6	33	
<b>Community safety/crime prevention</b>					
5a1 No benefiting community safety initiatives	538734	230119	234	12	239
5a2   ▪ Aged over 60	29388	24143	122	8	112
5a3   ▪ Females	142859	88583	161	8	108
5b1 No dwellings with upgraded security	11634	9909	117		
5b2 No commercial buildings with upgraded security	3074	2622	117		
5c No community safety initiatives	565	341	166		
5d1 No youth crime prevention initiative	436	313	139		
5d2   ▪ Nos attending crime prevention initiatives	52565	43885	120	22	87
<b>Environmental improvements</b>					
6a Land improved/reclaimed for open space (Ha)	260	168	155		
6b Land improved/reclaimed for development (Ha)	166	146	113		
6c No buildings back into use	402	395	102		
6d1 Roads built (km)	7	8	87		
6d2 Roads improved (km)	29	26	111		
6e No traffic calming schemes	35	35	100		
6f No waste management/recycling schemes	173	174	99		

<b>Table 9.1: Summary of gross outputs for the 20 case studies (all years) Contd</b>					
<b>Description</b>	<b>Actual outputs</b>	<b>Forecast outputs</b>	<b>Actual as % of target</b>	<b>BME outputs as % of actual</b>	<b>BME outputs as % of EM target</b>
<b>Community facilities</b>					
7a1 People access to new health facilities	102631	34122	301	2	133
7a2 People with access to new sport facilities	296677	368397	81	17	97
7a3 People access to new cultural facilities	979071	899909	109	8	75
7a4 No new health facilities	71	39	182		
7a5 No new sports facilities	32	33	97		
7a6 No new cultural facilities	113	50	226		
7b1 No using improved health facilities	19763	56446	35	12	282
7b2 No using improved sports facilities	237985	174757	136	8	91
7b3 No using improved cult facilities	711870	706657	101	3	55
7b4 No health facilities improved	110	118	93		
7b5 No sports facilities improved	25	30	83		
7b6 No cultural facilities improved	66	54	122	8	167
<b>Voluntary/community sector</b>					
8a1 No voluntary organisations supported	5775	2528	228	13	126
8a2 No community organisations supported	873	567	154	4	122
8c No individuals involved voluntary work	13545	6192	219	10	232
8d No employee volunteering schemes	264	132	201		
8e No community enterprise start ups	81	79	103	30	96
<b>Childcare</b>					
10a No childcare places provided	2512	2058	122	10	213

\*results affected by incomplete forecast figures

Source: Department of Land Economy 20 case study final evaluations

- 9.2.3 Achieved outputs for this objective tended to be in excess of forecasts ranging from over double the number of students in collaborative projects to in line with expectations for the number of disadvantaged obtaining jobs. This points to a pessimism bias on the part of the partnerships for employment outputs. Those outputs that did not achieve expectations were still very close with the lowest being 84% of the target for the number of unemployed people obtaining a job through training. Overall the average of actuals achieved against forecasts is some 22% higher than expectations.
- 9.2.4 Economic growth achievements were also very strong with over 4,600 new business start-ups and over 2,000 new businesses supported. Again most were in excess of original targets with new business/commercial floorspace built over double the original expectations. Two exceptions were improved business/commercial floorspace and new businesses surviving after 78 weeks. Overall the average achieved actuals was 30% above expectations.
- 9.2.5 Housing outputs were a little more mixed reflecting the delays sometime associated with larger capital projects. While 1,085 new private dwellings were completed this represents only 50% of the intended targets. This is largely affected by the Royds Bradford housing programme that is being carried out over a ten-year period. The average overall for this set of outputs was some 19% below forecasts.
- 9.2.6 There were 565 community safety initiatives set up and a further 436 youth crime prevention initiatives. As a result over half a million people who benefited from community safety initiatives which is more than double originally expected. Land improved and reclaimed amounted to some 426 hectares of which nearly 40% was for development. In addition over 400 buildings were brought back into use and over 170 waste management/recycling schemes were initiated. In addition there were 35 traffic calming schemes, 7 km of new road built and a further 29 kilometres improved. On average these outputs outperformed expectations by some 47%.
- 9.2.7 Community benefits are also an important part of the SRB programme and as such over almost 1,000,000 people had access to new cultural facilities with almost 300,000 accessing new sports facilities. People using improved cultural facilities reached over 700,000 with over a quarter of a million using improved sports facilities. Over 5,700 voluntary and 873 community organisations were supported through the programme and over 13,500 individuals became involved in voluntary work. Over 2,500 childcare places were also provided. These achievements were largely in excess of expectations being 44% above on average. Most notable achievements were people with access to new health facilities which was three times the forecast and number of community organisations supported at over double the number expected.

### **9.3 Outputs relating specifically to black and minority ethnic communities**

- 9.3.1 One of the requirements of the SRB monitoring framework is for partnerships to record separate output figures for members of the black and minority ethnic (BME) communities within the SRB target area. This is to enable an examination of the extent to which members of such communities benefit from SRB schemes. Obviously, the importance of this assessment depends upon the degree to which the BME communities are represented in the SRB area and only those areas containing significant proportions of the population drawn from these communities were obliged

to record separate figures. In summary thirteen of the case studies recorded these figures with the remaining areas which included Limes farm, Brighton and Swadlincote all having very low proportions of residents from the black and minority ethnic communities.

- 9.3.2 The results of this analysis can be seen in Table 9.1, which shows actual BME outputs as a percentage of the total achieved. The spread over the range of indicators is quite large, ranging from 30% of actuals achieved with regard to the number of community enterprises set up to only 3% for BME users of improved cultural facilities. There is general clustering between 9-27%. Over a quarter of all those achieving a formal qualification were from the black and ethnic minorities which was higher than had been targeted for this output. A similar proportion obtained jobs following training, although this was only 78% of the intended target. Overall 13% of voluntary organisations supported were from the black and ethnic community and encouragingly 10% of individual volunteers had an ethnic background which was over double expectations. On average achieved against expectations was still strong although slightly lower than for aggregate outputs at 16%. Economic growth outputs overall were not as strong with on average only 90% of outputs being achieved.
- 9.3.3 With regard beneficiaries of crime prevention measures were higher than anticipated with an average of 36% above. Community benefits to the black and minority ethnic groups were also largely strong with nearly three times the number using improved sports facilities than had been forecast. The one area where numbers were considerably down was with those accessing improved cultural facilities which was only 55% of expectations. Overall BME achievements were 41% higher than anticipated.
- 9.3.4 It should be remembered that these are aggregate figures and that, as such, some of the individual detail from the case studies is lost. For example, some partnerships designed projects exclusively for the ethnic community to help address the problem of the lack of take up of mainstream programmes in the area. An example of this is the “pre-vocational training for the Asian community” project in Canalside which was set up to encourage further training take up by the local Asian community. In addition, the Wolverhampton scheme “women and health courses” project focused specifically on women from BME groups who are disproportionately affected by inequalities in health.

## 9.4 Gross to net: assessing ‘net’ additionality for outputs

- 9.4.1 This section assesses how far the gross outputs for SRB projects represent additional outputs to the SRB target area which would not have been generated in the absence of SRB. In practice, regeneration projects do not only work to make things happen that would not otherwise occur. They also work to bring outputs forward in time and/or improve the quality of them. The assessment of the non-SRB “alternative position” cannot be precise and estimates are subject to a wide margin of error. The estimates are made by classifying additionality of projects into one of five categories:

	<b>Range</b>	<b>Mid-point</b>
Negligible additionality	0-9%	4.5
Low additionality	10-34%	22.0
Medium additionality	35-54%	44.5
High additionality	55-74%	64.5
Very high additionality	75-100%	87.5



- 9.4.2 What is being estimated in this additionality assessment is what proportion of the gross outputs of SRB projects would have been supplied and taken up by residents if SRB projects had not existed. In making this assessment we relied heavily on SRB project managers and partners knowledgeable about the local area and its public services. In addition we have drawn on some of the findings from our beneficiary surveys. Frequently, alternative services would have been available but they would have been supplied on a passive basis and usually some distance away. Much of the additionality of a neighbourhood regeneration scheme is to bring the service geographically closer to residents and to target particular groups of residents on the estate. Also, where SRB funding permits longer duration, highly resourced service provision, the quality can be much higher - as in the case of Chalkhill.
- 9.4.3 Once the overall gross benefits arising from the SRB programmes have been adjusted to allow for deadweight and displacement it is then possible to calculate the net benefits associated with SRB. One further adjustment is to allow for extra benefits that might arise to a local area from increased linkage activity between local businesses as a result of the programme and also additional local income generated by increased local demand for goods and services.
- 9.4.4 In each of the final evaluations we discussed issues of additionality with the partnerships and project managers to determine the non-SRB "alternative position" for each of the projects. The appropriate ratio was then applied to individual project outputs to obtain an estimate of overall net additional project outputs for the scheme. This was estimated for both the target area and local economy. These additionality ratios have been applied to the projects for all case studies to produce the net additional outputs. Table 9.2 above shows aggregate net outputs for the SRB target area. There are clear differences between outputs indicators in terms of additionality. Once again, however, care must be taken in interpreting these results as they are based on only 20 case studies and some figures may be skewed by the impact of one or two schemes.
- 9.4.5 Jobs created, safeguarded and construction jobs are all around 40% of the gross out figures whereas training weeks were just over a third of the gross figure. Those from disadvantaged groups who obtained a job and employers involved in collaborative projects were at around 60% of the gross level. New business start-ups and those receiving advice were around 40% additional. In the housing theme around 45-50% of outputs were additional although the number of dwellings in tenant management organisations had a higher additionality at 65%. Community safety initiatives were quite strong at around 50% additional and most notably those attending youth crime prevention initiatives were judged to be 70% additional. Improvements to land and reclaimed space was also highly additional at 76% and roads improved were 75% additional. Projects related to community facilities tended to more than 60% additional as were those targeted at the voluntary and community sectors where the number of community enterprise start-ups were assessed to be 78% additional. Black and minority outputs emerged as slightly more additional in some of the jobs, training and education outputs and as community safety initiative beneficiaries. With regard to the economic outputs, however, additionality tended to be slightly lower for these groups.

**Table 9.2: Summary of target area net additional outputs for the 20 case studies (all years)**

<b>Table 9.2: Summary of target area net additional outputs for the 20 case studies (all years)</b>				
<b>Description</b>	<b>Net additional outputs</b>	<b>Net additional outputs as % gross</b>	<b>Net additional BME outputs</b>	<b>Net additional BME outputs as % of gross BME outputs</b>
<b>Jobs, training &amp; education</b>				
1a1 No FTE jobs created	5788	41	596	33
1a2 No FTE jobs safeguarded	5614	43	906	51
1a3 No FTE construction jobs (person weeks)	71924	42	5627	46
1b No pupils benefiting from projects assigned to enhance/improve attainment	196075	53	19589	58
1c No people trained obtaining qualifications	22992	56	6623	60
1d No residents accessing employment through training advice or targeted assistance	5864	62	1397	59
1e No training weeks	47301	36	-	-
1f1 No people trained obtaining jobs	2778	50	789	53
1f2 ■ Who were formerly unemployed	2121	48	564	50
1g1 No entering self-employment	826	57	88	48
1g2 ■ Who were formerly unemployed	229	56	55	51
1i No from disadvantaged groups being targeted who obtain a job	398	61	108	69
1j No young people benefiting from projects to promote personal & social development	66821	47	7958	51
1k1 No employers in collaborative projects with educational institutions to improve student performance	4070	60	-	-
1k2 No students in collaborative projects	45571	49	5176	66
1l No teachers who have had a placement into business in the last period	2789	61	0	-
<b>Economic growth</b>				
2a No new business start-ups	1951	42	246	33
2b1 Business/commercial floorspace improved (m <sup>2</sup> )	40512	36	-	-
2b2 New business/commercial floorspace (m <sup>2</sup> )	133938	45	-	-
2c1 New businesses supported	939	44	112	40
2c2 ■ Surviving 52 wks	553	44	47	41
2c3 ■ Surviving 78 wks	297	46	30	40
2d No businesses advised as a result of SRB assisted activities	8788	43	586	33

**Table 9.2: Summary of target area net additional outputs for the 20 case studies (all years) (Contd)**

<b>Table 9.2: Summary of target area net additional outputs for the 20 case studies (all years) (Contd)</b>					
<b>Description</b>					
<b>Housing</b>					
3a1	No private dwellings completed	455	42	-	-
3a2	No private dwellings improved	852	47	-	-
3a3	No local authority dwellings completed	0	0	-	-
3a4	No local authority dwellings improved	2039	50	-	-
3a5	No Housing Association dwellings completed	486	45	-	-
3a6	No Housing Association dwellings improved	59	50	-	-
3b	No dwellings in tenant management organisation	97	65	32	65
<b>Community safety/crime prevention</b>					
5a1	No benefiting community safety initiatives	278772	52	37734	59
5a2	▪ Aged over 60	14358	49	1287	53
5a3	▪ Females	66486	47	5971	53
5b1	No dwellings with upgraded security	5742	49	4	45
5b2	No commercial buildings with upgraded security	1728	56	1	45
5c	No community safety initiatives	290	51	-	-
5d1	No youth crime prevention initiatives	236	54	-	-
5d2	▪ Nos attending crime prevention initiatives	37107	70	8619	73
<b>Environmental improvements</b>					
6a	Land improved/reclaimed for open space (Ha)	197	76	-	-
6b	Land improved/reclaimed for development (Ha)	82	49	-	-
6c	No buildings back into use	211	53	-	-
6d1	Roads built (km)	4	53	-	-
6d2	Roads improved (km)	22	75	-	-
6e	No traffic calming schemes	16	47	-	-
6f	No waste management/recycling schemes	132	76	-	-

<b>Table 9.2: Summary of target area net additional outputs for the 20 case studies (all yrs) Contd</b>				
<b>Description</b>	<b>Net additional outputs</b>	<b>Net additional outputs as % gross</b>	<b>Net additional BME outputs</b>	<b>Net additional BME outputs as % of gross BME outputs</b>
<b>Community facilities</b>				
7a1 People access to new health facs	64216	63	1763	73
7a2 People with access to new sport facs	180928	61	27740	54
7a3 People access to new cultural facs	647157	66	56194	70
7a4 No new health facilities	46	65	-	-
7a5 No new sports facilities	20	62	-	-
7a6 No new cultural facilities	76	68	-	-
7b1 No using improved health facs	12442	63	1023	45
7b2 No using improved sports facs	115559	49	9007	45
7b3 No using improved cult facs	339356	48	10874	60
7b4 No health facs improved	55	50	-	-
7b5 No sports facs improved	15	60	-	-
7b6 No cultural facs improved	32	49	2	46
<b>Voluntary/community sector</b>				
8a1 No voluntary orgs supported	3574	62	488	66
8a2 No community orgs supported	576	66	17	51
8c No individuals involved vol work	7695	57	793	61
8d No employee volunteering schemes	170	65	-	-
8e No community enterprise start ups	64	78	18	76
<b>Childcare</b>				
10a No childcare places provided	1252	50	120	50

Source: Department of Land Economy

## 9.5 The additionality of public expenditure in the SRB areas

- 9.5.1 In this section the emphasis is on identifying how much of the public expenditure under SRB was additional to the target and local areas in the sense that it would not otherwise have been spent there.
- 9.5.2 Locally, the two critical geographical areas considered for assessing additionality are the schemes' target area and the local economy. In the case of SRB the size of target areas varies widely from a single housing estate to a whole standard region. Some of the thematic case studies such as Engineering in Education, Northumbria Community Safety, the West Cornwall Initiative cover one or more local authority districts and in these cases the SRB target area and the local economy area are the same. In other case study schemes such as Hull, Nottingham, Bristol, Woolwich, Bradford, Brighton, Chalkhill, South Leytonstone and Limes Farm the target area is only a small part of a single local authority district. In these cases we define the local economy as the local authority district as a whole. Logically, the degree of scheme additionality will be higher for the target area than for the local economy area to the extent that some scheme projects go ahead in the target area which would, in the absence of SRB, have gone ahead in non-target area parts of the district.
- 9.5.3 At the level of the target area, particularly if geographically small and very local, additionality would normally be expected to be relatively high at 50-60% or more. Only if the SRB funded projects would have gone ahead in the target area anyway, in the absence of SRB, would additionality be low. The extent to which the same projects would have occurred anyway is referred to as deadweight - since the SRB expenditure would not be generating any additional effects in the target area. The smaller deadweight is, the higher will be target area additionality.
- 9.5.4 There is a close link between mainstream programme bending and target area additionality. The more mainstream programme spending diverted into the target area from other areas, to supplement SRB funding, the higher the target area additionality is likely to be. SRB spending itself is additional to the target area by definition, since it could not be spent in the target area if SRB did not exist. The extent of SRB spend plus main programme bending provides a measure of additionality from the expenditure side. [But additionality should also be assessed independently from the output side since expenditures do not translate into outputs in a uniform way and there are extra dead-weight/displacement/substitution effects in assessing the outcomes of the expenditure in the local economy e.g. where beneficiaries receive "an output" but do not change their behaviour such as to generate an additional outcome in the local area.] Additionality of outcomes is frequently lower than the additionality of project expenditures, because there is an extra layer of potential dead-weight at the output/outcome end of additionally funded projects in the area.

### *Additionality of public expenditure for target areas and local economies*

- 9.5.5 Using the information for the 20 case studies presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 public sector funding additionality can be estimated at the target area level and at the local economy level. SRB funding plus short distance main programme bending expressed as a percentage of total public expenditure is target area additionality. Local area additionality is SRB spending plus long distance main programme bending expressed as a percentage of total public expenditure on the scheme. These are shown for the 20 case studies in Table 9.3 below.

<b>Table 9.3: Additionality of public sector funding in SRB case study target areas and local economies</b>		
<b>Case Study Schemes</b>	<b>Funding Additionality (%)</b>	
	<b>Target Area</b>	<b>Local Economy</b>
1. Northumbria Community Safety	50	50
2. Engineering in Education	67	67
3. Limes Farms Partnerships	51	26
4. West Cornwall Initiative	29	20
5. Brent and Harrow	85	80
6. Hangleton Knoll	82	73
7. Bristol 2020	52	52
8. Merseyside Learning Partnership	69	69
9. Chalkhill	88	79
10. Lancashire Manufacturing	59	49
11. Canalside Rochdale	63	51
12. Wolverhampton	57	51
13. Swadlincote Woodlands	51	36
14. South Leytonstone	59	45
15. Central Brighton	33	27
16. Sunderland	75	72
17. Hull City Vision	59	34
18. Nottingham	49	40
19. Greenwich/Woolwich	34	30
20. Royds Bradford	74	67
<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>43</b>

Source: SRB Evaluation Team, Department of Land Economy.

9.5.6 Taking all 20 case studies together the additionality proportion of public spending averages 52% for the target area and 43% for the local area economies as defined by LA District/LSC areas. There is considerable variation around these averages ranging from 88% short distance expenditure additionality in Chalkhill to as low as 29% in West Cornwall. Long distance additionality ranged from only 20% in West Cornwall to 80% in Brent and Harrow.

9.5.7 From the above tables it is now possible to make an assessment of net additional public expenditure for both the SRB target area and the local economy. All SRB funding is judged to be 100% additional and the remaining other public expenditure is calculated using the additionality ratios in Table 9.3. Table 9.4 presents the results. Overall there is just over £119 million net additional other public expenditure in the SRB target area. Ranging from just £130,000 for the Engineering in Education scheme to over £21 million for Woolwich. In terms of the wider local economy total net additional other public expenditure amounted to almost £97 million with Woolwich once again emerging with the highest net additional spend at over £18 million.

<b>Table 9.4: Net additional public expenditure - all years (£ millions)</b>			
	<b>SRB</b>	<b>Net additional other public in SRB target area</b>	<b>Net additional other public in local economy</b>
Northumbria Comm Safety	0.9	0.45	0.45
Engineering in Education	0.4	0.13	0.13
Limes Farm	1.0	3.99	2.04
West Cornwall Initiative	2.7	3.41	2.27
Brent & Harrow	1.6	0.34	0.32
Hangleton & Knoll	1.6	0.49	0.44
Bristol 2020	7.6	3.64	3.64
Merseyside Learning partnership	4.5	1.38	1.38
Chalkhill	3.3	0.79	0.71
Lancs Manufacturing Partnership	8.1	4.86	4.10
Canalside Rochdale	10.5	7.30	5.93

Table 9.4: Net additional public expenditure - all years (£ millions) Contd			
	SRB	Net additional other public in SRB target area	Net additional other public in local economy
Regenerating Wolverhampton	16.4	9.09	8.20
Swadlincote Woodlands	3.4	3.33	2.40
South Leytonstone	10.0	7.12	5.48
Central Brighton	11.8	11.25	9.17
Sunderland	10.8	3.22	3.08
Hull City Vision	11.7	13.63	7.91
Nottingham	12.9	9.55	7.75
Greenwich/Woolwich	24.9	21.22	18.50
Royds Bradford	29.5	14.02	12.73
<b>Total</b>	<b>173.6</b>	<b>119.21</b>	<b>96.63</b>

Source: SRB Evaluation Team, Department of Land Economy.

## 9.6 Value for Money Calculations

- 9.6.1 This section examines the value for money of the 20 case study schemes. This is measured as the ratio of net Exchequer costs to net scheme outputs or benefits to provide a measure of cost effectiveness. Due to the multi-objective nature of the SRB programme it would not be appropriate to consider at one single measure of cost effectiveness, as such Table 9.5 below showing the case study cost/benefit account sets out a 'basket' of net additional benefits which have been achieved at both the target and the local economy level<sup>7</sup>.
- 9.6.2 The benefits described in Table 9.5 have been achieved at a net Exchequer cost of £292.7 million. The benefits to both the target and local area are shown. In the target area these range from 11,400 jobs created or safeguarded, almost 200,000 pupils benefiting with enhanced attainment, 2,000 new business start-ups and 4,200 voluntary and community groups supported. In the corresponding local economy these benefits amount to 9,300 jobs, 160,000 pupils, 1,600 new businesses and 3,400 voluntary and community groups assisted.

<sup>7</sup> **Discounting:** The guidance on methodology for Assessing the Impacts of Spatial Interventions published by ODPM (May 2004) states that wherever possible all costs and benefits in an evaluation should reflect true economic costs and benefits and should be discounted at the Social Time Preference rate (currently set at 3.5%). The Evaluation Team considered what might be the most appropriate way to proceed in relation to SRB recognising that whatever the approach adopted it should be **consistently** applied to both cost and benefit streams. Basically we either sought to discount **both** costs and benefits or we did not discount at all. In order to apply a discounting process to the SRB regeneration schemes we required evidence on expenditure **and** outputs (as the measure of benefits adopted in this chapter seeking as it does to produce a VFM account). This was required for each regeneration scheme for each year that it existed so that we had an expenditure/benefit profile that then could be summed for the programme as a whole. Unfortunately we did not have this information since the only evidence recorded for each SRB scheme was the agreed **total** scheme spend over the lifetime of the regeneration scheme. The same was true for the 'estimated' gross outputs. In these circumstances the only option was to profile both expenditure and outputs in some way but it was not clear that there was evidence to do this in anything but an arbitrary fashion. In these circumstances it was felt best not to discount the evidence. The lack of profile information on SRB expenditure also meant that it was not possible to adjust for inflation in an unambiguous way and the estimates presented here are thus current prices.

<b>Table 9.5: Case study cost/benefit account</b>		
<b>Net Exchequer costs £ million:</b>	<b>Target area</b>	<b>Local Economy</b>
SRB	173.6	173.6
Other net public expenditure	119.2	96.6
	<b>292.8</b>	<b>270.2</b>
<b>Net additional Benefits</b>	<b>Target area</b>	<b>Local economy</b>
Number of jobs created/safeguarded (000s)	11.4	9.3
Number of pupils with enhanced attainment (000s)	196.1	160.5
Number of people trained with qualifications (000s)	23.0	18.5
Number accessing employment through training (000s)	5.9	4.8
Number of target disadvantaged obtaining employment (000s)	0.4	0.4
Number of young people receiving personal/social dev (000s)	66.8	54.8
Number of new business start-ups (000s)	2.0	1.6
Number of businesses advised (000s)	8.8	7.0
Number of dwellings completed/improved (000s)	3.9	3.0
Hectares of land retained/improved	279	226
Number of community safety beneficiaries (000s)	278.8	228.2
Numbers using additional health, sports, cultural facilities (000s)	467.4	382.2
Number of voluntary community groups supported (000s)	4.2	3.4
Number employed in voluntary sector (000s)	7.7	6.3
Number of child-care places provided (000s)	1.3	1.0

Source: Department of Land Economy

9.6.3 While the benefits in Table 9.5 present net outputs achieved for the 20 case studies at a total net public cost of £292.8 million, most of us have little idea of what could be achieved on the ground with this expenditure or what other mainstream programmes and regeneration schemes have achieved elsewhere or in the past. To obtain a better understanding of what these net outputs mean it is useful to consider them in respect of a set amount of public expenditure to enable comparison of achievements across different programmes. It is, therefore, useful to express this cost benefit ratio to show what was achieved on average for every unit of £20,000 of net public expenditure.

9.6.4 In carrying out this exercise the net additional public expenditure estimates as set out in Table 9.4 above will be used. Table 9.6 below summarises some of the key SRB outputs per £20,000 of net additional public expenditure for the target SRB area. This has been calculated based on the SRB target area estimates given in Table 9.5.

<b>Table 9.6: Net additional benefits in the 20 case study areas for every £20,000 of net additional public expenditure</b>		
<b>Net additional Benefits</b>	<b>Target area</b>	<b>Local economy</b>
Number of jobs created/safeguarded	0.8	0.7
Number of pupils with enhanced attainment	13.4	11.9
Number of people trained with qualifications	1.6	1.4
Number accessing employment through training	0.4	0.4
Number of target disadvantaged obtaining employment	0.03	0.03
Number of young people receiving personal/social development	4.6	4.1
Number of new business start-ups	0.1	0.1
Number of businesses advised	0.6	0.5
Number of dwellings completed/improved	0.3	0.2
Hectares of land retained/improved	0.02	0.02
Number of community safety beneficiaries	19.1	16.9
Numbers using additional health, sports, cultural facilities	31.9	28.3
Number of voluntary community groups supported	0.3	0.3
Number employed in voluntary sector	0.5	0.5
Number of child-care places provided	0.09	0.1

Source: Department of Land Economy



9.6.5 From Table 9.6 within the SRB target area for every £20,000 of net additional public expenditure 0.8 jobs had been created or safeguarded, 13.4 pupils had enhanced attainment, 4.6 young people received personal/social development and 19.1 people had benefited from community safety initiatives. In terms of the wider local economy the benefits per £20,000 of net additional public spend was 0.7 created/safeguarded jobs, 11.9 pupils, 4.1 young people and 16.9 community safety beneficiary beneficiaries.

9.6.6 In order to understand these achievements it is helpful to make some comparison with other similar programmes such as City Challenge and London Docklands. As always with any comparison it is important to be aware that care must be exercised as any set of benefits reflects the underlying objectives of the programme which vary from one to another. With City Challenge the cost per net additional job created was around £28,000. The corresponding figure for Docklands was £56,000 with SRB emerging as £25,000.

## 9.7 Value for money for the SRB programme in the first two rounds

9.7.1 By grossing up from the estimates for the 20 case study areas we can get an indication of the likely benefits generated from the wider programme. As the case studies were all from the first two rounds of the programme we can expect the remaining 353 schemes from these two rounds to bear similar characteristics. Consequently this section grosses up net benefits expected for the first two rounds of the programme based on additionality estimates made for the 20 case study areas. Table 9.7 below sets out the gross outputs expected for the first two rounds of SRB as estimated using data provided by ODPM derived from the Delivery Plans of all 373 schemes. Using our additionality estimates for the 20 case studies we have made an estimate of net outputs for the target and local area.

<b>Table 9.7 Cost benefit account for first two rounds of SRB based on forecast outputs</b>			
<b>Net Exchequer costs £ million:</b>		<b>Target Area</b>	<b>Local economy</b>
SRB		2236.4	2236.4
Other net public expenditure		2270.3	1877.4
		<b>4506.7</b>	<b>4113.8</b>
<b>Programme outputs</b>	<b>Forecast Gross outputs lifetime</b>	<b>Estimated Net outputs Target area</b>	<b>Estimated Net outputs Local economy</b>
No. of jobs created/safeguarded	541313	227793	186353
No. of pupils benefiting with enhanced attainment	2898849	1523059	1247025
No. people trained with qualifications	459006	256638	206966
No. accessing employment through training	451649	281513	228253
No. young people receiving personal/social dev	1038188	487452	399781
No. new business start-ups	72777	30528	24423
Area new/improved business & commercial floorspace (sqm)	6984836	2971513	2430942
Hectares of land retained/improved	8140	5331	4312
No. of voluntary/community gps supported	21837	13632	11146
No. employed in voluntary sector	69782	39644	32442

Sources: ODPM Dataease database based on Delivery Plans of the 373 SRB schemes from rounds one and two.

9.7.2 Estimates of net additional public expenditure have been based on the projected total SRB and public expenditure amounting to £2.2 billion and £4.4 billion respectively. Using the additionality ratios estimated on Table 9.3 above it is possible to calculate net additional public expenditure for the target area and local economy. In the same way this allows us to reach estimates of net additional benefits from the first two

rounds of SRB for every £20,000 of net additional public expenditure. This is set out in Table 9.8 below.

<b>Table 9.8 Estimates of net additional benefits in the first two rounds of SRB for every £20,000 of net additional public expenditure*</b>		
<b>Programme outputs</b>	<b>Estimated Net outputs target area</b>	<b>Estimated Net outputs local economy</b>
Jobs created/safeguarded	1.01	0.91
Pupils benefiting from enhanced attainment	6.76	6.06
No. people trained with qualifications	1.14	1.01
No. accessing employment through training	1.25	1.11
No. young people receiving personal/social dev	2.16	1.94
No. new business start-ups	0.14	0.12
Area of new/improved business & commercial floorspace (sqm)	13.19	11.82
Land imp/rec for open space/dev (hectares)	0.02	0.02
Vol orgs/comm gps suppd	0.06	0.05
No. employed in voluntary sector	0.18	0.16

\*Due to the fact that it is not possible to satisfactorily estimate the expenditure and associated benefits for each year that the Round one and two schemes were running we have not adjusted expenditure for inflation or discounted the estimates of net additional benefits.

Source: Department of Land Economy

- 9.7.3 Alternatively the achievements of SRB can be considered in respect of the number of schemes. A total of 373 schemes received SRB funding from the first two rounds. Table 9.9 below sets out the net outputs achieved for every scheme. It shows that on average each scheme target area is expected to create or safeguard around 600 jobs with just 755 residents finding jobs following targeted assistance. Around 37 voluntary and community organisations are estimated to receive support with 14 hectares of land improved or reclaimed for use as open space or development.

<b>Table 9.9: Estimated net additional outputs achieved for every SRB scheme from the first two rounds</b>		
<b>Programme outputs</b>	<b>Target Area</b>	<b>Local economy</b>
Jobs created/safeguarded	611	500
Pupils benefiting from enhanced attainment	4083	3343
No. people trained with qualifications	688	555
No. accessing employment through training	755	612
No. young people receiving personal/social dev	1307	1072
No. new business start-ups	82	65
Area of new/improved business & commercial floorspace (sqm)	7967	6517
Land imp/rec for open space/dev (hectares)	14	12
Vol orgs/comm gps suppd	37	30
No. employed in voluntary sector	106	87

Source: Department of Land Economy

## 10. Joined-up Regeneration


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**This chapter considers the factors that lead to sound regeneration and looks at the contribution SRB has made to achieving this end. The areas of: engaging the community, voluntary sector, private sector and mainstream are examined. Some examples are then used to illustrate how this has been achieved by the 20 case studies**

### 10.1 Introduction

- 10.1.1 During the course of the evaluation of the Single Regeneration Budget the research team were able to build-up a good understanding of the factors that led to sound regeneration and how the SRB approach helped to produce this. There were a number of elements to this, some of which have already been discussed in other parts of this Report. Thus, a good partnership usually produced good regeneration outcomes because the partnership engaged its members in ways that were conducive to producing well thought out and executed actions. Issues relating to good partnership working were discussed at length in chapter four and are not discussed extensively here.
- 10.1.2 Other elements, however, related to the ability on the part of the partnership and its members to identify projects and schemes that worked well to overcome the barriers to regeneration in the area concerned and thus produce sustainable outcomes. In some cases these barriers were considerable and required well thought-out solutions to overcome them. It is a fact of life that at any point in time some areas in the United Kingdom will be undergoing relative decline, perhaps due to a number of things that may include the closure of a large employer. However, many such areas will eventually regenerate again because they will attract new investment and support that will revive their fortunes. In many areas this regeneration is a relatively frictionless process because the area has sufficient opportunity relative to its needs to bring about positive change. However, in other areas, for reasons that are discussed extensively in Part Three of this Report, the process of readjustment becomes stalled and it may require substantial policy intervention to be applied for a considerable period of time if an area is to revive.
- 10.1.3 This chapter provides examples from our case study work of successful initiatives that helped to contribute to successful regeneration outcomes. In each case the nature of the activity concerned is described, its positive features and what was associated with relative success and the role of SRB support.
- 10.1.4 Before describing the projects and actions concerned it is helpful to characterise the overall process that characterise the most successful holistic regeneration partnership schemes that were considered in the SRB case studies (Figure 10.1). Before the partnership can define its Vision for the area and its residents it is essential that a proper baseline analysis be conducted that involves consultations between all of the relevant parties. The baseline should consider the nature of the economic, physical and social problems that the area faces, relative needs, priorities and objectives and what are the assets or competences of a wide variety that the regeneration partnership has to work with. It is crucial that the partnership considers how the target regeneration area sits within its wider environment and the opportunities for positive linkage.

Figure 10.1: Joined up regeneration



10.1.5 The strategy of the partnership should identify how its work and thus activities over the period concerned will engage with all the principal stakeholders to produce improved and sustainable outcomes and this requires a clear understanding of how to initiate change. (We examine some of the issues required in the theory of change analysis in Part Three of this Report).

10.1.6 During the course of our SRB work we have found that the following interfaces are of particular importance;

- Combining physical regeneration (e.g. developing sites, refurbishing buildings) with people related regeneration (e.g. providing skills training, community facilities);
- Forging transport improvements and other links between deprived neighbourhoods and other parts of the often urban area where employment opportunities are available;
- Providing premises and support services for onsite training of residents most disadvantaged in the labour market;
- Providing premises and support services to encourage local small businesses and self-employment;
- Strengthening the capacity of the community to manage the physical neighbourhood effectively; and
- Bringing about changes in housing tenure and, in particular, securing the underlying conditions for suitable profitable private sector house building.

10.1.7 Land and property market interventions will remain central to the regeneration challenge, particularly in the older urban areas. The key findings from the SRB research are that land and property-based initiatives are particularly relevant because they enhance quality of life, external image and visual appearance of an urban neighbourhood.

10.1.8 It is essential that regeneration initiatives think through how physical, social and economic initiatives can come together to deliver the best outcomes and this can only be achieved through a well articulated strategy from the outset.

10.1.9 To secure good regeneration schemes the key issues are;

- Pay attention to the opportunity for interactions between themes;
- Identify the appropriate service areas (i.e. employment, health, crime, education, housing, environment, leisure, community development, transport and shopping) that the scheme is playing to and ensure that resources are deployed appropriately. Some regeneration schemes spread the ground bait too thinly. Better to concentrate and do well in specific areas but identify how the scheme fits into a bigger, wider, more holistic strategy for the area concerned. Local Strategic Partnerships should help with this. Thematic schemes need to identify clearly how they are addressing the problems associated with the key area concerned;
- Identify how the impact of changes to the physical nature of the area (i.e. land, property, buildings etc) relate to the desired effects on people and how all the effects sum to tackle the original problems. A common problem is to presume that changes to housing and the physical environment of an area will be sufficient to solve the social exclusion problems of the local inhabitants. Alas, it is rarely so;
- The need to consider how the projects identified can be co-ordinated to maximise the scheme for synergy in the attainment of scheme objectives. It is often the case that individual components of the regeneration scheme operate in something approaching splendid isolation to the detriment of overall goals and objectives. At the end of the day the objectives should be specified in terms of desired outcomes;
- The advantages of understanding how the needs of the residents in the regeneration areas can be met by facilitating greater interaction with adjacent areas. One of the most obvious examples of this relates to the labour market. An appreciation of how residents in deprived areas can interact in the wider labour market is essential if problems of worklessness and the like are to be addressed adequately, particularly when it comes to thinking about increasing the mobility of the unemployed;
- The importance of considering how difficulties experienced by residents in problems areas interface with the policies of mainstream programmes. This is of great importance in the relation to welfare to work and thus the interface between benefit regimes and encouraging people into work. However, there are also specific issues relating to how the regeneration scheme and its constituent activities on the ground through its projects can encourage those experiencing social exclusion to take up mainstream programmes that will help them improve their circumstances;
- The importance of identifying the most effective way in which each of the respective partners can make their contribution;
- The changed format by which policy is now delivered has created considerable demands at the local level for professionals who can bid for funds, manage the delivery of the regeneration scheme concerned and identify ongoing funding strategies as appropriate. Whilst there is a clear necessity to divide labour in delivering the regeneration product, there is a very real need for project managers who can see the big picture to have the appropriate skills with which to do this;

- Good project management is about the provision of good quality guidance and information systems. The evidence from the fieldwork points quite clearly to some partnerships not having information and management systems in place that allow for effective and timely decisions to be made;
- Baseline information must be one of the most neglected aspects of the work put in by partnerships to secure their funding. Many of those involved in the process of delivering regeneration do not re-visit baseline material. It is essential to assess how the net additional outputs arising from the project activities might be affecting key baselines and whether this accords with what was intended for the area and communities concerned;
- It is also important that partners understand the value of key management tools like appraisal, monitoring and evaluation. There is an increasing need for this particularly as the community is involved more in the formulation and delivery of regeneration. The better case study SRB schemes were often also those that went to considerable lengths to adopt sound appraisal and evaluation procedures. There is an urgent need to educate many of those involved as to how good evaluation can be used as an effective management tool to ensure that regeneration is delivered effectively and that lasting outcomes are delivered. Some of our case study partnerships did not, for instance, undertake intermediate evaluations even though the duration of the regeneration scheme was five years or more. This is an obvious shortcoming but again relates back to a failure amongst those concerned to understand what evaluation is about and what it can deliver as a management tool;
- As the breadth and indeed depth of regeneration activity has increased it is becoming ever more important that those involved in delivering regeneration be able to compare their achievements with those of others even if considerable care needs to be exercised in interpretation. If it is costing a regeneration scheme three times more to train a person than the broad average associated with such initiatives elsewhere then it is at least appropriate to ask why. Without some kind of benchmarking in place, particularly when it comes to assessing cost per unit of gross and net output or even in some cases outcomes it is simply not possible to do this.

10.1.10 During the evaluation of SRB it has been possible to assess a number of examples of where partnerships were able to engage with:

- The community
- The voluntary sector
- The private sector
- The mainstream

10.1.11 It is to an examination of these that we now turn.

## **10.2 Engaging the Community**

### **The Royds Community Association (RCA)**

10.2.1 Since its formation in 1994 the Royds Community Association (RCA) has gained national recognition as an example of an effective community-led partnership. With partners from Bradford Metropolitan Borough Council, Keepmoat Plc. and the Brunel Housing Association, it is led by the elected representatives of local residents who

hold the majority on the Board and act as the accountable body. The SRB programme focuses on the three Bradford housing estates of Buttershaw, Delph Hill and Woodside and at all stages the local residents have been involved in the regeneration process including planning, developing and delivering the physical, economic and social projects. In addition, they have been active on the various working parties and committees that also provide channels of communication for the Board and the wider community.



10.2.2 The Royds community-led Board functions as the principle structure for articulating resident opinion and advocating strategic policy, and all Board meetings are open to the public to enhance the transparency of the decision-making process. This arrangement will continue with the management of the SRB6 (Enterprise Park) over its seven-year life. In the longer term, Royds directors are committed to achieving high levels of neighbourhood management that enable the local community to work with, but gain independence from, mainstream players who invariably operate at the wider district level and may therefore not be in a position to meet locally defined needs.

10.2.3 In developing the baseline, local people were encouraged to become involved through partnership working in terms of:

- **Influencing strategies**, through activities/elective membership of the Board, various working parties/committees and consultation exercises;
- **Inclusion**, by involving all elements of the local community (residents, voluntary and statutory sectors and private sector) through working in partnership linked to equality of opportunity;
- **Communicating**, through consultation, field surveys, dissemination of information, promotion of objectives and the development of democratic processes linked to elections for Board membership, etc.; and
- **Capacity building**, through the development of volunteer skills and resources through the support of the RCA.

10.2.4 In reaching the wider community the marketing of the Royds initiative has focused on the production of regular newsletters, an annual report and many articles in both local and national newspapers and journals. The Royds Consultation Bus mounted roadshows across the estates involving some 5,000 local residents with such success that a second bus came into operation in the summer of 2002 and will be part of a continuing local engagement strategy. Within this SRB scheme, the involvement of the community has been an integral part of the sustainability strategy for Royds that led to the local management of the physical, economic and social resources necessary to improve the quality of life for residents.

### The Royds Bradford Physical Initiative

10.2.5 The Royds Bradford physical regeneration initiative consisted of groups of interlinked projects designed to meet three distinctive broad strands: providing a balanced mix of good-quality homes for rent and purchase; creating a safe, attractive, community-focused environment; and turning the estates of Buttershaw, Delph Hill and Woodside into distinct urban villages with their own identity. The refurbishment of almost 1,400 existing council properties which were in a poor state of repair, dating back to the 1950's and 1960's was the largest element of the work.

### How did it do it?

10.2.6 £12.5 million of SRB funds contributed to the housing improvement works with a further £7.6 million from other public funds. The work was carried out according to urban codes which were commissioned by Royds Community Association (RCA) to maintain quality standards of materials and workmanship and funded by SRB for £30,000. At every stage of the refurbishment works local residents were consulted in order to develop a clear sense of ownership in the planning and delivery of initiatives to meet their needs. Three residents also funded by SRB (£116,000) were employed as Visiting Officers to reassure people and keep them informed of key developments and meetings. Alongside these works 700 flats in a serious state of repair were demolished and 320 new homes were built to provide a balanced mix of good quality homes. While housing refurbishment and new build programmes provided an opportunity to improve the quality of life for individual residents, it was also considered important to develop an Environmental Action Plan which received almost £148,000 of SRB funds. These improvements not only encompassed the development of village centres, but included tree planting, the clearing of dumped rubbish/gardens, training on environmental awareness/management issues for residents, traffic calming measures, improvements to park areas and the claiming/development of any unused land as part of the local responsibility strategy for public areas.

10.2.7 Each of the estates benefited from the development of new/improved shopping amenities, health and sports facilities and community centres that have provided a clear focus for local communities within a more vibrant local economy. For example, the construction of the Buttershaw Healthy Living Centre provided much needed services beyond a GP surgery dealing with primary health care, as nursing staff, dentistry services, signposting to wider health facilities and alternative health services are now available at a single location. Indoor recreation facilities, meeting rooms and a café provide a social focus with local churches also involved in this multi-dimensional project.

### What did it achieve?

- A key feature of the refurbishment works was the installation of new doors and windows, the closing off of alley-ways and the erection of fencing around each property as part of the secured by design strategy to combat domestic burglary/fear of crime. The RCA received the Government's 'Secured by Design' award that has been justified through Police data, indicating that the number of reported break-ins to refurbished properties has fallen by 82% since the project was launched. Both the Home Office and other police forces have taken an interest in this initiative that was considered to be extremely innovative at the time of its inception in 1996.
- The development of a Healthy Living Centre for the area. Both the Bradford Health Authority and the Bradford Community Health Trust have demonstrated their support for the development of more comprehensive outreach facilities linked to preventative health care strategies.

### What did it achieve?

- The main housing programme is maintained by the Council and the Healthy Living Centre will be funded for a minimum of ten years by the Bradford Community Health Trust.



## 10.3 Engaging the voluntary sector

### The Old Steine Centre, Brighton

10.3.1 Problems related to street drinking had become a serious issue for Brighton by the 1990's and there was a major gap in local service provision for this hard-to-reach group. After several failures in attempting to address this long-standing issue due to lack of multi-agency partnership, opposition of the local community and the failure to identify an appropriate site for the centre, the advent of SRB made it possible to adopt a more joined-up approach and the Old Steine Centre was established in 1998. Its overall objective was to provide a centre for street drinkers which would provide support, information and healthcare services in a central location and thereby discourage drinking on the street.

#### Where?

10.3.2 The Old Steine Centre is located in council-owned premises directly adjacent to the Royal Pavilion grounds. The Pavilion grounds is a popular tourist attraction in the vicinity of the Old Steine Gardens, an area where many street drinkers gathered, causing problems for the local population and tourists attracted to the area. Strategically, this is a key location for the Centre in that it had the advantage of being close to where many of its potential clients already assembled.

#### How did it do it?

10.3.3 The Centre is a drop-in facility that provides a number of practical services including washing and laundry facilities, breakfast, advice on housing, legal issues and health matters with access to a doctor. Its unique feature is being one of only a few amenities in the country to provide a 'wet room' facility, which is carried out under the supervision of the qualified staff. The centre provides a service for 4.5 days each week with clients also having some limited access to the Centre or related services for part of the weekend. Take-up has been extremely good and comments from clients, who took part in our beneficiary survey, were positive as it provided a practical amenity that they could not find elsewhere. The Centre is run by Equinox, which is a special agency set up to care for vulnerable men and women in society and the Centre is managed by an Advisory Group.

10.3.4 SRB funding covered the refurbishment and furnishing of the premises where the centre is located, which was in a state of disrepair. Other funding went towards training of some staff in how to deal with the client group as well as food and hygiene courses. Total funding for the project was in excess of £680,000, with SRB contributing £308,000. Other funders included Brighton and Hove Council, the National Lottery, Department of Health and charitable trusts.

#### What did it achieve?

- It has reduced the number of people drinking on the streets for the hours the Centre is open and, consequently, has benefited the wider local population;
- It provides a range of facilities to a vulnerable and hard-to-reach group of people, including primary health care and other personal facilities;
- The Centre provides their clients with access to local detox. centres.
- Relationships have been built with local housing providers;

- Overall, if the Day Centre did not exist it would reduce the chances of its client group accessing mainstream services. There are two other day centres in Brighton but they are not wet centres.

#### Sustainability

10.3.5 The Centre has continued to operate receiving further SRB funding from the Brighton and Hove unified SRB budget, with further funding from the Council, Health Authority, Lottery Board and charitable trusts.

### 10.4 Engaging the private sector

#### Royal Arsenal, Woolwich – Working in partnership for long-term success

10.4.1 The 31 hectare former Royal Arsenal site is situated between Woolwich Town Centre and the banks of the River Thames. Owned by the Ministry of Defence, then English Partnerships and now the London Development Agency, the site's redevelopment is seen as key to the successful regeneration of Woolwich. The project has been taken forward as a mixed use development scheme, involving a combination of housing, retail, leisure and tourism opportunities within a high quality public realm that fronts onto the River and is properly integrated with the existing town centre.

#### How did it do it?

10.4.2 SRB funding has been key to securing the 'public face' of the Arsenal. Projects supported by SRB included relocation of Royal Artillery Museum ("Firepower") to the site, establishment of a Greenwich Heritage Centre, creation of a new river walkway, improved links with Woolwich Town Centre and a Pier. WDA/SRB also provided funding for exploring alternative uses by funding feasibility work into commercial leisure opportunities, opportunities for live-work schemes, film studio development and public art. It is considered that these initiatives would have been much less likely to have been funded by other public sector funding partners, yet they are likely to be key in differentiating the site from numerous other riverside developments and in ensuring that the Royal Arsenal is seen as an extension of, rather than separate to, the existing Town Centre. The changes in the site's ownership over the years led to a number of master planning exercises. Crucially, however, the continuity of the SRB programme through Woolwich Development Agency provided an opportunity to exert influence over the project's design throughout its prolonged gestation. In general SRB and WDA are credited with shifting the redevelopment away from a traditional business park-type development into a mixed use scheme involving significantly more housing and leisure opportunities closer to the town centre.

#### Key elements of the project

- SRB funding has secured the 'public face' of the Arsenal through accessibility (e.g. Riverside Walk and Pier) and attractions (Heritage Centre and Firepower/RAM). In general, SRB/WDA credited with shifting the approach of EP (later LDA) away from a traditional business park-type development into a mixed use scheme involving significantly more housing and leisure opportunities closer to the town centre.
- This project is a good example of joining up between the economic and physical dimensions of regeneration, and of a strategic approach to land and property redevelopment which is properly integrated with a range of other local initiatives.

### The Urban Forest Park and adjacent housing development, Swadlincote

10.4.3 The concept of a multi purpose forest at the heart of England dates back to 1987 with the Forestry Commission 'Forestry in the Countryside'. At this time extensive feasibility work was carried out to decide on the location of the National Forest, which would eventually spread across the three counties of Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Staffordshire. The town of Swadlincote is situated within the heart of the National Forest area. The aim of the project was to create an Urban Forest Park from a piece of derelict grassland which was not originally destined as part of the Forest but was highly visible from the town centre and detracted from the ambience of the area. At the same time this new facility would be developed in sympathy with an adjacent major housing development to provide new housing in forest surrounds.

#### How did it do it?

10.4.4 The Forest Park was created in partnership with the National Forest Company who were essential to co-drive the project, South Derbyshire District Council and Gresley Investments Limited, who owned the land. They were all members of the Made in Swadlincote Partnership which drove the SRB programme. The main enhancement works included preparing the site, planting in accordance with the local soil conditions and interfacing drainage, plumbing and landscaping works with the adjacent housing projects. The completion works that followed incorporated a number of features including the Gallery Grid (an outdoor teaching facility), the Water Spine, an adventure play area, a communal area, boardwalks and decking. In addition, an enterprise trail was designed to act as an arts interpretation and cultural resource.

10.4.5 Funding for the projects amounted to £730,000, with SRB contributing over £575,000 and other funders being the National Forest Company, the Tender Scheme, the Forest Authority and South Derbyshire District Council.

#### What did it achieve?

- It has provided a facility for the local people to enjoy the surrounding countryside, one that will develop and grow over the coming years
- It has linked in with a major housing project to provide
- It has eradicated a derelict area of grassland making a significant impact on the character of the town

#### Key elements of the project

- SRB funds gave the potential to develop the area through interlinked projects which in turn linked with two housing projects which ran concurrently, providing new private and social housing units adjacent to the Park.
- The success of these linked projects also owe much to the working of the SRB partnership, which provided a medium for different agencies to work together in a way that would have been otherwise unlikely to have occurred.

#### Sustainability

10.4.6 Following the completion of the Park the ongoing maintenance is carried out by South Derbyshire District Council, which includes upkeep of the enterprise trail. The housing projects were finished on time and had a high take-up becoming a very popular place to live.

## 10.5 Engaging the mainstream

### The Opportunities Centre, Hangleton Knoll

10.5.1 The Opportunities Advice Centre was designed to meet the local need for local residents on the two housing estates of Hangleton and Knoll. The aim was to provide an advice, training and job search facility for unemployed people on an isolated housing estate.

#### Where?

10.5.2 The Centre is located within a shop-fronted facility, intended to be a less formal location which was more easily accessible for the local population.

#### How did it do it?

10.5.3 The Centre, which was opened in 1997, is a one-stop shop that provides information and advice for local people who find difficulty in accessing mainstream training programmes, with an interface to local service provision through the presence of staff from the JobCentre on the premises for part of the week. The facilities at the Centre include job search through interview techniques and CV writing and the design of personalised programmes specifically tailored to the individual needs of the client to help them access training facilities.

10.5.4 The total cost of this project was just under £650,000 with over half the funds coming from SRB. Other funders included the Employment Service, local colleges through training and the Hangleton Knoll Project.

#### What did it achieve?

- The Centre significantly exceeded original SRB targets. This can be attributed to its physical location being within the heart of the community and the willingness of the staff to understand and respond to the specific requirements of those seeking training and employment opportunities.
- The success of the Advice Centre has been demonstrated in the development of a second office in Kempton
- The Centre was selected by DTI for their new pilot IT employment Scheme
- The Centre has demonstrated that a need exists for a local training/employment advice centre (operating in conjunction with other public services), not only in Hangleton and Knoll, but in the adjacent areas of Portslade, Whitehawk and Kempton.

#### Key elements of the project

- This project has developed a person-centred approach to dealing with clients on an isolated housing estate providing training/job search facilities to assist those who wish to move into employment.

#### Sustainability

10.5.5 The Opportunities Advice Centre continued beyond the life of SRB and has sought further funding through mainstream sources, support from the local colleges and other public funding.

### The Click Centre, South Leytonstone

- 10.5.6 The Youth Technology Centre in South Leytonstone, locally known as the 'Click' Centre, was built as a direct result of concerns about the lack of provision for young people in the local area. This Centre was set up to: meet the needs of the local unemployed and socially excluded providing an enhanced employment service/guidance service, with training and access to the Internet; to encourage sustainable economic growth and wealth creation by improving the competitiveness of the local economy through provision of demonstration, site and training for local SMEs in internet and multi-media skills including e-commerce; to tackle crime and improve community safety by providing access for local young people to positive leisure and educational activity based around ICT; and to enhance the quality of life for local people by providing a Cyber Café and other entertainment opportunities.



#### Where?

- 10.5.7 The Centre is centrally located on Leytonstone High Road on the border between Cathall and Cann Hall wards in East London, which is at the epicentre of the area targeted by the South Leytonstone SRB two scheme

#### How did it do it?

- 10.5.8 The Click Centre is a high-profile and distinctive oval-shaped building designed to reflect the views of the young people in the area who requested something unconventional. It opened in spring 2000 and was the first Internet Centre and Cyber Centre in Leytonstone. It provides an environment for informal learning, runs leisure/youth activities including home work clubs and ICT based projects, and services including colour photocopying and scanning. Employment advice is also available from Employment Advice, Support and Training (EAST). Basic IT and office skills training is supplied through Learndirect and City and Guilds. Other ICT and multimedia training is also available, including courses aimed at local small businesses and community organisations, literacy/numeracy improver courses for the unemployed, and web design and music production through the Cybersquads project.
- 10.5.9 The Centre is managed by O-Regen, which is a charity operating in the local district with representation from the local authority, Waltham Forest College and the SRB partnership. Half of the members of the Steering Group, which meet every two months, are local residents, including the Chair and Vice-Chair.
- 10.5.10 Total funding for this project amounted to some £2.1 million of which £1.2 million was from SRB. Other funding has come from the National Lottery and Waltham Forest Housing Action Trust, the European Union and other charitable trusts.

#### What did it achieve?

- The project has been successful in targeting groups that have been identified as in danger of social exclusion (those unemployed and from ethnic minorities);
- The Click has also brought positive benefits to the community and changes to individual lives in and around the borough. A survey carried out by the University of East of London shows that the training provided has equipped people with new skills.
- The project provided unprecedented access to new technology for all the local community in (South) Leytonstone

### Key elements of the project

- Local input is vital to the running of the project;
- SRB has been crucial in providing the capital funding to the construction of the building, which would have not otherwise happened.
- The Click Centre won the British Urban Regeneration Association Award in December 2001, and a BBC award in June 2002 as the "Best UKOnline Centre", for best practice, innovation and dedication to teaching ICT, especially recognised for its 'Computers on Wheels' workshops, which took ICT learning opportunities to community venues throughout the borough.

### Sustainability

10.5.11 Income received from the operation of the Cyber Cafe has increased and contributed to almost a quarter of the budget in 2000/2001. In addition, the project has successfully bid for further funding from both the public and private sectors.

### The Gipsyville Warren

10.5.12 The Gipsyville Warren is a community and resource centre for young people aged between 14 and 25 years. It is a satellite centre of the Warren of Hull Ltd., which was established in 1982 in the city centre by Humberside Youth Association and became an independent registered charity and company limited by guarantee in 1988.

10.5.13 The Gipsyville Warren was established in 1999 as a response to growing concerns on the part of the local community and local agencies that there was a lack of services offered to socially excluded young people in the Gipsyville area. Crime and drugs were very big issues on this estate and there was a need to correctly address and tackle of such problems. In view of this, the city centre Warren was invited by the local community and Hull CityVision officers to make an SRB bid to set up a Warren on the Gipsyville estate. The bid was successful and in January 1999 a team of five workers were appointed.

10.5.14 The key aim of the Warren was to focus on the philosophy of empowerment, by seeking to maximise the involvement of young people in sharing in the organisation's decision-making processes. For example, young people can have their say about what courses they run, what projects they do, etc..., at what is known as the 'weekly parliament'. Thus, any young person under 25 can vote on policies and decisions that affect the centre, which enables young people to develop the skills necessary for them to take control over their own lives.

### Where?

10.5.15 The Centre is in an accessible location within the Gipsyville housing estate in Hull

### How did it do it?

10.5.16 The Gipsyville Warren offers a wide range of services and activities, all free of charge they include: counselling and information, courses in drugs awareness, reading, maths and building, benefits advice, free childcare, careers advice, IT skills and health support services. The Centre has an 'open door' policy in that there is no membership requirement and their policy of 'empowerment' is at the core of their activities. The project has seen many positive developments, particularly in the work with young women. Initially the project was very much male dominated but now women represent around half of all young people using the centre.

10.5.17 Total funding for the project amounted to £249,000, with almost £232,000 coming from SRB. The latter was used to fund some of the workers, the rental of the premises (which are Council owned), running costs, childcare expenses and counselling and information related costs. Funding of slightly under £11,000 came from voluntary sources and in kind contributions of around £6,000 from the University of Hull brought additional tutors to work in the Centre and materials for those sessions. The East Riding Health Authority contributed £470 for health support services

#### What did it achieve?

10.5.18 The project has enabled young people to realise their potential through providing opportunities that have shown them that there is more to life than crime or drugs and that there are other opportunities in life apart from a life in prison. The project has also been useful in helping young people identify their reasons for involvement in crime. The counselling and information service has proved an invaluable resource in that it has enabled many young people from the Gipsyville community to cope with and overcome crisis and upheaval. For others it has provided a very real lifeline when in desperation. Furthermore, by bringing a careers advisor into the centre young people have benefited from support and access to specific information on training and jobs and for some this initiative has led to training and employment

#### Sustainability

10.5.19 SRB2 funding came to an end in March 2001 and unfortunately a bid for SRB round six was unsuccessful. However, the Warren did secure £450,000 of Lottery funding over three years and a further £250,000 from ESF for a UK online service. The project has expanded the provision of services and the geographical area that is targeting, becoming the West Hull Warren and working with socially excluded young people from the West Hull area.

#### The Youth Information Shop (YIS), Swadlincote

10.5.20 When SRB funding was first secured for the town a Youth Needs survey was carried out to determine the needs of the local young people. The result of this research elicited a need for a multi purpose facility to meet a gap in provision for youngsters that would be informal, brightly decorated and in a youth friendly environment. The main purpose was to give local young people access to information and support for issues facing them in their transition from childhood to adulthood.



#### Where?

10.5.21 The YIS is located centrally in the town of Swadlincote to provide an easily accessible meeting place for young people in the local area.

#### How did it do it?

10.5.22 The YIS, which opened in 1999, is a shop-fronted facility which provides a wide range of services, information and advice for local young people. Initially established within one shop, the success of the project and availability of the adjacent property led to an extension of the facility to include both shops and the accommodation above which led to a quadrupling of the usage of the space. Many agencies use the shop offering specific services which range from sexual health, drugs, mental health, consultant paediatrician, general counselling to housing aid and advice and help with

job search. The YIS also provides clients with access to the internet and other office services such as photocopying and printing. A creche is also provided.

10.5.23 The YIS has been very successful in attracting different agencies to the shop including Derbyshire Careers Service, South Derbyshire Health Service, Derbyshire Housing Aid. Agencies have had to adapt to operating within a multi-agency environment which has encouraged good partnership working learning the boundaries of their own expertise and making referrals as necessary where some overlap occurs.

10.5.24 Funding for YIS amounted to some £680,000 for the shop and extension of which SRB contributed £380,000. Other funders included Derbyshire County Council, South Derbyshire District Council, the Health Authority, Methodist Church and Housing Aid.

#### What did it achieve?

10.5.25 It has successfully provided a one-stop shop for young people in the area. The services developed here are now being used elsewhere, e.g. the Mobile Youth Centre. YIS acts as the hub for the local youth and is trusted by local young people.

#### Key elements of the project

- SRB made possible a very comprehensive project with a set of comprehensive services located under one roof, rather than disjointed information points across the area
- SRB allowed for creativity and gave a breathing space to pilot it which was very important.

#### Sustainability

10.5.26 The Youth Service (part of Derbyshire County Council) has taken over the running of the shop so it will continue. SRB allowed the project to be piloted and now DCC has taken it within its main budget. (In effect the funding level is similar to that when SRB funded the scheme).

#### The Dome and Museum and Art Gallery, Brighton

10.5.27 In the early 1990s a review of old buildings in Brighton showed that the Dome complex offered one of the best opportunities for renovation for the town. The project sought to provide a comprehensive cultural facility for Brighton that would be capable of attracting artists from around the world while at the same time upgrading an area of the town that had become rundown.



#### How did it do it?

10.5.28 The project involved the renovation of the Dome auditorium, the Corn Exchange building and Pavilion Theatre, which together make up the Dome complex. These buildings were badly in need of improvement since their previous restoration in 1935. As part of the refurbishment some highly technical improvements were carried out including innovative work on improved acoustics, better ventilation via a specialised air conditioning/cooling system and improved accessibility throughout.



10.5.29 This project eventually amounted to around £24 million in total expenditure of which the national lottery contributed £17.5 million and SRB some £5 million. While the SRB expenditure was somewhat less it was crucial to the overall success of the scheme, helping to maintain the momentum of the project by providing a cashflow which funded the specialised core team that were carrying out the renovation works while delays during the building programme affected the accessibility of other funding sources. In addition, changes in Lottery funding rules meant that the Pavilion Theatre improvements had to be shelved but SRB funding was found to finance a reduced refurbishment of the Theatre. It was always intended to close down the venues for the least possible time during their refurbishment but further delays resulted in more lost income than forecast and attempts to raise funds elsewhere proved unsuccessful. As a result, a further application was made to SRB in 2000 from the unified SRB budget managed by the Brighton Regeneration Partnership. An extra £1.4 million was granted and helped the project towards completion.

10.5.30 Attached to the Dome complex site is the Museum and Art Gallery building, which underwent renovation works at the same time with some SRB and Lottery funding, amounting in total to just under £11 million, with around £2 million from SRB. Being inextricably linked to the works carried out on the adjacent Dome complex, the success of the Museum and Art Gallery was dependent on the outcome at the Dome and without the stabilising effect of SRB more serious delays would have had serious repercussions for the museum.

#### What did it achieve?

10.5.31 By April 2000 the Corn Exchange was finished with a capacity for 1,200 standing or 320 seated. The Pavilion Theatre finished at the same time, which accommodates 350 standing or 240 seated. Spring 2002 saw the opening of the main Dome building, which now houses 1,800 people in the auditorium and a grand new entrance. The Museum and Art Gallery re-opened in 2002.

#### Key elements of the project

- The flexibility of SRB helped maintain the momentum of an important and technically complicated project. The SRB contribution provided a vital cashflow which enabled the project manager to keep the same core team of specialists in place throughout the development of this project while delays during the building programme affected the accessibility of other funding sources.
- SRB funds also contributed to some enhancements of the Museum and Art Gallery project, funding the Children's gallery, greater IT interactive facilities and outreach work, which was an area the museum had wanted to develop but had not had appropriate funding before. This included employing a community researcher to research users and non-users of the museum, community exhibitions, reminiscence work and activities with ethnic minorities.

#### Sustainability

10.5.32 The management of the Dome Complex was passed over to the Brighton Festival in 1999. Ongoing running costs will be covered by the local authority with any major maintenance to be serviced by an index-linked sinking fund. In addition the Dome's ability to attract 'bigger players' and run conference events should enable the Dome to generate more of its own income. Other future projects include a training facility, educational events and workshops.

10.5.33 Funding for the Museum is continuing from the Brighton SRB unified budget to cover three posts and the Children's Gallery. Brighton & Hove Council will also be funding three permanent established posts. The Green Trust also continues to fund part-

time post. The Gallery will be carrying out fund raising to cover further costs. Heritage Lottery Fund is financing work on collections and DfEE to fund some school work. Maintenance is on the same basis as the Dome.

### Sharpe's Resource Centre, Swadlincote

10.5.34 The Sharpe's Pottery and Visitor Centre emerged after the planned project for a Heritage Centre at the Forest Park in Swadlincote did not go ahead following an unsatisfactory feasibility study. As a result, the remaining SRB monies were used to fund the renovation of the Grade II Listed buildings in the centre of Swadlincote that housed the old Pottery including the bottle kiln which date back to 1821. The aim of the project was to give the area its first museum, provide a Centre for local interest groups to meet and at the same time improve the local environment by bringing a historic building back into use.



#### Where?

10.5.35 Located centrally in Swadlincote, the renovation of the building has made a significant contribution to the character of the town

#### How did it do it?

10.5.36 The project involved the repair of the buildings and fitting out to provide a modern visitor centre that would include computer interactive facilities to enable local people to explore the industrial and cultural heritage of the local area. The Centre was completed and opened at the beginning of 2003 and includes a museum (with local artefacts, models and other archive material that celebrates the cultural heritage of the area). Other facilities include a lecture/meeting room, an educational resource for schools and a venue where many local interest groups can meet.

10.5.37 This project reached over £1.3 million in total expenditure, with SRB contributing £241,000, which included funding for a feasibility study. The majority of funding at almost £1 million came from the Heritage Lottery Fund. While the project would have still gone ahead, SRB funding enabled the project to be completed earlier than it would otherwise have been.

#### What did it achieve?

- The project brought forward the transformation of an area of the town to coincide with the other physical improvements from the rest of the SRB programme, resulting in a stronger impact on the town overall.

#### Key elements of the project

- This project is an example of the flexibility of the SRB programme where a proposed project that did not receive approval was substituted by another project which was completed ahead of its original schedule.
- It provided the District of South Derbyshire with its first museum facility

#### Sustainability

10.5.38 The Centre is now open. It is a free facility for visitors and has ten years revenue support from South Derbyshire District Council. It is intended that it will eventually become self-supporting.

### **Positive Action Training Project – Matching Employment Opportunities with Need**

- 10.5.39 This project sought to take advantage of a range of growth sectors in the Bristol economy and focused on finding managerial, professional and technical employment opportunities in a range of sectors where Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) people are under represented, namely construction, management, media and retail sectors.
- 10.5.40 The end of scheme evaluation pointed to the main successes of the project which included the efforts made by CEED, the project deliverer, to find a wide range of host employers committed to positive action, and the attention that it gave to each individual trainee through its mentoring programme. It also pointed to the strong community links that CEED had, and the use to which these were put to maximise the recruitment of potential BME trainees. On average about 75% of trainees went into a employment or further training. Trainees are tracked after three and six months following training. Over 50% of the trainees have previously been unemployed for over two years.
- 10.5.41 CEED, and the Positive Action Training project, are good examples of joining up between projects at a local level, to ensure that there are good gross-referral mechanisms in place, and between the needs of individuals and high quality employment opportunities in growing sectors of the economy.

### **Youth Café – Service Delivery Outreach, Woolwich**

- 10.5.42 This SRB-funded project involved the creation of a safe, supervised environment for young people to meet in Woolwich Town Centre outside school hours. It involved the refurbishment of an existing building and provision of catering equipment and the recruitment of a co-ordinator. The project was led by a community group, including young people, which formed specifically for the purpose, and found support from one of the elected members of Greenwich Council who was then Mayor.
- 10.5.43 The project differs from a traditional youth centre in that it is run by young people for their own peers, with advisors on the management board who are able to provide expertise without being restrictive. The Café is reported to have achieved high standards of activity, but with local flexibility and control. Core funding beyond SRB proved difficult to maintain, but by utilising the Café to provide other services it has been possible to both maintain the main café activities for young people as well as host a wide range of other public services that are looking for a range of outreach opportunities. The Café is a Connexions one stop shop; a UK Online centre; a Learn Direct centre, it works with disabled groups and also ran a summer scheme with Neighbourhood Renewal Funding. With its town centre location, this means it has been able to deliver services “off-peak” to a range of older age groups while young people are still at school.
- 10.5.44 This Youth Café is a good example of joining up between the public and community sectors in the delivery of a range of public services, illustrating some of the key points that are often made about the benefits of such arrangements, notably the ability to provide a more flexible, customer-focused service that is better able to tap into the target market in question.

