

**Payback Killings and the Transmission of Norms in the New Guinea Islands: Observing
the Tip or the Iceberg?**

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ABSTRACT

Recently, customary killings in Papua New Guinea have gained the attention of the media and the Papua New Guinean government has made legislative changes to increase penalties in an effort to eradicate such practices. This paper highlights the apparent resilience of the customary norm of payback despite it having been illegal for more than a century. Based on a study investigating attitudes toward payback killings in the New Guinea Islands, a predictable relationship between education and disagreeing with the use of payback is found. However, it is also found that those in closer proximity to the state criminal law are more likely to agree with payback. These results suggest that the criminal law may be a weak force in terms of norm transmission and that education may be a more effective policy tool to reduce the persistence of harmful customary norms in the New Guinea Islands.

Keywords: norms, legal pluralism, custom, payback, Papua New Guinea.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Papua New Guinean government has embarked on a range of legislative reforms aimed at eradicating customary practices involving violence, especially in relation to the killing of alleged sorcerers (Ward 2013). In light of these reforms it is useful to consider other customary practices that are illegal and which attract already high prison sentences. A key example is the practice of *payback*. In much of Papua New Guinea, payback is considered a legitimate punishment and is still practiced in both urban and rural areas. Its legitimacy survives among a proportion of the population despite being considered a grave crime by the state, which can and does attract the highest possible prison sentences.²

There is a perception that the practice of customary law in rural populations is more at odds with western norms and law than in urban areas. This is articulated in an editorial on payback killings in Papua New Guinea's national newspaper, the Post-Courier (2010), which voiced the commonly held view that payback killers should "leave their terrible 'customs or culture' behind in their villages". Consistent with such a perception, Aldashev *et al* (2012) have recently provided models that predict that greater access to the formal court system should lead to the convergence of customary norms with the state law. Their work suggests that customary norms that run counter to the state law or western notions of human rights can be changed through increased penalties. Others such as Dharmapala and McAdams (2003) and Geisinger (2002) reach a similar conclusion by highlighting the *expressive* function of law, and suggest the state is able to create and perpetuate norms through its ability to signal good and bad behaviour and change internalised beliefs. In contrast, scholars such as Bicchieri (2006) have suggested that where the state lacks legitimacy increased enforcement

² For instance see *The State v. Monodoao* [2010 PGNC] where a National Court judge sentenced a man convicted of wilful murder to life imprisonment for a payback killing.

may have little effect in changing norms. More recently Carbonara *et al* (2012) have provided a model that suggests that increases in the strictness of laws that run counter to societal norms may actually lead to countervailing effects that reinforce contrary norms and that can actually lead to an increased rate of violations. Despite the theoretical work in this area, and inconclusive anecdotal evidence, empirical work is scarce.³ This paper aims to shed some light on this issue by investigating attitudes toward payback killings in the New Guinea Islands (specifically New Britain and Bougainville). A key finding is that urban respondents are more likely to agree with the use of payback than rural respondents.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First a brief description is given of how wrongdoing is punished in the New Guinea Islands – including how customary norms interact with the state criminal system. Following on from this is an empirical examination of attitudes toward payback, including the sampling and data collection strategy, descriptive statistics, estimation method, and key findings. The paper concludes with a brief summary and some tentative policy prescriptions.

2. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE NEW GUINEA ISLANDS

Unlike some parts of Papua New Guinea which are reported as having some of the highest crime rates in the world, crime rates in the Islands, both in urban and rural communities are relatively low.⁴ This relatively low rate of crime is achieved despite having low levels of

³ See Wiessner and Pupu (2012) for some anecdotal evidence.

⁴ While direct comparison with other surveys is difficult, results from a victimisation survey conducted as part of this study suggest that the violent crime rate (which includes assault, threats of violence, robbery, armed robbery and one case of rape) was 11 per cent over a five year period. This compares to Truman (2011) who reports the *annual* violent crime victimisation rate for the United States at 1.47 per cent in 2010. Guthrie *et al* (2006a, b and 2007) who found crime rates considerably lower in Bougainville than in Port Moresby and Lae – although crime rates in the latter two cities were extremely high by world standards.

policing by world standards - approximately one police officer for 812 people in East New Britain (the regional headquarters), 1633 in West New Britain, and 1347 in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.⁵ This compares to the national average of one police officer for 1084 people and the global average of 400 inhabitants per police officer.⁶

Given these low policing rates, it is not surprising that state criminal law enforcement is both geographically confined and weak. The police mainly confine themselves to the towns and their surrounds and rarely venture to the more remote areas, in part due to a lack of funding for transportation. In 2007, the Papua New Guinea Law and Justice Sector Secretariat (2007:11-39) reported that the national arrest rates for crimes reported to the police (which are likely to be only a fraction of overall crimes committed) were extremely low - murder 27 per cent, rape 22 per cent, and robbery 16 per cent. Of those criminals who are arrested, found guilty and imprisoned, many escape. The Secretariat also reported an escape rate from the nation's prisons of 7 per cent per year. Despite the impotency of the state criminal law in punishing wrongdoers, it would be a mistake to conclude that wrongdoers are not punished. In both urban and rural areas, customary norms (or perhaps more accurately customary *law*) provide an important role in punishing criminal (and non-criminal) behaviour.

⁵ According to the Papua New Guinea Law and Justice Sector Secretariat (2007: 6) the total police population for these three provinces is approximately 514, with 271 in East New Britain (the administrative headquarters); 113 in West New Britain; and 130 in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.

⁶ See Shaw *et al* (2003) for a breakdown of regional policing levels, which demonstrates that Papua New Guinea has particularly low levels of policing and lower than Africa as a continent (approximately 800 people per officer).

Under customary law, a serious customary wrong such as homicide (often it does not matter if it was accidental or deliberate) can be punished by a *payback* killing.⁷ Such a reality led Narokobi (1996: 176) to conclude that in Papua New Guinea ‘killing is not a crime, but a punishment’. From the interviews conducted as part of this research, a common view expressed was that for a payback killing to be permissible under custom it must occur on the same day that the initial wrong was committed. If payback cannot be enforced on the same day, compensation should be demanded instead.⁸ The only exception to this rule is when a compensation demand is not met. Under these circumstances a payback killing may again be permissible, and in this sense it can be seen an enforcement mechanism for compensation demands. Needless to say however, a payback killing is an offence itself under Section 299 of Papua New Guinea’s *Criminal Code Act 1974* labelled *Wilful Murder*.

The other main customary punishment (or sanction) is a compensation payment which is usually seen as a substitute for payback. In cases of homicide, compensation payments range from Kina (K) 20,000 (\$8,000) to more than 100,000 K (\$40,000) in the New Guinea Islands depending on the place and circumstances.⁹ In a country where average annual income is approximately \$1,300 per year, even \$8,000 is a considerable sum. Given the magnitude of

⁷ Trompf (1994) suggests that the practice of violent payback, which he argues is an extension of the customary principle of reciprocity, extended throughout most of Melanesia at the time of European contact – and explicitly cites cases in the Islands of New Britain and Bougainville, where the survey and interviews for this research took place. Interestingly, in the interviews, some people suggested that violent payback was not ‘traditional custom’ but rather one that was imported by outsiders and outside influences and that homicide through the use of sorcery was their traditional form of payback.

⁸ In Papua New Guinea it is not uncommon to flee an accident in an effort to avoid payback. The intent is to lay low for a while until heads cool a little, and then begin negotiations concerning a compensation payment.

⁹ Dollars are in U.S. dollars.

compensation demands, help from an extended kinship network is necessary for payment.¹⁰

Usually, the families of the wronged and wrongdoer will come together and agree on a settlement, but sometimes a sum is simply demanded. Whether the wrong has been punished through payback or a compensation payment, it is usual for both parties to come together in a ceremonial state to signal the restoration of peaceful relations.

During the colonial period the vast majority of the population, apart from those living in or immediately around towns, continued to settle disputes and punish wrongs with custom with little or no interference from the colonial authorities or with tacit consent from the local administrative officials. These arrangements, described by Weisbrot (1982: 66) as a situation where the state criminal law ‘was effectively reserved for European residents’, continued up until the mid-1960s. However, in response to an influential report by Derham (1960), there was a change in policy that aimed to see the transplanted criminal law rolled out to the entire population, primarily in an effort to reach convergence between custom and the state criminal law.¹¹ The Independent State of Papua New Guinea has continued these efforts, but with varying degrees of diligence and enthusiasm.

3. OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

This paper presents data on views associated with the legitimacy of payback killings, and not data on *actual* payback killings.¹² It is acknowledged that there may be a significant

¹⁰100,000 Kina equates to approximately 30 times annual average income.

¹¹ One important official concession made by the outgoing colonial government that continues today was the establishment of Village Courts which only have (official) jurisdiction over relatively minor matters.

¹² No such data exists, and due to the high likelihood of reporting bias, it would be difficult to collect.

Obviously reported court data would be biased as regions with a higher level of police and court presence would be expected to have higher rates of detection.

divergence between views and practice. However, following Hart (1997), it is asserted that the internal viewpoint plays a crucial role in influencing compliance with the law.

The empirical research took place from October to December 2010 in urban and remote rural areas in the provinces of East New Britain, West New Britain and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville – 5 urban sites and 6 rural sites. Data was collected via a survey questionnaire in both English and *Pisin* (the survey). In total, 200 questionnaire responses were collected; 23 from the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, 115 from East New Britain and 62 from West New Britain. All possible efforts were taken to avoid sampling bias.¹³ Of those asked to participate in the survey, approximately 36 per cent refused.¹⁴

4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

¹³ The sampling took place in six remote villages and each of the three urban capitals, and two former capitals of the three provinces visited. The sampling method used in both urban areas and remote villages was aimed at gaining a cross section of the community, given a lack of residency records and given that a stranger entering some communities uninvited (both urban and rural) carries a significant risk to personal safety including guides and translators. In towns and villages, the aim was to have a respondent from every third residence encountered, however in some villages and urban communities we were guided by local officials or relied on kinship networks. While the need for a random sample was stressed, and appreciated, the sampling method was not strictly randomised. In order to gain a representative cross section of the community, household sampling was supplemented by sampling at marketplaces in towns and village stores in rural villages. For consistency with the market samples, there were no follow-ups with the household samples. The realities of conducting empirical research in Papua New Guinea make large scale random sampling difficult– indeed for the 2000 census of Papua New Guinea, census data for the New Guinea Islands was estimated rather than actually collected (see Turner 2006).

¹⁴ This rate is based on the recorded refusal rates for East New Britain and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. Refusals for West New Britain were incomplete; however the refusal rate for those recorded was in line with this ratio.

The dataset from the survey allows examination of whether there is a relationship between the customary norm of payback with direct legislative means (proximity to the state criminal law) and indirect means (education). Importantly the survey data allows analysis of these factors to be undertaken while controlling for a range of other factors that could influence the response, including province, sex income, age, type of employment, and whether the respondent had been a victim of a crime. Table 1 below provides a list of the variables and definitions.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

In order to gather information on attitudes toward the customary norm of payback, two vignettes involving a homicide were read out to respondents - one accidental and the other deliberate. Then in randomised order, the respondents were presented with various potential responses of the deceased's family and asked if they agreed or disagreed with each of them. The potential responses included the exercise of a payback killing, going to the police, seeking a compensation payment, and doing nothing. The respondents were also presented with a scenario where a payback killing had occurred and were asked if they agreed or disagreed with various state responses - life imprisonment, a reduced sentence, and no imprisonment.¹⁵ The vignettes and the responses are available from the author.

¹⁵ Obviously this is not the same as asking if the respondent agrees with payback. Indeed, while someone may strongly disagree with payback, they may still consider that the state should treat it more leniently for a variety of reasons – including customary considerations and notions of justice. Also, the respondent may simply disagree with imprisonment *per se*, and prefer customary settlements or ‘turning the other cheek’. Despite these factors, this question should provide some indication concerning the internalisation of the transplanted criminal law.

Overall, 36 per cent of respondents agreed with the use of payback killings in one or both of the scenarios. For an accidental death, 15 percent of respondents agreed while 29 per cent agreed in the case of a deliberate killing. It is also noteworthy that of those who agreed with the use of payback, slightly more agreed with killing a member of the offender's family rather than the actual offender. These responses highlight the fact that the 'traditional' customary norms of strict liability and group liability still hold some currency in Papua New Guinea.¹⁶

In relation to the appropriate state punishment that should be applied to a payback killing, while 42 per cent of respondents agreed with life imprisonment (the standard headline sentence for wilful homicide in Papua New Guinea), the majority (58 per cent) considered that the sentence should be reduced; comprising 38 per cent of respondents who agreed with a reduced sentence, and a further 20 per cent who agreed that there should be no prison sentence at all. The summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables are presented in Table 2 below.¹⁷

[Insert Table 2 here]

5. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION

¹⁶ Only 12 per cent of respondents agreed with taking no further action under the accidental killing scenario.

Numerous authors such as Narokobi (1993), Weisbrot (1982) and Strathern (1993) who have written on Papua New Guinea have highlighted the principles of payback, compensation, group liability and strict liability.

¹⁷ Despite the randomisation techniques employed, the dataset contains a higher proportion of male respondents to female respondents, representing the heightened gender differences in Papua New Guinea compared to many other societies. This is for one main reason; women approached for the questionnaire were more likely to refer it to a male family member. This response rate is consistent with other randomised surveys in Papua New Guinea such as Egan *et al* (1995) which had 72 per cent male and 28 per cent female respondents.

The relationship between agreeing with the customary norm of payback and a range of other variables is estimated using a maximum likelihood probit regression, where agreeing with the use of payback is represented by 1 and disagreeing is represented by 0. Conscious of the potential for multicollinearity, seven equations are presented below¹⁸. The correlation coefficient between the variables *Urban* and *Distance Pol* is -0.89, which is not surprising given that the police in Papua New Guinea are solely based in the town centres and usually require those who seek their assistance to go to town. In addition, the two pairs of variables *Crime Victim* and *Violent Crime*, and *Income* and *Formal* are also highly correlated, with respective coefficients of 0.65 and 0.59. Therefore, each of seven equations omit each of these variables, with the variable *Urban* being included more often due to the higher number of recorded observations.

[Insert Table 3: Agree with the use of Payback]

First, these results show that male respondents are more likely to agree with the use of payback suggesting they may have more retributive or violent tendencies. They also show that the provincial dummies are significant in many of the equations, underscoring the heterogeneity even in the Islands Region of Papua New Guinea. However, the most important result of this analysis is that those respondents that have greatest access to the state criminal law are more likely to agree with the use of payback. As can be seen, the variable

¹⁸ While not presented in tabular form, the results for those who agree with payback killings for an accidental death versus for a deliberate killing are similar to those presented below. The only significant difference is that in relation to an accidental killing which is a small proportion of the population, the ability to speak English is no longer statistically significant.

Urban is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level with a positive sign, suggesting that even when controlling for other observed variables urban residents are still more likely to agree to the use of payback.¹⁹ In Equation 1 all observed variables are included in the equation, which also includes *Distance Pol* which is not statistically significant. However, when *Urban* is removed from the estimated equation, *Distance Pol* is highly significant and the coefficient has changed sign, suggesting that multicollinearity was present in Equation 1. In Equation 2 the variable *Distance Pol* is both significant and negative providing a further indication that the further the respondent is from a police station the less likely they are to agree with the use of payback.

Overall these results suggest that there is no positive relationship between access and proximity of the state criminal law and the internalisation of state legal norms. Indeed, these results suggest that respondents are *more* likely to agree with the customary norm of payback when they are closer to, and have greater access to the state criminal law. Given that these results control for a range of observed variables that may influence this choice, they suggest *divergence* between the customary norms and the state law in terms of proximity and access.

It is suggested that these results may reflect another important customary norm which may explain urban and rural residents having differing attitudes to payback– the importance of kinship ties. The survey also found urban areas to be more ethnically heterogeneous than rural areas suggesting those who live in urban areas may be more likely to agree with payback due to the concept of the *sliding scale of justice* based on kinship ties as outlined by Lawrence (1965). This sees lighter, mostly non-violent punishments imposed on those who have closer social proximity while heavier, and often violent, sanctions are imposed on those with greater social distance. That is, despite payback being acknowledged as a legitimate

¹⁹ The variable urban is defined as those who live in towns or in villages that immediately surround them.

traditional punishment, it is usually reserved for outsiders of the *wontok* group. Therefore, the imposition of heavier and more violent customary punishments in ethnically fractionalised settings in Papua New Guinea –the urban areas – would be expected. These results suggest that if there is norm convergence taking place due to access to the state legal system, it is outweighed by other factors. It is suggested here that this is due to kinship considerations, however other factors such as potentially higher rates of homicide in urban areas or even the possibility that urban residents are somehow more inclined to violence cannot be ruled out. In summary, however, these results suggest that respondents in urban areas are more likely than their rural counterparts to agree with violent customary norms despite a higher level of access and degree of criminal law enforcement. This suggests that the potential for conflict between the two institutional frameworks is highest where they are more likely to interact with one another.

While the research found no evidence of customary norms converging through geographical proximity to the state criminal system, there *was* evidence of transmission of norms through other means. In each of the estimated equations above, increased schooling or tertiary education does not have any statistical relationship with a respondent's decision to agree with the use of payback killing. This suggests that the quantity of education *per se* does not affect the transmission of this transplanted norm. However, in all of the equations the variable *English* is significant and negative, suggesting that those who speak English are less likely to agree with payback killings. Among other things, the ability to speak English in Papua New Guinea is both a function of education and effort. The variable *Formal* (representing formal employment) is also significant and negative in the first three estimated equations, suggesting that those who work in formal employment are also less likely to agree with payback killings. It must be remembered that the bulk of formal employment in the survey area is either government or foreign business employment.

Attitudes towards payback and how these are transmitted may also be gained from views on the criminal penalty for such activity. It could be argued that respondents who consider that payback should be punished by life imprisonment have fully adopted the norms associated with the transplanted state legal order.²⁰ In this respect, these results provide a test of robustness of the previous results, however, it must be stressed that agreeing or disagreeing with payback is different from agreeing or with state penalties for such activity. For instance, one may disagree with cocaine use but also disagree with state penalties for such activity. All the same, estimations are broadly consistent with the results above. They do not provide any evidence for convergence based on geographic proximity while they do support convergence through education.

As can be seen in Table 4, the variable capturing proximity to the criminal justice system *Urban* is statistically insignificant, suggesting that once controlling for other factors, respondents are equally as likely to agree with life imprisonment for the perpetrator of a payback killing irrespective of whether they live in an urban or rural environment, again, providing no evidence of legal convergence based on proximity.²¹ These results also may suggest that kinship ties, rather than geographic proximity, are a key factor explaining views

²⁰ The other predictor of those respondents who have internalised transplanted norms in regard to criminal law is agreement that no sanction should be attached to an accidental killing. This equation was estimated. However, only a small portion (12 per cent) agreed that this outcome and both variables *Other Prov* and *WNB* predicted failure perfectly and were therefore dropped from the estimated equation. The estimated equation with these variables excluded was not statistically significant and therefore it is not presented. However it produced broadly similar results, most importantly with *schooling* remaining significant at the 10 per cent level. In addition, the variable *urban* was statistically significant and negative while *age* was no longer significant.

²¹ Note, for expositional ease the estimated equations for this variable are only reported in terms of the variable *Urban* and the variable *Distance Pol*, while producing similar results, is not reported.

on payback.²² This is so as variable *Other Prov* is positive and statistically significant suggesting those who come from other provinces are more likely to agree with life imprisonment for a payback killing. While this could suggest regional differences in customary norms across regions, it could also be picking up the importance kinship ties: as these respondents are ‘outsiders’ and are likely to have smaller kinship networks and therefore be more vulnerable to violent retribution and more reliant on the state criminal law as a form of redress. As above, again there is evidence of norm transmission through education as the variable *Schooling* is both significant and positive, suggesting those with higher levels of schooling are more likely to agree with heavy criminal punishments for those who engage in payback killings.

[Insert Table 4]

6. CONCLUSION

These research findings suggest that customary norms, even when in direct opposition to the state’s criminal justice system, can survive for considerable periods of time. They raise the possibility that such norms can persist indefinitely if policy makers were to rely solely on

²² The results in relation to suitable state punishment taken in conjunction with those above on whether the respondent agrees with payback suggest that while rural respondents are less likely to agree with payback, they are no more likely to agree with hefty state punishments than urban residents. It is argued here that this is due to kinship considerations. If the variable *Urban* is capturing effect of the lack of kinship rather than the effects of proximity to the criminal justice system (that is, if kinship considerations are dominating proximity), it would be expected to be negative in terms of agreeing with the use of payback and potentially insignificant in terms of state punishment. That is, while rural respondents are less likely to agree with payback due to kinship considerations, there is no clear reason why kinship considerations should affect attitudes toward the criminal punishment for payback once it has occurred.

legal means. For over one third of survey respondents, payback remains a legitimate form of punishment despite it having been illegal since the New Guinea Islands were first colonised more than 130 years ago.

The main purpose of this paper was to illuminate how norms that are contrary to the transplanted criminal law persist and how they may be altered. In particular, the survey data allows us to gain some insight into legal and non-legal transmission mechanisms.

The results show no evidence of norm transmission through the criminal law. That is, there is no evidence of a complementary relationship between a respondent's proximity to police and a rejection of the customary norm of payback. In fact, there is evidence of an opposite relationship; those respondents living in urban areas are more likely to agree with the use of payback than those respondents in rural areas. While the survey provides data on *attitudes* toward payback, and not *actual* cases, it does suggest that the inclination to commit a payback killing is higher in urban environments. This raises the possibility that urban instances of payback, which are more easily observable and therefore attract more publicity, might actually be the iceberg, rather than the tip. These results challenge the perception of some that the practice of custom in rural areas (which for the most part is unobservable) is more likely to be inconsistent with basic individual human rights than practice of custom in urban areas.

Perhaps most worryingly for Papua New Guinea, these results suggest that where contrary customary norms are most prevalent is also where the state criminal law has the highest level of enforcement activity. This suggests that the potential for conflict is highest where the degree of legal pluralism is highest - in urban environments. This is in contrast to rural areas surveyed, which have near-zero levels of state law enforcement, but have customary norms (at least in relation to payback) that are more consistent with the state criminal law.

Importantly, it must be remembered that in terms of norm transmission it is not possible to determine causality through statistical association. Agreeing with payback and proximity to the state criminal justice system is likely to be endogenous, due to unobserved characteristics and the importance of a sliding scale of justice based on kinship relations. The importance of kinship relations means that what is considered a legitimate punishment depends on the social distance of the two parties. Where kinship ties are close, which is more likely in rural areas than in urban areas, the punishment will be lighter and non-violent, even for grave wrongs such as homicide. Where one is less likely to interact with kin, for example in urban areas, there may be a greater disposition to agree with the use of payback.

Finally, and perhaps most important for policy purposes, these results provide some evidence of a positive relationship between education and attitudes toward payback. In particular, the ability to speak English was significant and negative in agreeing with the use of payback while higher levels of schooling were associated with agreeing with high state penalties for payback killings. Perhaps the most intriguing observed variable in the dataset is *English*. Despite being one of Papua New Guinea's three official languages, it is most people's third language, behind their local language, and *Pisin*, the *lingua franca* of the New Guinea Islands and much of Papua New Guinea. English is generally only spoken in formal education and some government and formal business activities. This seems to suggest that this variable is potentially capturing quality of education or internal disposition toward western norms and is an area for further research. However, the current findings, as qualified as they are, do provide some support for the use of education over punitive legal means to reduce the incidence of violent customary practices. This is particularly relevant for Papua New Guinea as World Bank (2013) suggests that primary school enrolment rates have been trending downward since the late 1990s.

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Table 1: List and Description of Variables

Variable	Description
Dependent Variables	
Payback	Respondent agreed with the use of payback killing to sanction either an accidental or deliberate killing: Yes = 1, No = 0.
Life	Respondent agreed with life imprisonment for payback killer: Yes = 1, No = 0
Personal Characteristics	
Male	Sex of respondent: Male = 1, Female = 0.
Age	Age of respondent measured in years from birth.
Schooling	Years of schooling of respondent.
Tertiary	Tertiary education of respondent including university and college (e.g. teacher's college, school of public administration); Yes = 1, No = 0.
English	Respondent could speak English; Yes = 1, No = 0
Formal Employment	Respondent in formal full time employment; Yes = 1, No = 0.
Student	Respondent is currently a student; Yes = 1, No = 0.
Income	Measured in three income bands per annum: 1 = low income (<K5,000 (\$2,000)), 2 = middle income (K5,000 (\$2,000) – K20,000(\$8,000)), 3 = high income (>K20,000 (\$8,000))
Other Province	Respondent comes from another province (i.e. internal immigrant): Yes = 1, No = 0.
Crime Victim	Respondent reported being a victim of crime within the last 5 years: Yes = 1, No = 0.
Violent Crime	Respondent reported being a victim of violent crime within the last 5 years: Yes = 1, No = 0.
Geographic Variables	
Urban	Respondent resides in urban area or town or village or settlement immediately surrounding the town: Yes = 1, No = 0.
Distance Pol	Motorised time to police station (measured in hours)
ARB	Respondent surveyed in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville: Yes = 1, No = 0
WNB	Respondent surveyed in West New Britain: Yes = 1, No = 0.

Table 2: Summary Statistics

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables of Interest					
Agree	195	0.358974	0.4809344	0	1
Life	170	0.423529	0.4955774	0	1
Personal Characteristics					
Male	196	0.729592	0.4453081	0	1
Age	196	34.58673	12.86648	16	68
Schooling	179	8.960894	2.397009	1	12
Tertiary	200	0.205	0.4047147	0	1
English	196	0.5	0.5012804	0	1
Formal (Employment)	199	0.256281	0.4376801	0	1
Student	199	0.080402	0.2726003	0	1
Income	199	1.231156	0.5093412	1	3
Other Province	199	0.085427	0.2802212	0	1
Crime Victim	200	0.215	0.4118533	0	1
Violent Crime	200	0.105	0.3073227	0	1
Geographical Variables					
Urban	200	0.685	0.4656815	0	1
Distance Pol	152	1.395395	1.808565	0	6
ARB	200	0.115	0.3198225	0	1
WNB	200	0.31	0.4636538	0	1

Table 3: Agree with the Use of Payback

VARIABLES	(1) Payback	(2) Payback	(3) Payback	(4) Payback	(5) Payback	(6) Payback	(7) Payback
Urban	2.321*** (0.864)		1.505*** (0.383)	1.452*** (0.366)	1.423*** (0.349)	1.452*** (0.366)	
DistancePol	0.195 (0.185)	-0.236*** (0.0883)					-0.222*** (0.0844)
Male	0.957*** (0.274)	1.034*** (0.268)	0.884*** (0.253)	0.885*** (0.250)	0.812*** (0.248)	0.885*** (0.250)	1.007*** (0.262)
Age	-0.00629 (0.0124)	-0.00261 (0.0120)	-0.00345 (0.0118)	-0.00151 (0.0116)	-0.00183 (0.0116)	-0.00151 (0.0116)	0.000260 (0.0117)
Schooling	-0.0461 (0.0673)	-0.0286 (0.0662)	0.0259 (0.0614)	0.0290 (0.0603)	0.0272 (0.0613)	0.0290 (0.0603)	-0.0227 (0.0655)
Tertiary	-0.00430 (0.371)	-0.0205 (0.365)	-0.117 (0.357)	-0.0682 (0.360)	-0.272 (0.356)	-0.0682 (0.360)	0.0315 (0.370)
Income	0.459 (0.304)	0.414 (0.310)	0.277 (0.292)		-0.00359 (0.250)		
Formal	-0.830** (0.380)	-0.743** (0.376)	-0.595* (0.356)	-0.401 (0.300)		-0.401 (0.300)	-0.436 (0.313)
Student	0.518 (0.461)	0.605 (0.454)	0.0754 (0.398)	0.124 (0.391)	0.227 (0.387)	0.124 (0.391)	0.634 (0.454)
English	-0.554* (0.308)	-0.631** (0.302)	-0.646** (0.290)	-0.649** (0.288)	-0.647** (0.291)	-0.649** (0.288)	-0.620** (0.303)
CrimeVictim	-0.211 (0.452)	-0.211 (0.443)	0.139 (0.419)	0.114 (0.287)	0.0740 (0.295)	0.114 (0.287)	-0.0785 (0.304)
ViolentCrime	0.0770 (0.587)	-0.00876 (0.574)	-0.138 (0.519)				
OtherProv	0.370 (0.487)	0.530 (0.475)	-0.0744 (0.404)	-0.0980 (0.414)	-0.0897 (0.421)	-0.0980 (0.414)	0.503 (0.484)
ARB	-0.524 (0.377)	-0.663* (0.388)	-0.613* (0.362)	-0.485 (0.335)	-0.510 (0.349)	-0.485 (0.335)	-0.473 (0.363)
WNB	0.143 (0.388)	0.168 (0.388)	-0.549* (0.297)	-0.556* (0.296)	-0.570* (0.297)	-0.556* (0.296)	0.161 (0.388)
Constant	-2.449** (1.120)	-0.182 (0.743)	-1.895** (0.813)	-1.677** (0.790)	-1.634** (0.800)	-1.677** (0.790)	0.0591 (0.727)
Observations	139	139	162	162	162	162	139
Prob > chi2	0.0006	0.0013	0.0008	0.0002	0.0001	0.0002	0.001
Pseudo R2	0.2289	0.1972	0.2355	0.2317	0.2234	0.2312	0.1891

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Life Imprisonment for Payback Killings

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	Life	Life	Life
Urban	0.441 (0.290)	0.443 (0.290)	0.433 (0.288)
Male	0.392 (0.261)	0.389 (0.257)	0.391 (0.256)
Age	0.0247** (0.0119)	0.0245** (0.0118)	0.0245** (0.0119)
Schooling	0.139** (0.0655)	0.139** (0.0656)	0.143** (0.0640)
Tertiary	-0.0265 (0.378)	-0.0341 (0.363)	-0.0269 (0.365)
Income	-0.0240 (0.317)		
Formal	0.0540 (0.331)	0.0418 (0.299)	0.0495 (0.297)
Student	0.124 (0.460)	0.120 (0.457)	0.128 (0.455)
English	-0.0765 (0.290)	-0.0746 (0.288)	-0.0902 (0.285)
CrimeVictim	0.263 (0.508)	0.256 (0.503)	0.0967 (0.326)
ViolentCrime	-0.286 (0.591)	-0.285 (0.592)	
OtherProv	0.814** (0.357)	0.815** (0.358)	0.789** (0.358)
ARB	0.434 (0.391)	0.426 (0.358)	0.403 (0.353)
WNB	-0.949*** (0.348)	-0.946*** (0.348)	-0.932*** (0.346)
Constant	-2.664*** (0.882)	-2.681*** (0.844)	-2.707*** (0.842)
Observations	147	147	147
Prob > chi2	0.0033	0.002	0.0013
Pseudo R2	0.1859	0.1859	0.1846

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, *** p<0.05, * p<0.1

